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 Three months before his death, Benjamin Franklin stepped into the public 
spotlight for the final time. Although he had once published ads for runaway slaves, and 
had even owned a slave couple himself, beginning in the 1750s Franklin had gradually 
turned against the institution. As president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the 
Abolition of Slavery, Franklin presented a formal petition to Congress in February 1790, 
denouncing both the slave trade and slavery itself. “Mankind are all formed by thesame 
Almighty Being,” it declared, “alike objects of his care, and equally design d for the 
enjoyment of happiness.” Therefore, Congress had a solemn duty to grant liberty “to 
those unhappy men who alone in this land of freedom are degraded into perpetual 
bondage.”1  
 Only fourteen years had passed since Americans had announced to the world that 
“all men are created equal.” Franklin’s reputation as an architect of that revolution was 
second only to George Washington’s. Nevertheless, southern congressmen displayed 
unveiled contempt for Franklin and his petition. Senator Pierce Butler of South Carolina 
castigated the society’s plan as a willful violation of the Constitution. In the House, 
James Jackson of Georgia and William Loughton Smith of South Carolina suggested that 
the eighty-four-year-old Franklin was no longer in his right mind. Jackson was 
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particularly vehement in his defense of slavery, insisting on the floor of the House that 
the institution was divinely sanctioned and economically vital to the southern economy.2   
 As he had done in the past, Franklin decided to take his case to the public in the 
form of an anonymous parody. On March 23, 1790, a public letter appeared in the 
Federal Gazette under the signature “Historicus.” In a disinterested tone, Franklin 
observed that Jackson’s speech in Congress bore a striking resemblance to a speech
delivered a hundred years earlier by Sidi Mehemet Ibrahim, a member of the Divan of 
Algiers, in response to a petition condemning the enslavement of European Christians. 
Assuming that Jackson had never read this speech, Franklin could not help but note “that 
men’s interests and intellects operate and are operated on with surprising similarity in all 
countries and climates, whenever they are under similar circumstances.”3   
Indeed, “the African’s” rationales for white slavery clearly presagd those 
invoked by Jackson and other southerners in favor of black slavery: “If we forbear to 
make slaves of their people, who in this hot climate are to cultivate our lands? And is 
there not more compassion and favor due to us as Mussulmen than to these Christian 
dogs?”   
Who is to indemnify the masters for their loss? . . .  And if we set our slaves free, 
what is to be done with them? . . . Must we maintain them as beggars in our 
streets, or suffer our properties to be the prey of their pillage? For men 
accustomed to slavery will not work for a livelihood when not compelled. And 
what is there so pitiable in their present condition? Were they not slaves in their 
own countries? They have only exchanged one slavery for another and I may say 
a better; for here they are brought into a land where the sun of Islamism gives 
forth its light, and shines in full splendor, and they have an opportunity of making 
themselves acquainted with the true doctrine, and thereby saving their immortal 
souls. [They are] too ignorant to establish a good government. While serving us, 
we take care to provide them with everything, and they are treated with humanity. 
The laborers in their own country are, as I am well informed, worse fed, lodged, 




As for those “religious mad bigots” with their “silly petitions,” it was pure foolishness to 
argue that slavery was “disallowed by the Alcoran!” Were not the two prece ts “Masters, 
treat your slaves with kindness; Slaves, serve your masters with cheerfulness and 
fidelity” ample evidence to the contrary? It was well known, explained the African, that 
God had given the world “to his faithful Mussulmen, who are to enjoy it of right as fast 
as they conquer it.”4 
 The stability and happiness of the nation could not be sacrificed simply to appease 
the demands of a few fanatics. Such was the determination of the Divan of Algiers, 
which, according to Franklin, rejected the antislavery memorial. Following suit, Congress 
announced that it lacked the authority to act on Franklin’s petition.5    
Franklin did not live to see the cotton boom and the consequent entrenchment of 
slavery in southern life. Little did he know that Congressman Jackson’s proslavery 
apology would become commonplace in the South during the first half of the nineteenth-
century. Nevertheless, Franklin’s last public letter anticipated an important, and 




 The thesis of this dissertation is that northerners feared slavery, in part, bec use 
the rationales for black slavery were inherently subjective and therefore posed a threat to 
the liberty of all Americans, irrespective of color. Southerners invoked five interrelated 
rationales in their defense of African servitude: race, moral and mental inferiority, the 
good of the slave, the good of society, and the lessons of history. Yet many of these 
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rationales had been used in the past (as Franklin illustrated), and could be used in the 
future, to oppress people of any race. Northerners often expressed concern that p oslavery 
arguments were subject to the transient prejudices and economic motives of those who 
invoked them. Anyone could fall victim to the argument that they were “inferior,” that 
they would be better off enslaved, that they posed a threat to society, or that their 
subjugation was justified by history and religion. Preparing for his debates with Stephen 
A. Douglas in 1858, Abraham Lincoln wrote a neatly synthesized passage that 
highlighted the dangerous arbitrariness of proslavery justifications: 
     If A can prove, however conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave B—why 
may not B snatch the same argument, and prove equally, that he may enslave A? 
     You say A is white, and B is black. It is color, then; the lighter having the right 
to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man 
you meet, with a fairer skin than your own. 
     You do not mean color exactly?—You mean the whites are intellectually the 
superiors of the blacks, and, therefore have the right to enslave them? Take care 
again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet, with an intellect 
superior to your own. 
     But, say you, it is a question of interest; and, if you can make it your interest, 
you have the right to enslave another. Very well. And if he can make it his 
interest, he has the right to enslave you.6 
 
Two conclusions flowed from this recognition. First, many northerners 
understood that the perpetuation of slavery, and its attendant rationales, made their own 
liberty, indeed everyone’s liberty, contingent on circumstance—namely, the ability to 
defend oneself against those who would seek to subjugate. Freedom would depend on an 
individual’s economic status, the prejudices of the majority, or the caprice of an 
aristocracy. They therefore held that the only effective safeguard of individual liberty was 
universal liberty, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. As long as Americans 
believed that “all men” were endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness, everyone’s liberty would be self-evident, regardless of 
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circumstance. Each person’s liberty would be respected simply by virtue of his r her 
status as a human being. Conversely, the justifications that were invoked to exclude a 
segment of society from the rights of man destroyed the self-evidence of those rights. 
They could be used to exclude any other segment of society. (This was the problem with 
popular sovereignty. Tolerating slavery’s expansion logically implied that slavery was 
not wrong. Consequently, its advocates were compelled to reject or qualify the 
Declaration of Independence.) By failing to repudiate slavery, Americans necessarily 
rejected the universality of human liberty, thus exposing themselves to the same 
proslavery rationales, especially when they happened to occupy a position of political, 
social, or economic vulnerability.  
Second, the capriciousness of these rationales, which was confirmed by historical 
evidence, proved that American slavery was simply another example of “might makes 
right.” Like other forms of tyranny, it was determined by the desire and ability of the 
strong to oppress the weak. As a result, even through the lens of bigotry, white 
northerners could look upon the slaves’ condition and wonder if a similar fate could ever 
befall them. Black skin had been stigmatized as a badge of servitude, yet there was 
nothing to guarantee that white skin would always serve as an unimpeachable badge of 
freedom. 
It is incumbent upon anyone offering a new interpretation of the Civil War’s 
causes to demonstrate that previous authors have missed a vital component of the 
sectional conflict. Such an explanation may seem hubristic given the staggering number 
of books and articles historians have dedicated to the topic. These historians are typiclly
divided into two camps: fundamentalists and revisionists. Fundamentalists argue that th
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institution of African slavery generated irreconcilable differences between northerners 
and southerners, differences that ultimately destroyed the intersectional political system 
and plunged the nation into war. Revisionists, on the other hand, emphasize contingency 
over fundamental forces and argue that the conflict over slavery was potentially 
reconcilable. They attribute the war to the collapse of the Second Party System, which, 
they contend, was caused primarily by factors unrelated to slavery (ethnocultural issues 
or political consensus), yet paved the way for sectional fanaticism. In the subsequent 
realignment, self-aggrandizing politicians had the opportunity and the motivation to 
exacerbate the slavery issue for political gain.  
Indeed, one cannot deny the argument made by James G. Randall, and later by 
Michael F. Holt, that political demagogues inflamed popular fears in both the North and 
the South.7 Charles W. Ramsdell also made a compelling case that climate would have 
rendered the conflict moot by barring the extension of slavery into the West—although 
his dismissal of slavery’s possible expansion into Mexico and Central America is far less 
convincing.8 And while historians became increasingly critical of the “needless war” 
theory after 1945, it is quite clear that revisionism did not die out, contrary to Gabor 
Boritt’s recent claim. In fact, Boritt himself highlights the importance of contingency, 
placing significant blame for the war’s outbreak on Lincoln and his fellow Republicans, 
who, in his view, tragically underestimated the depth of southerners’ disaffection. 
William Gienapp is particularly explicit in his insistence that the development of the 
Republican Party, which he deems the most crucial link in the chain of events leading to 
war, was far from inevitable. In the same vein, Joel Silbey has placed much of the onus 
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for the sectional crisis on Calhoun’s proslavery agenda during the campaign for Texas 
annexation.9  
But to call the war “needless” or irrational because the fears expressed by 
northerners and southerners seem unreasonable, or because they hinged on avoidable 
events, is to miss an important point. Questions of judgment and contingency (the 
interminable “what ifs” of history) can always be used to demonstrate that particular 
developments were not inevitable. The historian’s purpose is to explain what made 
events—in this case the Civil War—possible. Even if one can argue that slavery would 
have died a natural death, many northerners clearly believed that it endangered their way 
of life. As Pieter Geyl suggested in 1951, it is improper for historians to separat 
fundamental and “artificial” causes on the basis of their own sense of rationality.10 Using 
the benefit of hindsight to dismiss northern fears as irrational, and therefore as 
illegitimate, ignores history’s value as a means of understanding human motivations.  
 The other problem with revisionist histories that reject a fundamental conflict 
between North and South is the clear implication that slavery was a moribund institution 
that posed little or no threat to the future of the United States. In my view, the institution 
was worth far too much to the South, both monetarily and socially, to be easily given up. 
And from a northern perspective, the consequences of its continuation posed a clear 
threat to the economic prospects and, as I will argue, the fundamental liberty of all 
Americans.  
 Despite the survival of revisionism, since in the 1960s, most historians have 
embraced the fundamentalist position. With the publication of Eric Foner’s Free Soil, 
Free Labor, Free Men in 1970, a socioeconomic interpretation has won widespread 
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acceptance. I stand quite convinced of the validity of Foner’s argument that many 
northerners opposed the spread of slavery because it inhibited upward social mobility by 
stigmatizing labor and, consequently, threatening their access to the West, which served 
as a safety valve for the growing population of white laborers. (Given that the vast 
majority of northerners were just as racist as their southern counterparts, interpretations 
of the antislavery movement that stress northern self-interest are the most convincing.) In 
addition, James L. Huston has argued that the emergence of a national market threatened 
to put northern workers and southern slaves into direct competition, thus depressing 
northern wages and further stultifying social progress.11 It seems to me that the primary 
weakness of the economic interpretation (which I will attempt to address) is that it fails to 
differentiate Republicans from northern Democrats. There is no reason to believe that the 
latter were any less devoted to the free labor ideology, yet they were willing to accept the 
possible expansion and indefinite continuation of American slavery.  
 Other historians have pointed to the specter of a Slave Power conspiracy against 
northern liberties. The Slave Power has been a prominent theme in Kansas studies, 
particularly Nicole Etcheson’s recent book. This is hardly surprising considering that 
northern settlers, facing hostile Missourians and an illegitimate legislature, described 
their condition as “white slavery.” Bill Cecil-Fronsman’s 1997 article “Advocate the 
Freedom of White Men, as Well as that of Negroes” accurately describes the principal 
concern of many free-soil Kansans. Leonard Richards has also demonstrated that 
southern political power was a major concern to northerners on a national level, primarily 
in respect to the Three-fifths Clause, southern parity in the Senate, and the complicity of 
northern “doughfaces.” Yet while these historians offer convincing accounts f the Slave 
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Power’s strength, they say little about the specific reasons northerners feared that 
power.12  
 The fear of “white slavery” I hope to clarify here is distinct from, although clearly 
related to, the northern fear of both southern political power and the socioeconomic 
consequences of black slavery. My purpose is to compliment these interpretations by 
showing what northerners believed could happen to their liberties if they were forced into 
a condition of economic or political weakness. Northerners feared slavery because it 
would leave them impoverished and potentially disfranchised. In so doing, it would also 
leave them vulnerable. In fact, poverty was a prominent theme in northerners’ reactions 
to proslavery rationales. Poverty, as a condition of weakness, was taken as a sign of 
inferiority. Southerners considered slavery a blessing because it protected people from 
poverty. And according to republican theory, which some southerners still echoed, the 
poor posed a threat to society as a whole. Northerners realized that none of these 
arguments was strictly racial in nature. They were applicable to whites as well as blacks.   
 Lincoln scholars have come closest to the argument that the rationales for slavery
were dangerously subjective and therefore a threat to the liberty of all Americans. 
Examining Lincoln’s concern with the vicissitudes of power and weakness, David Potter
recognized that it was only “random chance” that made the white man free and the black 
man a slave. According to Harry Jaffa, “there was no principle which justified enslaving 
Negroes which did not at the same time justify enslaving whites”—although he does not 
elaborate on what those principles may have been. Jaffa also points to Lincoln’s 
insistence that Americans had to stand dedicated to the principle of universal freedom, 
lest they become victims of proslavery justifications. In the same vein, David Zrefsky 
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has written that “slavery denied the rights of man and, in this very fundamental sense,
threatened the entire edifice of natural rights.” Therefore, the only protection for the 
liberties of whites “lay in recognizing that these liberties derived from their status as 
human beings and hence were shared by all other people, including blacks.”13 Stephen 
Oates highlights Lincoln’s belief that Democrats (both northern and southern) were 
attempting to overthrow the Declaration of Independence, thus transforming the United
States into “a despotism based on class rule and human servitude.” Similarly, Alan 
Guelzo observes that the Declaration became the rhetorical touchstone for Lincoln after 
the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The enslavement of blacks was a step aw y 
from the Declaration, he explains, and “a step toward the enslavement of everyone.” The 
problem with these statements is that no one adequately explains the process by which 
that step would or could be taken. In other words, they do not explicitly link the 
arbitrariness of proslavery rationales with the importance of universal freedom.14  
In respect to Lincoln’s opposition to Senator Douglas, Jaffa tends to emphasize 
the potential danger of unalloyed majority rule (inherent in Douglas’s conception of 
popular sovereignty) when minority rights are not secure. This is a compelling argument, 
but while the fear of majority tyranny was certainly implied in the antislavery resistance 
to popular sovereignty, northerners more commonly expressed their fear of the 
slaveholding minority and the potential degeneration of the United States into a despotic, 
or at least hierarchical, society. Lincoln believed popular sovereignty was insidious 
because it fostered national indifference to the future of slavery and thus undermined the 
principle of universal liberty. Robert Johannsen has correctly observed that Lincoln 
rejected popular sovereignty as a “sinister” doctrine that threatened the Declaration of 
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Independence. And as Don Fehrenbacher explained, Douglas debauched the public mind 
by placing freedom and slavery on “the same ethical level.”15 
In short, my interpretation of the antislavery movement has been touched upon by 
previous authors, but only in a tangential fashion. Historians have largely overlooked 
northerners’ belief that slavery eroded the edifice of a free society by teaching dangerous 
principles. In addition to its political and economic impact, the expansion of slavery 
perpetuated the notion that it was proper and morally right for some men to subjugate 
others. This interpretation is ideological, in that it seeks to explain antislavery values and 
fears, rather than social reality. As I will attempt to show, antislavery northerners often 
considered the principles that would be established, and the messages that would be 
conveyed, by their opponents’ policies, as well as their own. And they concluded that the 
messages and principles perpetuated by southerners and northern Democrats were 
inimical to the future of freedom in the United States.  
  
Taken for a Mulatto  
 
 Of the proslavery rationales mentioned here, the only one that has been 
specifically analyzed as a threat to whites is race. This is somewhat surprising, 
considering that white skin is generally assumed to have been the clearest badge of 
personal freedom. The stigmatization of black skin, going back to the 1550s, has been 
well described by Winthrop Jordan in his examination of the connotations Englishmen 
attached to black and white (which he attributes to their desire for negative refer nce 
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groups). These assumptions would continue to define “blackness” as a mark of sin and 
inferiority, and a consequent qualifier for bondage, throughout the antebellum period.16  
Nevertheless, a handful of historians, including Russel B. Nye, Carol Wilson, 
Calvin Wilson, Thomas D. Morris, and Lawrence R. Tenzer, have observed that, from a 
legal perspective, slavery was not entirely, or even primarily, based on race.17 Beginning 
with a Virginia statute of 1662, southerners determined slavery by the status of the 
mother. After several generations of white paternity, which was anything but uncommon, 
the result was a class of people who were white by all appearances, but legally h ld in 
bondage. Indeed, northerners were quite aware that people who appeared fully white 
labored as slaves in the South. They called attention to countless advertisements in 
southern newspapers in which masters described their absconded property as having 
“blue eyes, light flaxen hair,” and “skin disposed to freckle.” One such slaveowner 
candidly admitted that his slave was “so nearly white that it is believed a stranger would 
suppose there was no African blood in him.”18 With these descriptions in mind, a slightly 
waggish northerner wrote to a Kansas newspaper expressing a desire to settl in the new 
territory, but then complained he was “almost afraid to come, for should I happen to tan a 
little under your hot sun I might be taken for a mulatto.”19 
Many abolitionists began to argue that the common sight of these light-skinned 
slaves would put poor whites at risk for abduction and enslavement. Carol Wilson and 
Calvin Wilson effectively examine the northern assertion that white children, in both the 
South and the North, were being kidnapped and sold as the offspring of white slaves. 
Harriet Beecher Stowe dramatically expressed this fear in her Key to Uncle Tom’s Cabin: 
“When the mind once becomes familiarized with the process of slavery . . . and when 
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blue eyes and golden hair are advertised as properties of negroes—what protection will 
there be for poor white people, especially as under the present fugitive slave law they can 
be carried away without a jury trial?”20 
 Other northerners, both abolitionists and Republicans, concluded that the 
continuing effects of amalgamation were destroying race as the natural barrier between 
freemen and slaves, thus producing a willingness to impose bondage without so much as 
the pretext of an enslaved maternal line. Southern slavery embraced all complexi ns, 
noted a Wisconsin editor. He then warned that white skin was quickly supplanting black 
through the natural process of miscegenation, which would ultimately “obliterate all 
distinctions of color.” William Lloyd Garrison went even further in personalizing the 
danger to northern whites, reminding them that southerners actively sought light-skinned 
slaves, particularly women: “No person can say I am safe, my wife is safe, my mother or 
my child is safe; that complexion settles the question in America, that none but black 
people can be enslaved.” Similarly, in the fall of 1855 the Lib rator took note of two 
slave children purchased in the nation’s capital who, according to observers, possessed no 
visible trace of African blood. Garrison suggested that local photographers display their 
pictures in order to convince the public that southerners were willing to enslave “any 
child in the land” if it would serve their financial interests. Congressman James Ashley of 
Ohio also warned his constituents that “the bleaching process” of amalgamation and the 
consequent appearance of white-skinned slaves could produce a willingness to impose 
bondage without any regard to color or birth.21  
Yet as a rationale for bondage, race may be best described as a subjective 
manifestation of arbitrary characteristics. Even if each and every southern slave had been 
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clearly black, slavery was still a threat to the liberty of others because the  
characteristics could be attributed to people with little or no reference to their racial 
background. Indeed, “the social construction of race” has been a key interpretation in the 
works of Eric Williams, Oscar and Mary Handlin, Kenneth Stampp, Edmund Morgan, 
William McKee Evans, and Barbara Fields. Williams argued that race had nothing to do 
with the choice of Africans as a labor force. They were simply the most vulnerable, and 
hence the most economical. Racism developed later as the justification for an existing 
practice. It was therefore apparent, as Stampp explained in his study of the peculiar 
institution, that race has no real meaning of its own; “its meanings accrue from ideas the 
powerful attach to it.” 22  
 
Abolitionists and Republicans 
 
 The belief that proslavery rationales were dangerously subjective was expre sed 
by northerners across the antislavery spectrum. Consequently, the evidence I present in 
this study will come from political as well as abolitionist sources. Thatbeing said, it is 
not always a simple task to draw a clear line between the abolitionist and Republican 
versions of antislavery. The traditional view of abolitionists is that they were a small 
group of evangelical northerners who demanded immediate emancipation, denounced 
colonization and compensation for slaveowners, felt genuine sympathy for the plig t of 
the slave, and were morally opposed to the racial prejudice endemic in American society. 
Republicans, on the other hand, looked to the gradual emancipation of slavery (through 
territorial restriction), and opposed the institution because of its deleterious socio-
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economic impact. In reality, however, the dividing line was hazy at best. After 
antislavery developed into a political force in the 1840s and 1850s, the Republican Party 
could claim important leaders who, despite their support for gradual emancipation over 
immediatism, can be accurately designated as abolitionists, including Charles Sumner, 
Salmon Chase, and Owen Lovejoy.  
 Even if the typical abolitionist had a greater claim to morality than the typical 
Republican, morality is certainly not devoid of self-interest. The Golden Rule can asily 
be interpreted as a warning to individuals that the oppression of others opens the door to 
the possibility that they might be similarly oppressed. According to one evangelical paper 
published at the time of the Missouri crisis, if it was truly the duty of all men to do unto 
others as they would wish others to do unto them, slavery would come to an immediate 
end, “for no man is willing to become a slave himself,” or to see his children enslaved. 
Consequently, Stowe, Garrison, and other abolitionists were quick to warn white 
Americans that the slave’s lot could potentially become their own. As with Republicans, 
they feared that Americans no longer honored the ideals of the founding fathers. They 
warned that qualifying or rejecting universal liberty in order to justify black slavery 
would put people of all races at risk. Theodore Parker argued that the principles which 
allowed slavery in South Carolina would also establish it in New England. If Virginians 
could raise Africans for sale, he saw no reason why people could not raise Irishmen, 
Democrats, and Know-Nothings for sale in Massachusetts. “The bondage of a black man 
in Alexandria imperils every white woman’s daughter in Boston,” he explained. “You 
cannot escape the consequences of a first principle more than you can ‘take the leap of 
Niagara and stop half way down.’”23 Abolitionists and Republicans also made a point of 
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reminding northerners that the slavery of antiquity—which southerners were so fond of 
invoking—was primarily white slavery.  
 Because these arguments emphasized the potential threat to whites, rather than the
suffering of African slaves, they easily fit the free-labor platform and political purposes 
of the Republican Party. It is not surprising that many historians have charged 
Republicans with hypocrisy, given the fact that they failed to offer civil equality as a 
corollary of their condemnation of slavery. In fact many Republicans, particulaly in the 
Midwest, vehemently denied any intention or desire to introduce social or political 
equality between the races. And many believed, or certainly claimed to believe, that 
blacks were morally and intellectually inferior to whites. Yet at the same ti e, they 
would not deny the black man’s humanity. They would not embrace the fiction that 
slaves were simply another form of property, in the same category as pigs and cattle. In 
the final analysis, it was their common humanity that linked the black man’s fate to th  
rights of white men. Republicans were thus forced to balance their own prejudice—and 
that of their constituents—with their insistence that whites and blacks were members of 
the same human family. As a result, they consistently attempted to segregat natural 
rights from civil rights, maintaining that blacks were entitled to the former, but could be 
safely denied the latter. (Northern Democrats, on the other hand, insisted that the 
Republican platform would lead inexorably to political and social equality.) For 
Republicans, ultimate emancipation was as much a means to an end as an end in itself. In 
his second annual address to Congress in 1862, Lincoln argued that “in giving freedom to 
the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we 
preserve.” Yet given the prejudice of northern voters, most placed a greater emphasis on 
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the second half of that equation. Lyman Trumbull, Illinois’ first Republican senator, 
observed that southerners had just as much right to enslave a white man in Kansas as they 
did to hold a black man in the same condition. White skin was no protection. He therefore 
maintained that “it is not so much in reference to the welfare of the negro that we are
here.” Their goal was to protect the rights and dignity of laboring whites.24  
From a strictly political standpoint, Democrats spared no attempt to capitalize on 
northern prejudice by characterizing Republicans as racial egalitarians, while 
Republicans actively sought to portray Democrats as tools of the slave power and traitors 
to the nation’s founding principles. The declension of American freedom, marked by a 
failure to respect the ideal of universal liberty, became a significant line of attack against 
both northern and southern Democrats. Republican editors and politicians made a point 
of connecting them to a defense of slavery in the abstract, characterizing southern papers 
that lauded slavery as the “special organs” of James Buchanan and, occasionally, Stephen 
A. Douglas. These editorials would often carry sensational titles—“The Buchanan 
Democracy Hate Freedom”—while the Democratic Party was frequently disparaged as 
“the bogus Democracy” or “the party calling itself democratic.”  
Republicans would also frequently include a special message for foreign-born 
Americans, warning them that they would be the most susceptible to enslavement and 
asking them to reconsider their devotion to the Democratic Party. This became an 
interesting facet of the Republicans’ balancing act between nativism and an appeal to 
immigrants in 1856. “These Democratic rhapsodies over the peculiar institution are not 
confined to merely negro slavery,” proclaimed the Springfield, Illinois J urnal. “The 
Douglas Democracy, it will be seen, say that ‘the principle of slavery does not depend on 
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difference of complexion,’ but goes further and embraces within its folds likewise all the 
poor and laboring classes, no matter to what race or lineage they belong. They argue th t 
the free-born sons of Ireland, of Germany, of Scotland, of America would be bettered and 
improved in their condition were they likewise brought into the bondage of the Southern 
slave. Was there ever a more monstrous doctrine promulgated? And yet it is to this that 
the present avowals of the Sham Democracy are rapidly tending.”25      
One might protest that Republicans were willing to accept the continuation of 
slavery in the states where it already existed, and were therefore compli it in the 
legitimization of proslavery rationales. Maintaining the ideal of universal liberty required 
the American people to repudiate slavery, but this did not require the immediate abolition 
of slavery in the South. Prohibiting the expansion of slavery, thus keeping it “on the 
course of ultimate extinction,” would signify that the public considered it a necessary 
evil, only to be tolerated temporarily as an aberration in a nation still dedicated to the 
proposition that all men possess equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
“Let us, by our legislation, show that we really believe the declaration,” anounced the 
New York Times. Americans could not yet enforce the doctrine in every section of the 
country, but they could strive to “stay the plague,” and affix the mark of national 
disapprobation on southern slavery.26  
 This was a major theme in Lincoln’s campaign against Stephen A. Douglas and 
the application of popular sovereignty as the method for determining slavery’s status in 
the territories. His greatest challenge was to convince northern audiences, including some 
of his fellow Republicans, that simple indifference to slavery was itself inimical to the 
liberty of whites. The question, as Lincoln saw it, was whether liberty would be universal 
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(at least in theory) or whether the justifications for black slavery would survive to 
threaten the liberty of all—a danger he pointed to repeatedly, as when he excoriat d 
Douglas for convincing the public not to care about slavery and for qualifying the 
Declaration of Independence, which he saw as the only sure safeguard against 
circumstance and the self-interest of the powerful. In order to fix my topic in thepolitical 
context of the 1850s, I will begin with an examination of Lincoln’s reaction to the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and his subsequent debates with Senator Douglas.  
Proceeding from Lincoln’s argument, the next four chapters will examine each of 
the proslavery rationales I have identified (inferiority, the good of the slave, the good of 
society, and the lessons of history and Christianity) and demonstrate how northern whit s 
could perceive each one to be a threat to their own freedom. Chapter five will analyze 
their contention that American slavery was simply a triumph of force, analogous to past 
examples of tyranny and subjugation. Chapter six will examine the antislavery response 
to southerners’ denials and qualifications of the Declaration of Independence, particularly 
in respect to the Dred Scott decision, while chapter seven will highlight the northern 
argument that slaveholders constituted a burgeoning aristocracy. The final chapter will 
consider the debate between antislavery northerners and northern Democrats after 1854 
(including the historical accuracy of their respective claims) as well as the Republican 
Party’s devotion to the ideal of universal liberty in the 1860 presidential campaign. 
One of the primary challenges that confront students of antislavery is the need to 
extrapolate northern motivations from the sources at hand. Fortunately, antebellum 
northerners left us an abundance of material with which to work, including newspapers, 
political tracts, published speeches, legislative petitions, and private correspond nce. In 
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the course of my research, I examined hundreds of newspapers and printed sources.
Although important arguments can be gleaned from personal letters, I believe the public 
record is more valuable than private correspondence. It seems reasonable to assume that 
individuals were more likely to elucidate their thoughts on issues when preparing 
speeches and editorials for public consumption. Furthermore, given the broadness of my 
topic, I saw no value in confining my research to a particular state or region—although a 
significant portion of my material emerged from the Old Northwest, which was the heart 
of the early Republican Party. Most of my sources will fall within the period of rapidly 
escalating tensions (1854-1860); however, some arguments will reach back into the 
nation’s first half century, a period in which many aspects of the proslavery and 
antislavery arguments initially took shape.   
Finally, it is important to clarify my use of the term “universal liberty.” It is not 
meant to express a belief that American slaves (much less all human beings) would 
actually enjoy freedom at any point in the foreseeable future; rather it is a reference to 
northerners’ belief that liberty had to be maintained as a national ideal. Only by defining 
slavery as an aberrant and temporary evil could human bondage be delegitimized as a 
social arrangement and cordoned off from American society. If the ideal of human liberty 
were not maintained (which it could not be if the American public sanctioned slavery’s 
expansion and perpetuation), no one’s liberty would be respected as “self-evident,” 
particularly if they were unable to defend themselves against the machinations of would-
be aristocrats. So my use of the term is very much predicated on Lincoln’s defen e o  the 
term “created equal.” All men were endowed with inalienable rights, but northerners’ 
devotion to the concept was not tantamount to an argument that all human beings the 
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world over should be immediately freed (certainly not for Republicans). It was an xiom 
adopted by the founding fathers to guide the nation in the future. And in this case, the 
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“I am not in the habit of looking upon this struggle as a local one, and confined to 
Kansas,” wrote the soon-to-be free-state “governor,” Charles Robinson, in 1855. “I 
regard it as one in which the whole nation is involved.”1 In the age of Manifest Destiny, 
the West represented the nation’s future, both literally and symbolically. However, 
Manifest Destiny rarely served as a nationalizing force. Driven by separat  sectional 
imperatives, westward expansion gave the conflict between North and South its 
“irrepressible” character. For more than forty years prior to the CivilWar, Americans 
struggled to define slavery’s status in areas where it did not yet exist or was not yet 
firmly established.  
Due to their increasing populations and their desire for additional political 
representation, northerners and southerners vied for control over the nation’s territorial 
growth. Southerners felt the need to expand because of the exhaustion of the soil and the 
growing slave population. Many Americans, both northerners and southerners, agreed 
that if slavery could not expand it would eventually die. In the words of one proslavery 
editor in Kansas, limiting the institution to those states where it already existed would 
force southerners “to choose between self-destruction and the agonies of a slow death.”2 
Likewise, northern society needed to expand in order to prevent a high population density 
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that would increase competition for jobs and lower wages, thus undermining the free 
labor ideology. Jefferson’s hostility to urbanization had been predicated on this 
reasoning. According to the traditional republican view, land was the only source of 
personal independence, and personal independence was a prerequisite for those who 
expected to maintain their freedom in a participatory republic. Without an abundant 
supply of land, people would be forced to work for wages in an increasingly crowded 
market, which would make them dependent on their employer and, consequently, would 
render them susceptible to blackmail and bribery. In this respect, Americans, with a 
sprawling continent at their doorstep, seemed particularly blessed. They envisioned the 
West as a safety valve through which people could make a fresh start when their for unes 
declined.3  
Yet northerners were convinced that their access to this land would be effectively 
blocked if they were forced to compete with slave labor. In the late 1850s, free labor rs 
earned roughly a dollar a day, whereas the cost of a slave’s daily labor was less than 
twenty-five cents. Competition with slaves could therefore be expected to severely 
depress wages. Psychologically, the effects were similar. Northerners argued that slavery 
undermined the work ethic of free laborers by stigmatizing hard work as servile. What 
could be more enervating, they asked, than having to compete with another man’s slaves? 
Slavery therefore prevented upward social mobility, created a stagnant economy, and 






A Hell of a Storm 
 
This conflict took a violent turn with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 
the spring of 1854. Four years earlier, Congress had passed a series of measures th t 
finally defused the crisis emanating from the Mexican War and the acquisition of 
California and New Mexico. Many Americans had hoped this would be a “final 
settlement” of the controversy over slavery’s expansion. Yet with the acquisition of this 
territory, facilitating travel and communication between East and West became a salient 
issue. In fact the war had not yet begun when Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, then a
thirty-two-year-old freshman congressman, began to advocate the construction of a 
railroad linking Chicago and San Francisco. In the fall of 1845, Douglas introduced a bill 
to organize the land west of Iowa as Nebraska Territory. The measure failed to pass, and 
while public support continued to grow, the possible location of a transcontinental road 
remained the subject of sectional and local rivalries almost a decade later.5  
In February 1853, William A. Richardson, Douglas’s ally and chairman of the 
House Committee on Territories, reported a new measure to provide Nebraska with a 
territorial government. The need for such legislation seemed obvious. “In the name of 
God, how is the railroad to be made if you will never let people live on the lands through 
which the road passes?” demanded the bill’s author.6 Douglas, now chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Territories, concurred and favorably reported the measure. Yet 
despite widespread support for a transcontinental railroad, many southerners opposed a 
move to organize the Louisiana Purchase territory north of 36˚ 30΄. Slavery had been 
prohibited there under the terms of the Missouri Compromise in 1820, and any states 
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carved from Nebraska would assuredly enter the Union as free states. Missourian  were 
particularly wary. With the free state of Illinois to the east and Iowa t the north, they 
now faced the unwelcome prospect of a free territory on their western border, where 
much of their slave population was concentrated. It was therefore with considerable 
misgivings that Senator David Rice Atchison of Missouri agreed to support the bill. 
Nevertheless, Douglas was still unable to garner the votes he needed. With the support of 
every slave state senator south of Missouri, the Senate voted to table the measure shortly 
before Congress adjourned.   
Douglas remained committed to Nebraska’s organization, but as the new 
Congress assembled in December 1853, he found the terrain to be even more difficult 
than it had been during the previous session. Perhaps most notably, Atchison, who had 
spent the recess battling Thomas Hart Benton in the opening stage of the next snate 
campaign, now announced that he would see Nebraska “sink in hell” before voting to 
organize it as free territory. If Douglas could not pass the bill with Atchison’s support, it 
was highly unlikely he would be able to do so without it. With this in mind, Douglas 
began to make a series of increasingly direct concessions to his southern colleagues. The 
new bill, reported out of his committee on January 4, made no reference to the Missouri 
Compromise, but repeated the language that had been employed in the New Mexico and 
Utah legislation of 1850: “when admitted as a State or States, the said territory, or any 
portion of the same, shall be received into the Union, with or without slavery, as their 
constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission.” Southerners quickly made it 
clear to Douglas that this was insufficient7, and within a week he added another section, 
which had supposedly been left out through “clerical error,” explicitly stating the right of 
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territorial residents to determine slavery’s status within their borders. Southerners 
realized, however, that slavery would never have an opportunity to take root if the 
Missouri Compromise remained in effect. Two weeks after Douglas first intoduced his 
bill, Senator Archibald Dixon of Kentucky pressed him to incorporate an outright repeal. 
Douglas agreed, fully aware that it would cause “a hell of a storm.” He also decide  to 
provide for two new territories, Nebraska to the west of Iowa and Kansas to the west of 
Missouri. While it was not unreasonable to allow these regions the opportunity to develp 
separately from each other, many construed this measure as a means of reserving Kansas 
for slavery and Nebraska for freedom.8 
Although Douglas may have hoped to placate southerners while leaving the 
Missouri Compromise intact, his basic reasoning remained constant. Beginning with the 
bill’s initial introduction, Douglas claimed that the principle of congressional exclusion 
had been superseded by “the leading feature of the compromise of 1850,” which in his 
view was “congressional nonintervention as to slavery in the Territories.” According to 
Douglas, Congress had repudiated the Missouri Compromise by refusing to extend it to 
the Pacific in 1848 (despite the support of the Polk administration).9 The supersession 
argument was, however, clearly disingenuous on Douglas’s part. He had publicly lauded 
the Missouri Compromise in 1849 as “a sacred thing, which no ruthless hand would ever 
be reckless enough to disturb.” And as for the Compromise of 1850, many northerners 
pointed out, quite correctly, that no one at the time believed that the New Mexico and 
Utah legislation had any bearing whatsoever on the Louisiana Purchase. Lincoln aptly 
noted the absurdity of the argument that those who favored the Wilmot Proviso in order 
to prohibit slavery in the Mexican Cession were actually fighting to allow savery north 
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of 36˚ 30́ by refusing to extend the line to the Pacific. The Missouri Compromise and the 
Compromise of 1850 were separate measures, he insisted, not general principles: “To 
argue that we thus repudiated the Missouri Compromise is no less absurd than it would 
be to argue that because we have so far forborne to acquire Cuba, we have thereby, in 
principle, repudiated our former acquisitions and determined to throw them out of the 
Union. No less absurd than it would be to say that because I may have refused to build an 
addition to my house, I thereby have decided to destroy the existing house! And if I catch
you setting fire to my house, you will turn upon me and say I instructed you to do it!”10  
To the extent it can be considered a principle, “congressional nonintervention” is 
perhaps a more accurate appellation than “popular sovereignty,” considering that the
actual sovereignty of territorial residents over slavery had been left inten ionally 
ambiguous ever since Lewis Cass first championed the measure in his run for the White 
House in 1848. Northern Democrats, including Douglas, assumed that a territorial 
legislature could exclude slavery during the territorial stage. Southerners, on the ther 
hand, assumed no such authority. In their minds, slave property should be as sacrosanct 
as any other form of property. Regulation could only occur as the territory entered th  
Union as a state. This ambiguity, while attractive as a means of garnering support in both 
sections, would later serve to divide the Democratic Party. 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act easily passed the Senate on March 3. Only two 
southerners voted against it, Sam Houston and John Bell, while party discipline kept all
but four northern Democrats in line. President Pierce had agreed to make the bill a test of 
Democratic orthodoxy, but the House, whose members soon had to face their 
constituents, was less amenable to administration demands. Douglas exerted his 
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influence, which, along with the legislative legerdemain of Alexander Stephens, secured 
the bill’s passage on May 22 by a narrow vote of 113 to 100. More so than the Senate, the 
vote in the House revealed the sectional realignment of American politics. Fifty-eight 
northern Democrats voted against the bill, as did every northern Whig, whereas two-
thirds of southern Whigs joined the Democrats to support it.11  
Douglas may have achieved an impressive legislative victory, but the Kansas-
Nebraska Act was far from a success in its operation. Douglas had hoped that 
congressional nonintervention would define slavery as a state and territorial issue, 
thereby banishing it from the nation’s capital. Congress and the president would then be
free to focus on greater issues. Instead, the dream of a transcontinental railroad was 
consumed by the sectional animosities engendered by the act, and the nation stood 
transfixed as Kansas descended into chaos and violence.12 
Three years after the passage of Douglas’s bill, northerners could look back on a 
long series of outrages in Kansas. Proslavery Missourians had stolen elections for 
Kansas’s delegate to Congress and for the territorial legislature. This legislature, 
fraudulent in spirit if not in fact, passed a draconian slave code, imposing a sentence of 
two years at hard labor for those who wrote or circulated antislavery material nd 
threatening the imprisonment of anyone who simply denied the institution’s legality.  
Those who would aid in the escape of slave property or incite rebellion risked the deat 
penalty. Southerners also threatened the life and expedited the departure of evey
governor who dared to oppose them. Cowed by their demands, President Pierce blamed 
the hostilities on New England emigrants (who, despite the propaganda, were relativ ly 
few in numbers), condemned the free-state Topeka constitution as “revolutionary,” and 
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authorized the use of federal troops to disperse the free-state government. Then in 
January 1857, the proslavery legislature attempted to solidify its gains by calling for the 
election of a constitutional convention.13  
Not surprisingly, free-soil opponents often lamented their “enslavement” by a 
proslavery minority. Broadsides advertising mass meetings were emblazoned with the 
words “No White Slavery!” Sara Robinson, wife of the free-state governor, observed that 
Kansans “feel the iron heel of the oppressor, making us truly white slaves.”14 Somewhat 
ironically, considering the northern reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, free-soil 
Kansans expressed acceptance of popular sovereignty as a democratic principle, but 
decried southerners’ violation of that principle. In an anguished remonstrance, free-stat  
leaders told Congress that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had granted popular sovereignty to 
proslavery Missourians, but had imposed “serfdom” on the territory’s actual residents. 
The doctrine of self-government is to be trampled under foot here, of all other 
places in the world, on the very spot which had been hallowed and consecrated. . . 
. The compact is to be basely broken, and the ballot of the freeman torn from our 
hands, almost before the ink of the covenant is dry. . . . The question of negr  
slavery is to sink into insignificance, and the greater portentous issue is to rise up 
in its stead, whether or not we shall be slaves, and fanatics who disgrace the 
honorable and chivalric men of the south shall be our masters to rule us at their 
pleasure.15 
  
The White Man’s Charter of Freedom 
 
Although Lincoln recognized all of these factors, it was not the disingenuousness 
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, nor the violence and fraud endemic in its operation that he 
considered the most troubling aspect of Douglas’s measure. From Lincoln’s perspective, 
the status of freedom and slavery in the public mind was the primary concern. He 
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believed slavery’s status in the West would determine the character of the entire nation. 
The approval or toleration of slavery’s expansion, under the terms of popular sovereignty, 
or any other policy, would signify that the American people approved of slavery as a 
permanent social arrangement. It would signify a dangerous philosophical atrophy in 
which the American people accepted the legitimacy of proslavery rationales.  
Lincoln argued that popular sovereignty was insidious because it undermined 
national devotion to the ideal of universal liberty. By relinquishing control over slavery’s 
expansion to territorial settlers, it both fostered and reflected national indifference to the 
future of human servitude. In other words, it presented freedom and slavery as equally 
acceptable options for local majorities in their dealings with vulnerable minorities. 
Beginning with his Peoria Speech in October 1854, Lincoln deprecated “this declare  
indifference” to the spread of slavery because “it assumes that there can be moral right in 
the enslaving of one man by another.” It was “a dangerous dalliance for a free peopl ”—
evidence that “liberty, as a principle, we have ceased to revere.”16 This would develop 
into a major theme in his debates with Douglas four years later. Tolerating slavery’s 
expansion connoted an assumption that slavery was “not a wrong.” No man, Lincoln 
reasoned, could logically express indifference toward something he considered immoral. 
But it made perfect sense if the issue at hand was trivial or morally acceptable. The real 
difference between Douglas and his followers on the one hand and the Republicans on 
the other was that Douglas “is not in favor of making any difference between slav ry and 
liberty—that he is in favor of eradicating, of pressing out of view, the questions of 
preference in this country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every s ntiment 
he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery.”17  
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Because popular sovereignty implied that slavery was not wrong, its supporters, 
like the proslavery apologists, were naturally compelled to qualify or reject th  
Declaration of Independence. How could Americans continue to proclaim that “all men” 
possessed inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness when they 
countenanced the expansion and perpetuation of human servitude? Popular sovereignty 
debauched public opinion—which, in Lincoln’s view, was “everything” in a republic—
by rejecting the universal rights of man: “Near eighty years ago we began by declaring 
that all men are created equal; but now from that beginning we have run down to the 
other declaration, that for some men to enslave others is a ‘sacred right of self-
government.’” By fostering northern apathy, popular sovereignty had the same corrosive 
effect as the proslavery ideology. Acceptance of the institution’s expansion, or 
indifference to it, necessarily destroyed the principle of universal freedom. F r this 
reason, Lincoln believed that Douglas and the northern Democrats posed as much of a 
threat to American liberty as did southern slaveholders.  
Qualifying the Declaration’s assertion of universal liberty in order to allow for 
black slavery was dangerous because it would leave the door open for additional 
qualifications. “I should like to know,” Lincoln asked—“taking this old Declaration of 
Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making 
exceptions to it—where will it stop? If one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not 
another say it does not mean some other man?” Without liberty for all (or at least a
recognition of that principle), the rationales that were used to exclude one class of human 
beings could be used to exclude any other class. Therefore, by refusing to recogniz  
slavery as a wrong, and thereby denying the universal rights of man, popular sovereignty 
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effectively, if unintentionally, conceded the legitimacy of slavery’s attendant rationales—
which posed a genuine threat, given the arbitrariness of those rationales. And it was for 
this reason that Lincoln explicitly accused Democrats of attempting to replace universal 
liberty with “the opposite idea that slavery is right in the abstract, the workings of which 
as a central idea may be the perpetuity of human slavery and its extension to all countries 
and colors.”18   
The Declaration of Independence was therefore the ultimate American 
palladium—a guarantee that Americans could never fall victim to arguments favoring 
their subjugation. Regardless of circumstance or misfortune, the freedom of each 
individual would be respected simply by virtue of his or her status as a human being. And 
it was to protect the Declaration’s principle of universal freedom that Lincoln opposed 
popular sovereignty. “Is there no danger to liberty itself in discarding the earli st practice 
and first precept of our ancient faith?” he asked at Peoria. “In our greedy chase to make 
profit of the Negro, let us beware lest we ‘cancel and tear in pieces’ even the whie man’s 
charter of freedom.”19 
Not surprisingly, Senator John Pettit of Indiana became a harbinger of national 
declension in the eyes of Lincoln and many Republicans. Pettit, a northern Democrat, 
agreed that Congress had the constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in the territories, 
and during the debates over the Kansas-Nebraska Act, he cited the Northwest Ordinance 
and the Missouri Compromise as precedents. Yet he favored Douglas’s bill, and he 
denounced the “ultra extreme abolitionism” of those who castigated the Little Giant. He 
also offered his understanding of black slavery and questioned the mental and social 
capacities of African Americans: “Tell me, sir, that the slave in the South, who is born a 
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slave, and with but little over one half the volume of brain that attaches to the European 
race, is [the white man’s] equal, and you tell me what is physically a falsehood. . . . The 
self-evident truths in the Declaration were nothing but self-evident lies.” Although some 
Republicans doubtlessly concurred with Pettit’s racial assumptions, they were 
scandalized by his direct assault on the Declaration of Independence. The phrase “self-
evident lie,” as a description of that document, quickly became a catchphrase for the 
political retrogression of the Democratic Party and the deleterious spirit of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. “When Pettit, in connection with his support of the Nebraska Bill, called
the Declaration of Independence a ‘self-evident lie,’” Lincoln explained, “he only did 
what consistency and candor require all other Nebraska men to do.” 
Of the forty-odd Nebraska senators who sat present and heard him, no one 
rebuked him. Nor am I apprised that any Nebraska newspaper, or any Nebraska 
orator, in the whole nation has ever yet rebuked him. If this had been said among 
Marion’s men, Southerners though they were, what would have become of the 
man who said it? If this had been said to the men who captured Andre, the man 
who said it would probably have been hung sooner than Andre was. If it had been 
said in old Independence Hall seventy-eight years ago, the very doorkeeper would 
have throttled the man and thrust him into the street. Let no one be deceived. The 
spirit of seventy-six and the spirit of Nebraska are utter antagonisms; and the 
former is being rapidly displaced by the latter.20 
 
 Douglas was far more reverential to the Declaration than Pettit, yet his officially 
stated indifference to the spread of slavery forced him to limit its meaning. He repeatedly 
proclaimed his belief that the signers of the Declaration “referred to the whitrace alone, 
and not to the African, when they declared all men to have been created equal.” In fact, 
Douglas was certain that the signers meant to exclude all “inferior races,” such as Native 
Americans, the Chinese, and the Japanese. “They were speaking,” he insisted, “of British 




 Lincoln echoed the feelings of many Republicans when he accused Douglas of 
making a “mangled ruin” of the Declaration of Independence. As a mere statement of 
equality between British subjects in America and those across the pond, it was stripped of 
all relevance and meaning to succeeding generations of Americans, many of whom, he 
noted, were not descendants of British colonists. Indeed, he was quick to remind his 
foreign-born listeners, Germans in particular, that, in Douglas’s construction, not only 
could they be excluded from the Declaration, they already were excluded. With the 
exception of white Americans, Britons, Irishmen, and Scots, the white people of the 
world “are all gone to pot along with the judge’s inferior races!”22  
 In response to Douglas’s argument, which Roger B. Taney also made in the Dred 
Scott Decision, that the founders could not have included blacks due to the fact that they 
had accepted slavery (and in many cases had owned slaves themselves), Lincoln insisted 
that the Declaration was never intended as an edict of emancipation or a description of 
reality, but rather as a statement of principle that set forth the ultimate go l of universal 
liberty. “They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be 
familiar to all, and revered by all,” he announced. And while this maxim would never be 
perfectly attained, it should be constantly looked to as the critical objective of a free
society. At the very least, inequality and subjugation should not be allowed to expand.23  
 The greatest difficulty Republicans faced was the need to counter Douglas’s 
explicit appeal to white supremacy. Although there were certainly gradations, particularly 
in Illinois, white racism was as much a fact of life in the North as in the South. And while 
Douglas promised the audience at the first joint debate at Ottawa to address himself to 
their judgment, “and not to your passions or your enthusiasm,” he was quite eager to affix 
38 
 
the odium of abolition and racial equality on his opponents. Willfully obfuscating the 
difference between abolitionists who advocated social and political equalitarianism and 
the vast majority of Republicans, who did not, he insisted that opposition to the spread of 
slavery was tantamount to support for racial equality, especially when Republicans 
invoked the Declaration of Independence. “I believe this government was made by our 
fathers on the white basis . . . made by white men for the benefit of white men and their 
posterity forever,” he intoned. “I do not question Mr. Lincoln’s conscientious belief that 
the negro was made his equal, and hence his brother; but for my own part, I do not regard 
the negro as my equal, and positively deny that he is my brother or any kin to me 
whatever.” In this same vein, Douglas accused Lincoln of conspiring to createan 
abolition party and continued to insist that the founding fathers did not include blacks 
“nor any other barbarous race,” when they declared all men to be created equal. In a 
particularly invidious attempt to paint Republicans as supporters of political and social 
equality between the races, his supporters paraded a banner with the caption “Negro 
Equality” and a depiction of a mixed-race couple with a mulatto boy in the background. 
Lincoln’s supporters quickly tore the banner down.24  
 In order to circumvent Douglas’s racist appeals, Lincoln insisted that the signers 
of the Declaration posited a universal equality of natural rights, not social or political 
rights. “I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men,” he 
explained, “but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects.” They had not 
meant to declare all men equal in color, intellect, morality, or social capacity. However, 
they did define all men to be equal in their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. Lincoln was politically obliged to disclaim any tendency toward racial 
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equalitarianism and to announce his own support for white supremacy, which included 
reserving the territories for free white workers. Yet he also argued that the American 
public had to accept the Declaration as a statement of the universality of natural rights. A 
black man may not have been his equal “in many respects,” Lincoln averred, “but in his 
right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is 
my equal and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man.”25  
 Lincoln also maintained that these assaults on the Declaration of Independence 
were a new phenomenon. The Kansas-Nebraska Act had turned Democrats away from 
their traditional devotion to the principle of universal freedom and threatened to debauch 
the public mind with a dangerous indifference to the liberty of others. Prior to the 
introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, no one, he argued, including Douglas, had ever 
attempted to exclude blacks from the Declaration—that is not until “the necessities of he 
present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that 
affirmation.” He therefore insisted that Americans should redeem their devotion t  
universal liberty by rejecting the “spirit of Nebraska” and readopting the spirit of 
seventy-six, which accepted slavery only as a necessary evil that would eventually end. 
This would be accomplished when they arrested the spread of slavery, and placed it 
“where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate 
extinction.”26  
 Given the indifference undergirding popular sovereignty—and the tacit 
acceptance of proslavery rationales it implied—Lincoln dismissed the very notion of a 
“free-state Democrat” in the struggle for Kansas. As far as Lincoln and his fellow 
Republicans were concerned, the Democratic Party, with its pliant northern wing, had 
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become little more than a vehicle for the southern slave power. It was apparent to them 
that all true advocates of free soil would flock to the Republican banner, an assumption 
that Lincoln expressed before a Springfield audience shortly after the election of 
delegates to the Lecompton convention. Musing on the role of Democrats in the election, 
Lincoln found it difficult to believe that any honest advocate of free soil could remain 
with the party of Jackson: “Allow me to barely whisper my suspicion that there were no 
such things in Kansas as ‘free-state Democrats’—that they were altogether mythical, 
good only to figure in newspapers and speeches in the free states. If there should prove to
be one real living free-state Democrat in Kansas, I suggest that it might be well to catch 
him, and stuff and preserve his skin as an interesting specimen of that soon-to-be extinct 
variety of the genus Democrat.”27 
 
Freedom by Default? 
 
 Nevertheless, Lincoln realized that Douglas exercised enormous influence over 
public opinion. He accused the Little Giant of using that influence to eradicate the “light 
of reason and love of liberty” in the American people. Unfortunately, Douglas’s influence 
had increased dramatically among northerners after his break with President Buchanan 
over the Lecompton Constitution. 
 Upon taking office in March 1857, Buchanan chose Robert J. Walker to serve as 
governor of Kansas. Pierce’s three appointees to the position, Andrew Reeder, Wilson 
Shannon, and John Geary, had all found the territory to be an intractable hornet’s nest.28 
Although a native of Pennsylvania, Walker had moved to Mississippi, which appointed 
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him as a U.S. senator in 1835; later he served with Buchanan in Polk’s cabinet as 
secretary of the treasury. As the new governor, Walker also had Douglas’s support. 
Indeed, Douglas had begged Walker to accept, telling him that “the whole success of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in that territory is to a great extent dependent on your consenting to 
go.”29  
 Walker agreed with the understanding that the legitimate residents of Kansas 
would be permitted to choose their own institutions. In his inaugural address, he boldly 
notified the proslavery legislature that Congress would not accept Kansas statehood 
unless a majority of its residents had approved the constitution in a direct vote, 
“excluding all fraud and violence.” Buchanan concurred, assuring Walker that “on the 
question of submitting the constitution to the bona fide residences of Kansas, I am willing 
to stand or fall.” Southerners, however, began to push back against Walker’s agenda, 
which ultimately eroded the president’s resolve. Democratic state conventions in Georgia 
and Mississippi denounced the governor’s meddling, as did the Alabama state senate and 
many southern newspapers. The territory’s proslavery leaders also became in reasingly 
uneasy as more and more settlers arrived, giving Kansas a clear free-state majority. In the 
territorial election that October northerners finally won control of the legislature, thanks 
in no small part to Walker’s determination to discard fraudulent returns.30 
 When the Lecompton convention met shortly thereafter, the proslavery delegates 
decided to offer the form of a referendum without the substance. Kansans could choose 
between the “Constitution with slavery” or the “Constitution without slavery.” However, 
the latter option provided that the slave property already in Kansas would not be 
interfered with. Republicans denounced this subterfuge as the “Lecompton swindle.” Not 
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only did it deny Kansans a right to reject the entire document, the provision protecting 
existing slave property would effectively establish Kansas as a slave state, considering 
that the prohibition on importation would be almost impossible to enforce.  
Douglas agreed: “Is that the mode in which I am called upon to carry out the 
principle of self-government and popular sovereignty—to force a constitution on the 
people against their will?” Buchanan, meanwhile, submitted the constitution to Congress, 
and urged legislators to approve it. Because the Lecompton document had been 
thoroughly stigmatized as a proslavery usurpation, Buchanan was (and still is) denounc d 
as a supplicating doughface, while Douglas found himself hailed as the champion of free 
soil.31 As such, he gained notable Republican support—much to Lincoln’s chagrin. 
Horace Greeley, whose New York Tribune reached a large national audience, counseled 
Illinois Republicans to support Douglas for reelection to the Senate. “His course has not 
been merely right,” Greeley proclaimed, “it has been conspicuously, courageously, 
eminently so.” Opposing the Little Giant under these circumstances would be to court the 
charge of radicalism and abolitionism. Douglas also won support from Republican 
leaders such as former Speaker of the House Nathaniel Banks and Senator Benjmin 
Wade of Ohio. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts expressed hope that Douglas 
would become a Republican, where he would be “of more weight to our cause than any 
other ten men in the country.” Even William H. Seward, who had championed the free-
state Topeka Constitution and had castigated Douglas for postulating a moral equality 
between freedom and slavery, came to agree with Douglas that popular sovereignty, and 
not congressional prohibition, was the best means of securing the territories for fr e 
labor.32        
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 According to this rationale, climate had already prohibited slavery in the West,
thus making northern Democrats free soilers by default. As with later revisionist 
historians, Douglas argued that slavery had reached its natural limits. Although the repeal 
of the Missouri Compromise had been intended to placate southerners, Douglas had 
never been shy about stating his assumptions. Within a week of declaring the 
compromise line “inoperative,” he insisted that Kansas was destined to become a free 
state: “In that climate, with its production, it is worse than folly to think of its being a 
slave-holding country.” (The admission of California as a free state four years earlier had 
already vindicated this assumption in Douglas’s mind.)33 Nor was Douglas the first to 
express this belief. David Potter credits President Polk with being the first to develop the 
idea, later popularized by Daniel Webster in his Seventh of March address, that physical 
conditions in the territories would exclude slavery.34 
 The climate argument even casts a slight antislavery glow on the Buchanan 
administration and its northern supporters. The dispute between Buchanan and Douglas 
was about the procedure of the Lecompton Convention rather than its ultimate outcome. 
Given the nebulous quality of popular sovereignty, which was reflected in the wording of 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it is difficult to see a dramatic difference between the two men 
on the general operation of popular sovereignty. In his first message to Congress in 
December 1857, the president explicitly defended the convention’s actions as a 
fulfillment of the principles of the Kansas-Nebraska Act—which, he noted, only required 
submission of the slavery question to the people. It did not require submission of a state 
constitution in its entirety. However, this was not Buchanan’s primary concern. Just as 
Douglas accused the Republicans of fostering an unnecessary sectional division for 
44 
 
political gain, Buchanan’s position implied much the same thing about Douglas himself. 
In the end, not unlike Douglas, he had little doubt that Kansas would be a free state. That 
being the case, there was no need for Republicans to antagonize the South with 
sanctimonious harping on the evils of slavery or for the Douglas Democrats to constantly 
moralize about the right of a majority to exclude the institution. Governor Walker had 
made the point a bit too bluntly for southern sensibilities when he declared in his 
inaugural address that Kansas lay north of an “isothermal line” beyond which slavery 
could not exist. And although he would soon condemn Buchanan for failing to back his 
promise for a full referendum on the Lecompton Constitution, the president maintained 
his belief in the inevitability of majority rule on the slavery question.   
 Indeed, Buchanan believed that the best way to give the free-state majority 
control over the issue (and to deprive the Republican Party of its chief source of 
propaganda) was to admit Kansas to statehood under the Lecompton document. “Should 
[Kansas] be admitted into the Union with a constitution either maintaining or abolishing 
slavery against the sentiment of the people,” he explained, “this could have no other 
effect than to continue and to exasperate the existing agitation during the brief period 
required to make the constitution conform to the irresistible will of the majority.” If the 
constitution’s provisions on the subject of slavery were unacceptable to the majority of 
the population, he insisted that “no human power can prevent them from changing it 
within a brief period.” On the eve of the final vote on Lecompton (under the provisions of 
the English Bill), the editor of the Fort Scott Democrat argued in favor of the organic act 
in the belief that Kansas would be a free state regardless of what the document might say. 
As a state, Kansas would be able to regulate her own affairs. “This, we believe and 
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understand, has been the chief design of President Buchanan in advising the adoption of 
the Constitution framed at Lecompton.” By opposing the measure, Republicans were 
simply looking to “manufacture political thunder for 1860.” The president seemed to 
concur, announcing that the peace and quiet of the nation as a whole was far more 
important than “the mere temporary triumph of either of the political parties in Kansas.”35  
Some free-state leaders saw the logic in Buchanan’s thinking. After all, in the 
election for officers under the Lecompton Constitution held on January 4, 1858, the 
Republicans had won control of the state legislature. The administration even convinced 
Governor Robinson to support Lecompton. In an open letter, Robinson suggested that 
“Kansas would be the gainer by being admitted under any conceivable Constitution, f the 
agitation could thus be ended” than to remain as a territory.36 Once admitted to statehood, 
Kansans could rid themselves of the Lecompton Constitution “in thirty minutes time and 
by the dash of a pen.”37 Conversely, as the practical results of statehood became clear, 
including the likely election of Robinson and James Lane as United States senators, 
Kansas’s proslavery leaders began to oppose admission under Lecompton. Furthermore, 
later that year, some southerners would defy the administration and come out in favorof
Douglas’s reelection, including Henry Wise, Alexander Stephens, and (much to 
Buchanan’s irritation) Vice President John C. Breckinridge.38  
 
The Same Old Serpent  
 
On a strictly personal level, Douglas opposed slavery. He privately called it “a 
curse beyond computation” and “a dangerous tumor.” Yet he did not consider it morally 
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or politically exigent. On the contrary, sectional agitation stultified the natio ’s manifest 
destiny, and perhaps threatened its very existence. As James L. Huston explais, Douglas 
refused to discuss slavery as an institution, all but ignoring the various facet of the 
antislavery argument.39 Because of his belief that slavery had reached its natural limits, 
Douglas seems to have assumed that slavery posed no threat to northern interests. It 
would exist only where climate allowed and where the people wanted it. Not even the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Dred Scott case had the potential to thwart the popular
will. (Douglas dismissed out of hand the idea that the Court would pass a similar decision 
protecting slavery in the free states.) If the people of a territory wanted slavery, he 
explained, they would pass laws to protect it; if they were opposed to slavery, the 
institution would be “as dead as if it was prohibited by a constitutional prohibition.”40 
Given this reality, sectional agitators were nothing more than self-interested fanatics. In 
Douglas’s view, there was absolutely no reason why the nation could not continue half 
slave and half free.41  
As a result of Douglas’s stance on Lecompton—and the power of the climate 
argument in general—Lincoln was at pains to explain to his audiences, and to some 
Republicans, the differences between the Republican platform and Douglas’s position 
(notwithstanding Lincoln’s dismissal of “free-state Democrats” the previous year). 
Lincoln watched with considerable anxiety as eastern Republicans seemed to fall over 
themselves in their rush to praise Douglas for his opposition to Lecompton. The stance 
taken by Greeley, whose New York Tribune had between five and ten thousand 
subscribers in Illinois, was especially troubling. “What does the New-York Tribune mean 
by its constant eulogizing, and admiring, and magnifying [of] Douglas?” Lincoln angrily 
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asked Lyman Trumbull. “Does it, in this, speak the sentiments of the republicans at 
Washington? Have they concluded that the republican cause, generally, can be best 
promoted by sacrificing us here in Illinois?”42    
The Douglas of 1858 held precisely the same position he had held in 1854, 
Lincoln insisted. Douglas’s policy was still predicated on national indifference to the 
expansion of slavery. It was still debauching public opinion by excluding blacks from the 
Declaration of Independence (thus denying the universality of human liberty). In he very 
same speech in which he had initially defied the Buchanan administration by denouncing 
Lecompton, Douglas made it quite clear that his only concern was the fairness of the 
democratic process, not the fate of slavery: “It is none of my business which way t e 
Slavery clause is decided,” he announced. “I care not whether it is voted down or up.”43  
Again and again, Lincoln would point to Douglas’s “care not” comment as 
irrefutable evidence that the Little Giant was no Republican. “How can he oppose the 
advances of slavery?” Lincoln asked in his House Divided speech. “He don’t care 
anything about it. His avowed mission is impressing the ‘public heart’ to care nothing 
about it. . . . Clearly he is not now with us—he does not pretend to be—he does not 
promise ever to be.”44  
Douglas was not a Republican, Lincoln explained, because he did not demand 
congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories, a policy Lincoln considered vital to 
the integrity of American liberty. Unlike popular sovereignty, this policy—the 
cornerstone of the Republican Party—treated slavery as a wrong. Slavery would carry the 
mark of moral condemnation, and the principle of the Declaration would be sustained, 
only as long as Americans prohibited slavery’s expansion with the expectation tha it 
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would eventually end—in other words, by treating it as a necessary evil, as the founders 
had done.  
Popular sovereignty simply would not do. In Lincoln’s view, the practical 
outcomes of a policy should not obscure the danger of its philosophical underpinnings. 
Although he considered the climate barrier to be nothing more than a “lullaby,” he 
nonetheless insisted that “if Kansas should sink today, and leave a great vacant sp e in 
the earth’s surface, this vexed question would still be among us.”45 Popular sovereignty 
tacitly legitimized slavery by defining it as an innocuous issue (analogous, as Douglas 
argued, to cranberry and oyster laws), and in so doing, it undermined the ideal of 
universal liberty, which was the only guarantee that everyone’s natural rights would 
always be respected. Douglas’s “care not” policy destroyed the nation’s mral compass, 
“penetrating the human soul and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty in 
this American people.” The only way to safeguard the liberty of all was to stigmatize 
slavery as an aberrant institution and accept the Declaration’s principle that all men are 
equal in their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
What would be the result if Douglas succeeded? The American people, by failing 
to repudiate slavery and sustain the Declaration of Independence, exposed themselves to 
these rationales whenever they happened to be economically or politically vulnerable. If 
white Americans consigned the black man to perpetual bondage, Lincoln warned, there 
was no guarantee “that the demon you have roused will not turn and rend you.” 
What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence? It is not our 
frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, our army and our navy. These are 
not our reliance against tyranny. All of those may be turned against us without 
making us weaker for the struggle. Our reliance is in the love of liberty which 
God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the 
heritage of all men, in all lands everywhere. Destroy this spirit and you have 
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planted the seeds of despotism at your own doors. Familiarize yourselves with the 
chains of bondage and you prepare your own limbs to wear them. Accustomed to 
trample on the rights of others, you have lost the genius of your own 
independence and become the fit subjects of the first cunning tyrant who rises 
among you.46 
 
 The belief that other, non-African, groups could be excluded from the 
Declaration was rational because the rationales for slavery were arbitrary. From 1854 to 
1859, Lincoln repeatedly highlighted the capriciousness of slavery by drawing an analogy 
between black servitude and divine-right monarchy. In an 1859 letter to a Boston meeting 
celebrating Thomas Jefferson’s birthday, Lincoln observed that “it is now no child’s play 
to save the principles of Jefferson from total overthrow in this nation.” The arguments 
used to justify slavery—calling the Declaration of Independence a “self-evident lie” or 
insisting that it applied only to “superior races”—were identical in their effect: 
“supplanting the principles of free government, and restoring those of classific tion, 
caste, and legitimacy.” These arguments “would delight a convocation of crowned heads 
plotting against the people. They are the vanguard, the miners and sappers of returning 
despotism. . . . We must repulse them, or they will subjugate us.”47  This sentiment was at 
the heart of what was perhaps Lincoln’s most unified explanation of his opposition to 
popular sovereignty: 
Now, sirs, for the purpose of squaring things with this idea of “don’t care if 
slavery is voted up or voted down,” for sustaining the Dred Scott decision, for 
holding that the Declaration of Independence did not mean anything at all, we 
have Judge Douglas giving his exposition of what the Declaration of 
Independence means, and we have him saying that the people of America are 
equal to the people of England. According to this construction, you Germans are 
not connected with it. Now I ask you, in all soberness, if these things, if indulged 
in, if ratified, if confirmed and indorsed, if taught to our children, and repeated to 
them, do not tend to rub out the sentiment of liberty in the country, and to 
transform this government into a government of some other form? Those 
arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with asmuch 
allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as 
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their condition will allow—what are these arguments? They are the arguments 
that kings have made for enslaving the people in all ages of the world. You will 
find that all the arguments in favor of kingcraft were of this class; they always 
bestrode the necks of the people—not that they wanted to do it, but because the 
people were better off for being ridden. That is their argument, and this argument 
of the judge is the same old serpent that says: “you work and I eat, you toil and I 
will enjoy the fruits of it.” Turn in whatever way you will—whether it come from 
the mouth of a king, an excuse for enslaving the people of his country, or from the 
mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is 
all the same old serpent, and I hold if that course of argumentation that is made 
for the purpose of convincing the public mind that we should not care about this 
should be granted, it does not stop with the Negro.48  
 
Lincoln then conceded that Americans had no choice but to accept slavery where it 
already existed, just as the founding fathers had done. This, he explained, was a matter of 
necessity. But yielding to necessity did not destroy the principle of universal liberty so 
long as Americans continued to look to that principle as their ideal and ultimate goal.  
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 The primary rationalization for slavery was the alleged inferiority of th se 
enslaved.1 Yet despite the inveterate racism of white Americans and the determination of 
antislavery leaders to maintain white supremacy, some did recognize that inferior ty, as a 
justification for slavery, was a nebulous standard, and ultimately a subjective one. In 
1849 Henry Clay wrote a letter—later quoted by Lincoln—expressing this concern: 
I know there are those who draw an argument in favor of slavery from the alleged 
intellectual inferiority of the black race. Whether this argument is founded in fact 
or not, I will not now stop to inquire, but merely say that if it proves anything at 
all, it proves too much. It proves that among the white races of the world any one 
might properly be enslaved by any other which had made greater advances in 
civilization. And, if this rule applies to nations there is no reason why it should 
not apply to individuals; and it might easily be proved that the wisest man in the 
world could rightfully reduce all other men and women to bondage.  
 
Lincoln summarized this danger with a simple question: “Who shall say, ‘I am the 
superior, and you are the inferior?’”2  
 For those Republicans with a clearer abolitionist cast than Lincoln and the 
majority of the party, this warning assumed a prominent position. Russell B. Nye has 
noted that abolitionists were anxious to demonstrate that if “slavery were the b st system 
for inferior races, it was also the best for inferior classes, regardless of race.”3 In an 1860 
congressional speech that was widely reprinted in northern newspapers, Owen Lovejoy of 
Illinois (whose brother, the abolitionist editor Elijah Lovejoy, had been murdered by an
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angry mob in 1837) conceded that blacks were inferior, but asked whether it was right to 
enslave people for that reason. “This, to me, is a most abhorrent doctrine,” he explained. 
Because “inferiority” was an amorphous concept, people could be enslaved for any
condition that left them in a position of vulnerability—poverty, isolation, physical 
weakness, or low intelligence. Such a doctrine “would place the weak everywhere at the 
mercy of the strong,” Lovejoy insisted. “It would place the poor at the mercy of the rich; 
it would place those that are deficient in intellect at the mercy of those that are gifted in 
mental endowment.” Two months later, Charles Sumner made a similar point in his 
famous speech “The Barbarism of Slavery.” Justifying the enslavement of blacks by their 
inferiority not only consigned an entire race to bondage, regardless of the capacities of 
individuals, but also “leaves it uncertain whether the same principle may not be applied 
to other races,” including, he added, “persons of obvious inferiority in the white race.” 
The danger is apparent when one attempts to ascertain precisely which whites Sumner 




There was no objective reason why the allegation of inferiority could not be 
extended to other races and ethnicities. As noted in the previous chapter, Senator Douglas 
had already interpreted the Declaration of Independence so as to exclude such “inferior” 
groups as Native Americans, the Chinese, and the Japanese. These people exhibited 
nothing but “ignorance, superstition and despotism,” Douglas maintained, and were 
therefore “utterly incapable of governing themselves.” So while Douglas did not believe 
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that enslavement was necessarily the appropriate option, the rights of these “inferior 
races” were properly subject to civil law—in other words, to the will of the majority. And 
as can be seen in the history of American settlement, characterizations of inferi rity—and 
a subsequent deprivation of rights—had never been strictly confined to Africans.5  
If it had been possible, white Americans would have enslaved Native Americans 
in large numbers. However, Indians had proven to be more difficult to hold in bondage 
because of the proximity of their compatriots. Indian slaves could easily abscond and 
native tribes could mount murderous reprisals against white settlements. (Once again, 
strength was a salient factor in the bondsman’s condition.) Consequently, most Indians 
enslaved by whites during the colonial period were shipped to the West Indies and 
exchanged for Africans.6 Yet if large-scale bondage was impracticable, coercion was still 
common fare for those defined as intellectually or racially inferior. 
Native Americans were by no means the only victims of white expansion. 
Mexicans also stood in the way. Manifest Destiny reflected both the growing pride that 
characterized American nationalism and the idealistic vision of social perfection that 
fueled the manifold reform movements of the period. However, it was highly 
ethnocentric. Running throughout the arguments for expansion was an explicitly racial 
justification. Throughout the 1840s many Americans defended the idea of westward 
expansion by citing the superiority of the “American race”—by which they meant white 
people of northern European origins. As had been the case with American Indians, white 
Americans did not believe that Mexicans had an inherent right to the land they possessed. 




Not unlike northerners in the 1850s, thirty years earlier Mexican officials and 
newspaper editors had expressed the concern that characterizations of inferiority would 
be expanded. Gene Brack has argued that the Mexican public adamantly opposed ceding 
territory to the United States in large part because of their awareness of Americans’ 
treatment of people they considered “inferior.” In the early 1820s, Mexican newspapers 
reprinted a letter written by John C. Calhoun in which the secretary of war recommended 
the forced relocation of Native Americans. Mexican officials assigned to Washington 
D.C. were alarmed by American prejudice against Indians and blacks and express d the 
belief that Mexicans, due to their culture and appearance, would soon fall under the same 
rubric. On the eve of the Mexican War, a Mexican diplomat quoted a New Orleans 
newspaper that characterized his countrymen as “semi-Indian” and “semi-Negro.” He 
then noted that in the United States, blacks and Indians were not considered “part of the 
human race.”7 This, of course, could only facilitate the self-justifying belief that 
Mexicans would benefit from American hegemony. 
Foreign-born Americans, most notably the Irish, also faced pejorative 
characterizations. Between 1845 and 1854, nearly three million immigrants arrived in th  
United States, of whom 1,200,000 were Irish. Economic competition, mixed with cultural 
and religious differences, led to widespread friction between the newcomers and native-
born Americans. By the early 1850s many nativists couched their opposition to Irish 
Americans in racial terms. The character of “Paddy”—dirty, ragged, violent, even 
simian—was immutable, not a consequence of his surroundings. As Dale Knobel 
explains, “once it became a habit to speak of the Irish as different and thus to think of 
them as different, it was not a great leap to treat them as different by nature r ther than 
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nurture.” A contributor to Harper’s Monthly in the 1850s, describing two “bogtrotters,” 
wrote that “the Celtic physiognomy was distinctly marked—the small and somewhat 
upturned nose, the black tint of the skin; the eyes now looking gray, now black; the 
freckled cheek, and sandy hair. Beard and whiskers covered half the face, and the short, 
square-shouldered bodies were bent forward with eager impatience.”8 Th  Irish were also 
repeatedly portrayed in political cartoons as vicious and apelike. Hence a group of white 
Europeans could be defined as an inferior race. Then what security would the Irish and 
Germans have that they and their children would not be “reduced to slavery in this land 
of their adoption?” asked the Anti-Slavery Bugle. “Is color any protection? No indeed.”9  
As with their coreligionists in Mexico, Catholicism helped to make foreign-born 
Americans objects of condemnation. Many historians have pointed out that nativism and 
antislavery were in some respects political cousins, outgrowths of the Second Great 
Awakening. Northern Protestants hated slavery and Catholicism for the same re sons. 
They felt that both were autocratic, repressive, and economically stultifying. “These two 
malign powers have a natural affinity for each other,” noted an antislavery paper.10  
Yet many Republicans viewed nativism as a distraction at best or another form of 
bigotry at worst.11 And they actively appealed to foreign-born voters. Northern 
newspapers repeatedly quoted an editorial in John Van Evrie’s New York Day Book, 
which in their view favored the enslavement of poor Americans, including Germans and 
the Irish. Van Evrie was rabidly proslavery and a staunch supporter of JamesBuchanan 
in 1856. He argued that impoverished children and their parents would be better off 
enslaved: “Let our legislature pass a law that whoever will take these parents nd take 
care of them and their offspring, in sickness and in health—clothe them, feed them, and 
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house them—shall be legally entitled to their service; and let the same Legislature decree 
that whoever receives these parents and their children, and obtains their services, shall 
take care of them as long as they live.” According to an Ohio newspaper, “this is what the 
Democratic party propose to do with the poor Americans, Irish and Germans and their 
Children.”12 These papers also quoted Robert Wickliffe, the largest slaveholder in 
Kentucky and a delegate to the 1856 Democratic convention in Cincinnati, who 
intemperately announced that “if there are not niggers enough to supply the demand for 
slave labor, he was in favor of making slaves of the damned Dutch and Irish.” Indeed, 
Wickliffe voiced his preference for these “white negroes.” A Wisconsin editor warned his 
readers that this was simply an honest expression of the true sentiments of the 
Democratic Party: “Let them go on; give them their way and the time is not rem e when 
slavery will not be confined to the African race.”13  
 Northerners also pointed to the use of “inferiority” arguments against the Chinese 
and the Japanese. In 1859 they highlighted an editorial that appeared in the Washington 
Union, President Buchanan’s official organ, which appeared to suggest that Chinese 
slaves would be an economical option for California’s labor needs: “for one-fourth of the
annual interest of an African slave, the Californian may have a laborer who will answer 
all the purpose of the negro.”14 The National Era expressed outrage that a party “which 
claims to have been founded by Jefferson,” no longer content with the enslavement of 
Africans, “should now propose to enslave the oldest civilized people in the world? The 
Chinese have no African blood in them, and their enslavement would at once destroy the 
peculiarity of slavery in this country, of being confined to the African race.”15 In his 
speculations on “inferior races,” Sumner alluded to “the polished Japanese,” an official
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delegation of whom were then in Washington. The federal government had recently spent 
$50,000 simply entertaining the Japanese embassy, observed one editor, while New York 
City expended $100,000 for the same purpose. “Yet if any of these inferior people should 
become residents of the state of Illinois, the theory of Douglas would place them at the 
mercy of the State, and their status would depend solely on legislation.”16  
If non-African races and ethnic groups could be enslaved due to their perceived 
inferiority, some northerners feared that anyone could be enslaved for the same reason. 
Congressman James Ashley of Ohio concluded that the ultimate purpose of southern 
slaveholders could be “fairly adduced from the fact that they do not hesitate to-day at 
enslaving Indians, Mexicans, Chinamen,” and, he noted, “even whites of American birth 
and unmixed blood.” Ashley’s fellow Ohio Republican, Benjamin Stanton, also sought to 
clarify the danger: “It will be remembered, if mere superiority gives the title, then it is not 
simply that a white man may enslave the Negro because he is inferior, but that he may 
enslave another white man who is his inferior. It is the inferiority of the slaveand the 
superiority of the master upon which the right rests. It is not, therefore, a question of race 
or complexion.”17 
 
Devils and Democrats 
 
 Even if one were to concede that a particular group of people was “inferior,” it did 
not follow that these people should be enslaved. The vast majority of northerners, 
including abolitionists and Republicans, maintained that blacks were inferior to whites. 
Indeed, Eric Foner has noted that there was “a strong overtone of racism” in the 
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antislavery movement.  So while antislavery leaders condemned the unjust denial of 
natural rights to the slave, there were still widespread legal proscriptions against African 
Americans in the North. C. Vann Woodward has argued that Jim Crow was born in 
northern cities, not in the antebellum South. According to Leon Litwack, “the northern 
Negro remained largely disfranchised, segregated, and economically depressed.”  Among 
abolitionists, even Harriet Beecher Stowe contrasted the “rudely indulged” passions of 
Africans with “the colder and more correct white race.” The Unitarian clergyman 
Theodore Parker suggested that “the Caucasian has hitherto shown the most instinct of 
progress.” Yet he went on to reproach the nation for robbing “the feeble Indian” and “the 
feebler Mexican,” and for playing the tyrant over the African, “her weakest child.”18  
Indeed, some argued that the enslavement of inferior people was decidedly 
unchristian. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts (later vice president under Ulysses 
S. Grant) disclaimed any intention of interfering with slavery as a localinstitution in the 
southern states. However, he was adamant that it should never become a national 
institution (sanctioned by Congress in the territories). In his view, the United States 
should not give its imprimatur to an immoral practice, thus implicating all of itscit zens. 
“I believe, and the people of Massachusetts believe,” he explained, “that slavery is a 
violation of the holy commands to love our neighbor, and to do unto others as we would 
that others should do unto us.” After listening to one of Senator Pettit’s lengthy 
disquisitions on inferior races, and the foolishness of recognizing them as equals, Wilson 
beseeched the Senate to adopt a more Christian, not to mention democratic, approach. 
The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Pettit] has made a long argument tonight to prove 
the inferiority of the African race. Well, sir, I have no contest with the Senator 
upon that question. I do not claim for that race intellectual equality; but I say to 
the Senator from Indiana that I know men of that race who are quite equal in 
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mental power to either the Senator from Indiana or myself—men who are scarcely 
inferior in that respect, to any Senators upon this floor. But, sir, suppose the 
Senator from Indiana succeeds in establishing the inferiority of that despised race, 
is mental inferiority a valid reason for the perpetual oppression of a race? Is the 
mental, moral, or physical inferiority of man a just cause of oppression in 
republican and Christian America? Sir, is this Democracy? Is it Christianity?19  
 
The phrase “all men are created equal” was not a “self-evident lie” as Pettit claimed, but 
rather a guarantee of protection to the weakest members of society. A trulyrep blican 
and Christian nation, Wilson argued, should seek to educate and elevate those who were 
inferior, not oppress them. Lincoln agreed: “In pointing out that more has been given 
you, you cannot be justified in taking away the little which has been given him. . . . If 
God gave him but little, that little let him enjoy.”20 
According to Lovejoy, the principle of enslaving human beings due to their 
inferiority was the antithesis of the golden rule: “If a man is a cripple, trip him up;” if he 
is old and feeble, “strike him, for he cannot strike back;” if he is unintelligent, “take
advantage of him, and if a child deceive him.” This, he concluded, was the doctrine of 
devils and Democrats, “and there is no place in the universe outside the five points of hell 
and the Democratic party where such doctrines would not be a disgrace.”21 As Lovejoy 
spoke, he approached the Democratic benches to address southern members directly. 
Enraged by this show of impudence, Roger Pryor of Virginia shook his fist and 
demanded that Lovejoy take his seat, precipitating a row that garnered considerable 
attention in the northern press. Thirty or forty congressmen surrounded the two men, 
shouting and gesticulating wildly. The speaker eventually restored some semblance of 
order, but the recriminations continued to fly. “You shed the blood of my brother on the 
banks of the Mississippi twenty years ago,” Lovejoy cried. “I am here today, th nk God, 
to vindicate the principles baptized in his blood.” William Barksdale of Mississippi then 
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exclaimed that Lovejoy was “a perjured negro thief” and told him that “the meanest slave 
in the South is your superior.”22   
 Others argued that inferiority was actually a consequence of slavery, rather than a 
justification for it. Considering the enervating effects of oppression along with southern 
laws that prohibited the education of slaves, an Ohio newspaper acknowledged that 
blacks were inferior, but told southerners that this inferiority was “in consequence of the 
degraded condition you wish to keep them in, for their good!”23 In the summer of 1855, 
the Illinois State Register, a supporter of Senator Douglas, offered a justification of 
slavery on the basis of black inferiority. In response, the Alton Weekly Courier 
encouraged its readers to consider the effects that centuries of bondage would produce. If 
whites rather than blacks had been placed in that position, “would the white race not be 
an inferior race?”24  
 
The Inferiority of Labor 
 
 The causal relationship between slavery and inferiority raises what was perhaps 
the most important question: Was “inferiority” a necessary prerequisite for enslavement? 
Some southerners subscribed to the “American school” of anthropologists, which 
advanced the notion of polygenesis—the separate creation of different human races. John 
C. Calhoun, Jefferson Davis, and James Henry Hammond all invoked polygenist 




However, many southerners rejected the theory. While on the surface polygenism 
may have strengthened the claim that Africans were inferior, and hence proper candidates 
for enslavement, the verbose defender of slavery, George Fitzhugh, opposed such a 
claim, not only because it was contrary to scripture, but also because it encouraged brutal 
masters to treat their slaves “not as weak, ignorant and dependent brethren, but as wicked 
beasts, without the pale of humanity.”25 By this reasoning, slavery was as much a 
consequence of weakness and vulnerability as it was of racial inferiority. In fact, 
Fitzhugh suspected that “inferiority of race is quite as good an argument agaist sl very 
as in its favor.” In a recent article, Christopher Luse has observed that abolitionists and 
southern Christians used the same religious arguments to denounce the inhumane 
treatment of southern slaves. Both argued that blacks and whites shared a common 
humanity, and that all people were moral beings with the capability for improvement. 
One southern missionary who studied African cultures admitted that “the charge of 
African inferiority . . . comes with an ill grace from Americans.” After all, one only had 
to look back a few centuries to see that Anglo-Saxons had once been “stupid idolators.” 
Of course the difference between southern Christians and abolitionists was that 
southerners viewed abolitionism as “false benevolence.” Black slaves may have been 
human beings with immortal souls, but that did not mean their enslavement was contrary 
to humanity or Christian doctrine.26   
Furthermore, while southerners may have justified slavery on the basis of African 
inferiority, in reality they did not always seek inferior people as slaves. Slave dealers, 
noted a Milwaukee paper, never dwelt upon the “inferiority” or the dark color of their 
property as selling points, “but on the contrary are glad to be able to exhibit them as of 
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light complexion and to recommend them as sprightly and intelligent.” In fact, the very 
attributes that southerners advanced as justifications for slavery “are the v ry things 
which most depreciate the value of slaves and are carefully ignored in offering them for 
sale.”27  
Considering that slaves were occasionally employed as skilled laborers—
mechanics, potters, blacksmiths—there was no apparent reason why slave labor could not 
be extended on a larger scale to employments other than agriculture. A widely read 1860 
Republican campaign tract argued that southerners had rejected the inferiority argument 
in favor of class-based servitude and sought to replicate the slavery of antiquity, in which 
members of every profession—from shopkeepers and mechanics to teachers and 
doctors—were enslaved.28 The enslavement of doctors and other professionals may strain 
credulity, but when one considers the enormous value of slave property, it is reasonable 
to assume that slaveowners, if they had ever faced a reduction in the profitability of 
cotton, would have attempted to maintain the value of their investment by applying it to 
other vocations, namely manufacturing.29 
 Many northerners expressed alarm when white southerners confounded inferiority 
with labor. In his infamous “Mudsill speech,” Senator James Hammond of South 
Carolina noted that northern laborers were physically and intellectually equal to their 
employers, yet insisted that, due to their poverty and lack of personal security, slavery 
would be as much an “elevation” for them as it was for Africans. According to one 
Republican paper, Chief Justice Taney’s invocation of inferiority in the Dred Scott case 
was “a miserable dodge.” Instead, the decision was a blatant proscription of labor: “If 
those who read Taney’s decision will, where it declares that ‘colored’ men hav  no rights 
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which ‘white men’ are bound to respect, substitute ‘laboring’ for colored—and ‘idlers’ 
for white men, the real merit and intention of the decision will be arrived at.”30   
Given the widespread belief that slavery stigmatized labor and undermined 
personal work habits, northerners could easily posit the degradation of all laborers, white 
and black. In words very similar to Lincoln’s 1858 campaign speeches, one Wisconsin 
editor warned his readers of the dangers of complacency:  
We ask those laboring men who do not believe that negro slavery is right, but are 
influenced by arguments such as these [that slavery is confined to the African 
race], to consider carefully whether in their selfish indifference to the rig ts of an 
inferior class, they are not bringing contempt upon their own freedom. . . . Poor, 
degraded, despised by [slaveholders] . . . there is no justification of slavery, based 
upon the inferiority of the negro race, which does not apply with equal force and 
pertinency to him. . . . With the fact so palpably before us that wherever slavery 
exists, the laboring man nominally free is as subject and wretched as the slave 
himself, it is folly to suppose that the slave holder will continue always to rest his 
justification upon the assertion that the black men are inferior to the white, or 
upon any other assumption, than that all men who labor are incapacitated to be 
free.  
 
And once the slave power succeeded in spreading the institution across the whole 
country, “it will be too late for the poor men of the North who are now recreant to the 
cause of justice and their own highest interests, to prevent the imposition upon their own 
necks of a yoke which they considered a trivial thing when borne by the necks of 
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 “It is of no use to write on this subject,” Thomas R. Bayne replied to a query from 
the Kansas State Historical Society in 1895. “The Northern people don’t now understand 
what slavery was and never will.” Bayne had been one of the slaveholding settlers of 
Kansas Territory. Like many southerners, he felt frustrated by the determination of 
abolitionists and antislavery politicians to paint slavery as a moral abomination and 
slaveholders themselves as inveterate sinners. Occasionally it was true tha  the institution 
was paternal in nature and not wholly devoid of affection. Marcus Freeman, one of Mr. 
Bayne’s former slaves, fondly recalled the relationship. His master “was kind to his 
slaves,” Freeman insisted, and he “thought a great deal of me.” Freeman had been given 
as a “gift” to Bayne when they were both infants. With a slight hint of pride, the ex-slave 
noted that at one point someone had offered to purchase him for $1,800. But Bayne 
would not hear of it. The experiences of childhood had precluded any such notions. 
Bayne and Freeman had grown up together, according to the latter, just as if they “had 
been two little puppies.”1 
Ironically, Freeman was giving voice to a proslavery argument that southern 
whites had adopted at least thirty years prior to the Civil War. One of the first and most 
influential examples can be found in Thomas R. Dew’s Review of the Debates in the 
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Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832. Dew, a thirty-year-old professor of political 
economy at the College of William and Mary, was alarmed by the support some 
Virginians had recently expressed for the abolition of slavery in the commonwealth. 
Expressing dismay that Thomas Jefferson had provided the “sanction of his great name” 
to the antislavery cause, Dew insisted that southerners had no reason to regret or 
apologize for the institution of slavery. In his view, the southern way of life was well 
within the mainstream of Western history, analogous to Greek democracy and other 
slaveholding societies of antiquity. Southerners could also rightfully claim a superior 
morality, in which the master’s economic self-interest protected African bondsmen from 
the specter of want and extermination that would otherwise haunt such an inferior race. 
To emancipate a slave, explained Dew, was to throw him “into the hands of those who 
have no scruples of conscience—those who will not perhaps treat him so kindly.” Indeed, 
the master-slave relationship was similar in paternalistic affection to the relationship 
between parents and children and husbands and wives. No one even insinuated, he 
observed, “that slaves in Virginia were not treated kindly. And all, too, agree that they 
were most abundantly fed; and we have no doubt but that they form the happiest portion 
of our society.” In short, “a merrier being does not exist on the face of the globe than the 
Negro slave of the United States.”2  
 As Dew and other Virginians debated slavery’s future, the entire South was 
beginning to change its tune in respect to the institution. Just beneath the surfac, a 
proslavery ideology had already taken shape. Although the Revolution may have 
weakened the slaveholder’s position, southerners had demanded the institution’s 
continuation as a social and economic necessity. They openly recognized that it was 
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incompatible with the ideals of 1776 and apologized for it as a “necessary evil,” but they 
also manifested an intense defensiveness when challenged, as evidenced by Congressman 
Jackson’s response to Franklin’s abolitionist petition. And as time went on, slavery only 
became more profitable and more entrenched in the southern landscape. The early 1830s 
proved to be the tipping point.  In 1832 Virginia was still reeling from Nat Turner’s 
rebellion. The previous August, Turner and fifty followers had exterminated around sixty 
whites—men, women, and children—in Southampton County. Rather than blame 
themselves, white southerners denounced the baneful influence of the burgeoning 
abolitionist movement, which had been symbolically inaugurated by the introduction of 
William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator in January 1831. Dew was not alone when he 
contended that slaves were almost invariably content until “the wily philanthropist” 
agitated their minds with notions of equality. As the decade wore on, southerners became
increasingly defensive and paranoid, developing a siege mentality that refused to tolerate 
outside criticism.3 
 Slavery then ceased to be a “necessary evil” and became “a positive good,” 
sanctioned by history and biblical teachings. Not only was it a blessing to southern 
whites, it was a blessing to the slaves themselves. Slaves enjoyed cradle-to-grave 
protection. They were not cast aside when they fell sick, got too old to work, or were 
unneeded. They also had the comfort of knowing that their family would always be taken 
care of. By the 1850s, Senator James Hammond could confidently proclaim that it would 





The Principle of Slavery is Itself Right 
 
 If slavery was the beneficent and paternalistic institution that southerners claimed, 
could it not be applied with equal morality to whites as well as blacks? This question 
became a prominent aspect of the antislavery argument in 1856 and would continue to 
serve as a lightning rod for northern indignation. Northerners had occasionally voiced
their concern prior to this time, as in 1839 when the Anti-Slavery Lecturer quoted 
Professor Dew’s proslavery defense and then warned that the day would eventually come 
when all American laborers would be slaves of the rich. The same paper also quoted 
South Carolina Governor George McDuffie’s prediction that northern laborers would 
soon be reduced to bondage.5 
But the true smoking gun—the apparent evidence of southern designs—was an 
anonymous editorial that appeared in the Richmond Enquirer on December 15, 1855. It 
offered a trenchant and wide-ranging defense of slavery in the abstract. “Until recently, 
the defense of slavery has labored under great difficulties,” the author explained, 
“because its apologists took half-way ground.” By confining themselves to a defense o  
black slavery, southerners gave up “the slavery principle” and involved themselves in 
hopeless inconsistencies. Presenting slavery as a necessary evil, or an exception to the 
ideal of universal freedom, was to admit that the institution was wrong, thus placing 
southerners in an untenable position. In reality, they had history and religion on their 
side. The Bible sanctioned slavery—irrespective of race—as did the societies of 
antiquity. A defense of “mere negro slavery” not only yielded this authority, but also 
denied biblical truth. It also failed to recognize the fading of racial linescau ed by 
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amalgamation. Indeed, the author was quick to point out that “the laws of all the Southern 
States justified the holding of white men in slavery,” provided that they were descnded 
from a slave through the maternal line. 
 The South, however, had changed its line of defense, the author was proud to 
note, and now the North was “completely cornered, and dumb as an oyster.” Southerners 
could compare their moral, physical, and religious condition with the North, or any other 
society, and take pride in their institutions. “They will see that Slavery is a positive good, 
and not a necessary evil.” 
Let them read history, and balance the evils that have grown out of the little short-
lived experiment of free society against those of slavery, and they will find the 
evils of the former a hundred to one compared to those of the latter. Crime, 
famine, ignorance, anarchy, infidelity and revolution stare the reader in the face 
on every page of the history of universal liberty. A single season of want in 
Ireland and Scotland will exhibit more human suffering than Mrs. Stowe could 
glean from the annals of slavery through all time and all countries. Slave society 
is co-extensive with man in time and space.   
 
This was simply the immutable law of God, he argued, and northerners would eventually 
recognize the futility of universal freedom. As for race, the author fully conceded that it 
was “far more obvious that negroes should be slaves than whites,” because the former 
were unfit for anything beyond simple labor. “Yet the principle of slavery is itself right,” 
he insisted, “and does not depend on difference of complexion.”6  
 Antislavery northerners reprinted portions of this editorial in scores of 
newspapers. Republicans quoted it again and again on the campaign trail, in state 
legislatures, and in the halls of Congress. In their hands the statement “slavery does not 
depend on difference of complexion” joined “a self-evident lie” as a mantra not only for 
the South, but for the Democratic Party as a whole. Congressman Mason W. Tappan of 
New Hampshire delivered a typical Republican speech to the House of Representatives in 
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July 1856 entitled “Modern ‘Democracy,’ the Ally of Slavery.” Expressing fear th t the 
“hateful badge” of servitude would no longer be confined to the black race, he quoted the 
“complexion” editorial as evidence of Democratic designs. A month later, the Illinois 
State Chronicle hung the article like an albatross around northern Democrats’ necks: 
Mr. Douglas says the democracy are the same every where—that they are 
identical all over the world. This paper [the Enquirer] contends, that the 
democracy has just started a new doctrine, but a few weeks old, which is the most 
popular political idea that the world has ever seen. The doctrine is, that the slave 
owner, the slave breeder—the black democracy, may carry slavery wherever a at 
may burrow; or the American flag may flutter in the breeze. . . . This is the 
democracy, which the people in Illinois—of Macon county are to respect and 
worship, and call glorious democracy. That sheet, confessedly democratic, 
maintains, that slavery is correct in principle; that it is the national, normal, 
logical condition of the race of man, and that that principle is as applicable to the 
white man as well as to the black. 
 
Taking their cue from the Enquirer, Republicans repeatedly presented the enslavement of 
labor, irrespective of race, as the “crown jewel” of the Democratic platform.7   
 The editorial’s apparent relevance as a statement of Democratic principles was 
enhanced by the Enquirer’s undoubted status as a respected party organ. The paper was 
founded at Jefferson’s behest in 1804, and in the succeeding decades it continued to 
endorse the states’ rights principle of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. By the 
1840s the Enquirer was widely read in both the South and the North. In his study of the 
southern press, Carl Osthaus argues that the paper could be found in “every respectable 
reading room in the United States.”8 Lincoln’s law partner, William H. Herndon, 
subscribed to the Enquirer, and Lincoln was well acquainted with its arguments. “I have 
noticed in Southern newspapers, particularly the Richmond Enquirer, the Southern view 
of the free states,” Lincoln told a Michigan audience in August 1856. They defend 
slavery on principle, he noted, and “insist that their slaves are far better off han Northern 
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freemen.” Later that year he referred to the Enquirer as “an avowed advocate of slavery, 
regardless of color” and denounced the “mistaken view” that northern laborers 
constituted a permanent underclass.9  
 But as Lincoln suggested, the Enquirer was not the only advocate of class-based 
slavery in northerners’ eyes. The Richmond Examiner printed an editorial that echoed 
many of the same sentiments and phrases as the Enquirer, including the statement that 
slavery was “right, natural, and necessary, and does not depend on difference of 
complexion.” Because many of these articles appeared in early 1856, the fear of enslaved 
labor became a major aspect of that year’s presidential campaign. Republican editors 
offered a long list of Democratic quotations lauding slavery as a superior form o  labor. 
Under such titles as “Slavery Not to be Confined to the Negro Race,” “Northern Freemen 
Read This!,” and “Northern Laborers But Slaves,” this list circulated from one newspaper 
to another—with only minor changes—as an indictment of the Democratic Party. On 
several occasions, they simply labeled it “The New ‘Democratic’ Doctrine.”10 
Along with the Richmond Enquirer and Richmond Examiner, it included the 
following quotation from the Charleston Standard: “Slavery is the natural and normal 
condition of the laboring man, whether WHITE or black. . . . Master and slave is a 
relation in society as necessary as that of parent and child; and the Northern Stats will 
yet have to introduce it. Their theory of free government is a delusion.” This was often 
followed by the Muscogee Herald, an Alabama newspaper: “Free society! We sicken at 
the name. What is it but a conglomeration of GREASY MECHANICS, FILTHY 
OPERATIVES, SMALL-FISTED FARMERS, and moon-struck THEORISTS.” A 
quotation from the Southside Democrat (Virginia) then announced its hatred for 
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everything “free”--“FREE farms, FREE labor, FREE society, FREE will, FREE thinking, 
FREE children and FREE schools.” Finally, in addition to the previously mentioned 
statements of John Van Evrie regarding impoverished families in New York City and 
Robert Wickliffe in favor of making slaves of the “Dutch and Irish,” the list also
highlighted Louisiana Senator Solomon W. Downs’ views on the moral superiority of 
slave labor:  
I call upon the opponents of slavery to prove that the WHITE LABORERS of the 
North are as happy, as contented, or as comfortable as the slaves of the South. In 
the South the slaves do not suffer one-tenth of the evils endured by the white 
laborers of the North. Poverty is unknown to the Southern slave, for as soon as the 
master of slaves becomes too poor to provide for them, he SELLS them to others 
who can take care of them. This, sir, is one of the excellencies of the system of 
slavery, and this the superior condition of the Southern slave over the Northern 
WHITE laborer.  
 
As the campaign entered its final weeks, Republicans added new statements from the 
pages of the Enquirer.  
Make the laboring man the slave of one man instead of the slave of society and he 
would be far better off. Two hundred years of Liberty have made white laborers a 
pauper banditti. Free society has failed, and that which is not free must be 
substituted. Free society is a monstrous abortion, and slavery the healthy, 
beautiful and natural being which they are trying unconsciously to adopt. The 
slaves are governed far better than the free laborers at the North are governed. 
Our negroes are not only better off as to physical comfort than free laborers, but 
their moral condition is better.11  
 
The list would conclude with a warning that this was “the doctrine which ‘Democracy’ so 
called, would introduce in Iowa”—or Wisconsin, or whatever state the list appeared in. 
And lest there be any doubt about the significance of the upcoming election, it reminded 
voters that “JAMES BUCHANAN, the presidential candidate of the men and of the party 
who hold these odious views,” would surely prove a fit instrument for those “who would 





 One might ask whether northerners’ fear of class-based slavery was irrational, or 
perhaps disingenuous. Was there truly a possibility that southern leaders would attempt to 
enslave white laborers? Or were Republicans simply cherry picking the most outrageous 
statements in an effort to discredit the Democratic Party? To properly consider these 
questions, one must look to the source of this proslavery outlook. 
 The preceding editorials and arguments are in large part attributable to one man, 
George Fitzhugh of Port Royal, Virginia. On the surface, Fitzhugh was not a particularly 
notable character. Born on the Brenttown tract in Prince William County in 1806, one of 
many descendants of Virginia’s distinguished Fitzhughs, he settled into a languid d 
less-than-remunerative legal career. In 1829 he married Mary Metcalf Brockenbrough 
and settled into her family’s decaying mansion on the banks of the Rappahannock. With 
bats flapping in the crevices of his writing chamber, Fitzhugh researched local history 
and his own ancestry. He took particular pride in his first Virginia forebear, William 
Fitzhugh, who had strong ties to the British court and exemplified the nobl sse oblige of 
the planter-aristocracy. A lifelong insomniac, Fitzhugh spent many a night reading 
antislavery papers, including the Liberator and the New York Tribune, as well as 
conservative English journals like Blackwood’s Magazine, the North British Review, and 
the Edinburgh Review. He was a devotee of Thomas Carlyle, the British philosopher who 
argued that emancipation within the empire had been a “short-sighted philanthropy” and 
denounced democracy as the inarticulate “voice of chaos.” Although he was well 
acquainted with Virginia’s political leadership and took an active role in local 
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Democratic politics, Fitzhugh never pursued elective office and served only briefl  as a 
law clerk in the attorney general’s office during the Buchanan administration. As a 
whole, Fitzhugh had the reputation of being slightly absentminded yet altogether nial 
toward friends and opponents alike.13 
 He was also a bold advocate of southern society, and by 1849 he had embraced 
his new vocation as the author of proslavery polemics. His first work, Slavery Justified, 
by a Southerner, was an unsigned twelve-page pamphlet intended strictly for local 
consumption. However, it introduced the themes he would soon bring to a national 
audience. “Liberty and Equality are new things under the sun,” he explained. 
Furthermore, they had not only failed to ameliorate human misery, but had proven to be 
highly injurious to the people’s happiness and well being.14  
Northerners argued that slavery was simply another manifestation of “might 
makes right,” but Fitzhugh effectively turned this argument on its head. As he suggested 
in the titles of his two books, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society and 
Cannibals All! or Slaves Without Masters, universal liberty was an oxymoronic concept. 
By ushering in free competition, universal liberty begot a “war of wits” betwe n the 
strong and the weak and fostered a destructive attitude of every man for himself. Free 
Society was thus reminiscent of Hobbes’s state of nature, a “dog-eat-dog” situation in 
which the most vulnerable members of society inevitably suffered. Northerners posited a 
harmonious relationship between employer and employee, arguing that even the mos  
humble laborer could reap the rewards of his diligence and work his way up the social 
ladder. But to Fitzhugh, this free labor ideal was purely fallacious. Self-intrest made 
employers and laborers enemies. The former were determined to keep wages as low as 
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possible in order to maximize profits, while the latter teetered on the edge of starvation. 
The pursuit of profit encouraged employers to cast their employees aside when they were 
no longer essential to the bottom line, thus depriving families of security when the 
breadwinner was sick, injured, elderly, or unneeded. In short, free society gave the 
employer as much control over labor as any slaveholder, but allowed him to abdicate his 
paternal responsibilities. As a result, northern laborers were, in Fitzhugh’s word , slaves, 
but were denied “the rights of slaves.” They were “slaves without a master!” 15   
As noted in chapter one, some northerners characterized slavery as unchristian 
because it exploited the weakest members of society. Fitzhugh suggested that his w s 
actually true of freedom, not slavery. Christian morality, he observed, had little p ace in 
free-market capitalism: “‘To do unto others as we would they should do unto us’ would 
be acts of suicidal self-sacrifice.”   
In Fitzhugh’s view, the iniquities of the modern world were the result of a 
historical process that had run amok. With their emphasis on individualism, the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment had gone too far, depriving men of the religious and 
political institutions they needed for survival. An isolated man was unnatural, he insist d, 
and would prove to be “as helpless and ridiculous as a bee setting up for himself.” With 
the end of feudalism and the decline of the Catholic Church, “might makes right” and 
“every man for himself” came into full play, and as a natural consequence, the strong 
were able to subjugate the weak much faster than they had ever done before. Beggary 
began after the abolition of serfdom, which, according to Fitzhugh, had prevented class 
struggle by uniting the interests of tenants and landholders. By this logic, the Glorious 
Revolution was a tragic development because it had stripped the prerogatives of the 
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crown, the nobility, and the Church, “the natural friends, allies, and guardians of the 
laboring class,” in favor of the moneyed interests represented in the House of Commons. 
(It was no accident that the Bank of England was chartered shortly thereafter.) More to 
Fitzhugh’s liking was the subject of John Locke’s criticism in Two Treatises of 
Government, Sir Robert Filmer, whose book Patriarchia presented government as an 
extension of the family, an institution that brought together people of different needs and 
abilities for the sake of their mutual support.16  
Nor did his iconoclasm spare the Lockean acolytes of 1776. While Locke was “a 
presumptuous charlatan,” Jefferson was “the architect of ruin” and “the inaugurator of 
anarchy” who enshrined laissez faire as America’s seminal philosophy. Jefferson had 
engineered the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Virginia, which was yet 
another blow to paternalistic institutions. In short, whereas the Sage of Monticell  had 
believed “that government is best which governs least,” Fitzhugh subscribed to Carlyle’s 
dictum that “the world is too little governed.”17 
Fitzhugh’s remedy was to “identify the interests of the weak and the strong,” 
which slavery did better than any other institution. Slaveholders provided their workers 
with all the necessities of life, in sickness and in health, in infancy and in old age, “not 
according to his labor, but according to his wants.” In this respect, slavery was the best 
form of socialism. If the master fell on hard times and was no longer able to take care of 
his slaves, they were “transferred” and would then “participate in the profits”  another 
master. A slave could take comfort in the knowledge that his family would be taken c r  
of, with or without him. Unlike free laborers, there was no competition among slaves for 
work. Nor was there a war between master and slave. Unlike the northern capitalist, 
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whose self-interest impelled him to pay his employee as little as possible, the master’s 
self-interest prevented any reduction in the slave’s allowance, lest he harm or lose the 
slave in the process. Furthermore, because slaves were part of the family, his affection for 
the bondsman would also keep the master from casting him aside in old age. A master 
loved a dependent slave for the same reason that he loved his dog, not because he was 
always useful, but because he was the master’s personal responsibility. Consequently, 
Fitzhugh explained, southern slaves had “no dread of the future—no fear of want.” They 
could sleep peacefully and luxuriate in mental repose. In fact, they were “the happi st, 
and, in some sense, the freest people in the world.”18 
The free laborer, by contrast, was beset with soul-crushing worries. The threat of 
unemployment made the specter of homelessness and hunger a constant companion. If 
his wife or child fell ill, he could not look over their bedside. If he could no longer work, 
he and his family would starve. Given this life of uncertainty, Fitzhugh expressed doubt 
that free laborers ever slept at all. “They are fools to do so,” he suggested, “for, whilst 
they sleep, the wily and watchful capitalist is devising means to ensnare and exploit 
them.” According to this reasoning, free laborers did not have a fraction of the liberties of 
southern slaves. Northerners, moreover, were fully aware of the failures of their own 
society, even as they denounced servitude in the South. Why else, Fitzhugh asked, would 
northern society be infested with so many utopians, transcendentalists, reformists, and 
other assorted “isms”?19   
Northerners often invoked Fitzhugh’s books, along with the aforementioned list 
of newspaper quotations, as evidence of southern intentions. Lincoln never referred to 
Fitzhugh by name, but Herndon, who purchased a copy of Sociology for his and his 
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partner’s edification, recalled that this work “aroused the ire of Lincoln more than most 
pro-slavery books.”20 It appears to have aroused Herndon’s ire as well. In a public letter 
to the editors of the Illinois Journal, he observed that Fitzhugh described himself as a 
Democrat. “This I do not doubt,” he quipped, caustically noting that Sociology was “a 
good Democratic book.” The failure of liberty and the desirability of slavery for members 
of all races were “fixed ideas of the southern despots.” There was no escaping a principle, 
Herndon explained. “Slavery is right or it is wrong. If it is justice and right toward one 
race, so it must be to all. The South enslaves one race, so she must necessarily, if adopted 
as a principle, contend for the enslavement of some of the white race.”21 Congressman 
Israel Washburn of Maine was among several politicians who cited Sociology in the 
House and noted that it had been “extravagantly commended” in the slave states.22 
Fitzhugh was also a favorite object of condemnation for William Lloyd Garrison, who 
castigated the Virginian as “the Don Quixote of Slavedom.” Fitzhugh had attempted, 
without success, to initiate a cordial correspondence with Garrison, as he had with other 
abolitionists.  In respect to Fitzhugh’s contentions in Cannibals All!, Garrison observed, 
“Such idiocy may pass current as wit and wisdom among the cradle-plunderers and slave-
drivers at the South, but the rest of the world will rate it at its true value.”23   
Northerners were unaware, however, that Fitzhugh was also the author of the 
infamous “difference of complexion” editorials, as well as many others.24 Shortly before 
the release of Sociology for the South in 1854, he had accepted a contributing editorship 
with the Richmond Examiner, which then claimed the largest circulation of any southern 
newspaper. More than a dozen of his articles appeared in the Examiner that spring and 
summer, many of which presaged his arguments in Sociology. He denounced laissez 
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faire, free trade, and free labor; and he appealed to southern educators to teach prosl very 
arguments to the next generation. The following year Fitzhugh won an editorial position 
with the Richmond Enquirer, which, as previously mentioned, enjoyed tremendous 
authority as a Democratic organ in both the South and the North. Furthermore, Fitzhugh’s 
biographer, Harvey Wish, contends that the other editorials and statements quoted by 
Republicans in 1856 were clearly influenced by Fitzhugh’s positions. Consequently, 
despite his relatively low profile, the lawyer from Port Royal exercised considerable 
influence on the national debate.25 
But to what extent did Fitzhugh actually represent the mainstream of southern 
opinion? By invoking his words time and time again, many northerners implied they were 
descriptive of the slave power’s nefarious agenda. Eugene Genovese, who expresses 
admiration for Fitzhugh from a Marxist standpoint, has stated that Fitzhugh’s ideas were 
“neither typical nor representative,” but did represent the logical outcome of th
slaveholders’ philosophy. However, many historians have maintained that his views were 
nothing but aberrant musings, albeit highly quotable ones. Albert Beveridge expressd 
doubt that his position on servitude “was held by any large number in the South.” Going 
a step further, Robert Loewenberg has argued that Fitzhugh’s proposal to enslave white 
laborers was an outright embarrassment to the southern position. In respect to the 
northern reaction, David Donald contends that Lincoln and other Republicans mistook 
the “idiosyncratic” Fitzhugh as a representative thinker and erroneously claimed that the 
Democratic Party stood in support of white slavery. Robert Johannsen has likewise 
argued that Lincoln “should have known (if he was the reader recent writers have claim d 
him to be) that Southerners themselves rejected Fitzhugh’s extreme arguments.”26 
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 Yet it is not entirely clear that they did in fact reject his views. It is probably true, 
as both Wish and Genovese state, that any “anti-Yankee, proslavery tract” would have 
won southern approval in the hysterical years following the passage of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. Still, one cannot dismiss the fact that his works were disseminated in the 
most respected southern journals—the Examiner, the Enquirer, and De Bow’s Review—
or that they were widely read and received fulsome praise from the most prominent 
southern reviewers. In January 1860 James Doolittle of Wisconsin told the Senate that 
southerners had adopted the doctrine that slavery was the natural and normal condition of 
the laboring man. James Chestnut promptly denied the charge. It was the African laborer, 
he insisted, not the white, for whom slavery was a natural and beneficial condition. 
Doolittle then proceeded to quote Fitzhugh’s editorials, as well his books, which, 
Doolittle argued, had been “commended very generally by the leading Democratic press 
to the people of the South.” In a conciliatory tone, he claimed not to question Chestnut’s 
rejection of class-based slavery, but nonetheless insisted that the South was tending in 
that direction:  
I do not say that all the leading men and presses of the South today take the 
ground that the laboring man is a slave, whether white or black, but I do maintain 
that some of their leading presses and some of their leading men do take that 
position, and do justify slavery upon the ground that the true way to reconcile this 
troublesome question of capital and labor is simply this: that capital should own 
its labor, and not hire it.27 
 
As Lawrence Tenzer points out, Fitzhugh’s anonymous editorials were never chall nged 
by printed rebuttals, which in his view implied “a virtually total acceptance on the part of 
Southern readers”—although this is undoubtedly an overstatement. Nor can one deny that 
he had a clear impact on southern leaders. According to Genovese, “Miller, Hammond, 
Holmes, Thornwell, Harper, Simms, Memminger, Hughes, Edmund Ruffin, and a host of 
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others moved step by step toward the defense of slavery in the abstract.” Wish notes 
Fitzhugh’s influence on such southern luminaries as R.M.T. Hunter and James Mason. It 
therefore seems safe to contend that antislavery northerners were not being overly 
disingenuous when they held up “Fitzhughian” comments as evidence of southern 
designs.28  
 It would also appear that the notion of the “wage slave” made inroads into 
southern culture. In 1855 the South Carolina lawyer and poet William J. Grayson 
lamented the treatment of northern laborers in his fifty-page poem The Hireling and the 
Slave. Like Fitzhugh, Grayson stressed the beneficence of servitude and the free laborer’s 
desperate need for a paternalistic master. For the hireling: 
 Free but in name—the slaves of endless toil . . . 
 In squalid hut—a kennel for the poor, 
 Or noisome cellar, stretched upon the floor, 
 His clothing rags, of filthy straw his bed, 
 With offal from the gutter daily fed. . . . 
 These are the miseries, such the wants, the cares, 
 The bliss that freedom for the serf prepares. . . .  
 
The black slave, by contrast: 
 
 Taught by the master’s efforts, by his care 
 Fed, clothed, protected many a patient year, 
 From trivial numbers now to millions grown, 
 With all the white man’s useful arts their own. . . .  
 Guarded from want, from beggary secure, 
 He never feels what hireling crowds endure, 
 Nor knows, like them, in hopeless want to crave, 
 For wife and child, the comforts of the slave 
 
The same theme can be seen in the multitude of novels southerners penned in response to 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. One pithily expressed its intended moral in the title: Uncle Robin in 
His Cabin in Virginia and Tom without One in Boston.29 
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 On the other hand, it is not safe to assert that Fitzhugh was actually advocating the 
enslavement of white laborers in the United States, although it is not surprising that 
northerners saw his statements in that light. C. Vann Woodward has suggested that 
Republicans took Fitzhugh’s more troubling statements out of context in order to 
discredit northern and southern Democrats. But capturing the larger context of Fitzhugh’s 
arguments can be quite challenging, considering that his various writings are not exactly 
monuments to clarity. His style “suffered seriously from a lack of organization nd 
tiresome repetition,” which, according to Wish, often led him to “abbreviate his ideas in a 
dangerous fashion.” John Ashworth also takes note of Fitzhugh’s “linguistic 
inconsistencies” and “penchant for the startling overstatement.” Indeed, the latter was 
especially prominent. “How can we contend that white slavery is wrong,” Fitzhugh asked 
in Cannibals All!, “whilst all the great body of free laborers are starving; and slaves, 
black or white, throughout the world, are enjoying comfort?”30 
The “slavery principle”—or the “patriarchal principle”—transcended race, and 
could not be surrendered if southerners intended to justify and maintain domestic 
servitude. Yet despite his vociferous condemnation of free society, Wish makes the poin  
that Fitzhugh was not primarily interested in reforming the North, but rather in 
demonstrating the normality and moral integrity of the South. In May 1856, he wrote an 
editorial for the Enquirer disclaiming any desire to enslave white laborers: “We do not 
hope, nor wish, to see slavery like ours introduced at the North. There is no room for 
black slaves, and we never wish to see white men made slaves.”31  
As for the question of whether blacks and whites were equally suited for 
servitude, Fitzhugh believed that dependence was racially inherent for blacks but a matter 
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of circumstance for whites. “Almost all negroes require masters,” he opined, but among 
whites only “the children, the women, the very weak, poor, and ignorant” needed the 
benefits of paternalism. (Of course, ignorance and weakness are subjective terms.)
Blacks, in other words, were inherently incapable of competing in the “war of wits,”
while many whites could successfully compete. So even though he may have rejected 
polygenesis at first—by 1861 he declared himself a convert to the racialist views of Nott 
and Van Evrie—Fitzhugh never expressed doubt that blacks were inherently inferior. He 
fully subscribed to the herrenvolk ideal of confining blacks to menial labor, thus allowing 
the southern white man to become “a noble and a privileged character” like the Roman 
citizen of antiquity. Black slavery elevated whites “for it makes them not the bottom of 
society.” All whites were therefore equal in respectability, he noted, if notn terms of 
wealth. Yet in the hopes of ameliorating economic disparities, Fitzhugh became a vocal 
advocate of active state governments that would sponsor education and internal 
improvements for the betterment of their citizens.32  
Still, in the end he did hope that Americans would adopt the principle “that men 
should be governed, not ‘Let Alone,’” and that each person should be governed 
“according to his wants, and moral and intellectual capacity.” Precisely what this meant 
is open to debate. Ashworth writes that Fitzhugh did not address the question of whether 
his desired form of slavery would allow for temporary or limited bondage. But in fact he 
did. After the success of Sociology, he began a correspondence with the New York 
abolitionist A. Hogeboom, which was published by the Liberator, the Examiner, the 
Enquirer, and De Bow’s Review. In his letters to Hogeboom, Fitzhugh seems to have 
envisioned a form of voluntary indentured servitude. In a statement redolent of Van 
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Evrie’s proposal in the New York Day Book, he explained that he would allow destitute 
women to sell themselves and their children “for life, or for a term of years.” He also 
expressed support for those agricultural laborers who might want to sell themselv s “for a 
year at a time.” During this period of servitude, moreover, they would be treated much 
differently than African slaves. Indeed, this is implied in the oft-quoted “difference of 
complexion” editorials, in which he stated that it was “far more obvious that negroes 
should be slaves than whites—for they are only fit to labor, and not to direct.” To 
Hogeboom he noted that it would be unwise and “unscientific” to govern white men in 
the same manner as African slaves due to the former’s superior capacities. Although the 
New Yorker disagreed with Fitzhugh’s ideas, he cordially acknowledged the subtlties of 
the Virginian’s position.33  
His more vehement criticisms of free society were also mitigated by his 
acceptance of the Jeffersonian conception of land as a safety valve for wage laborers. 
Although Fitzhugh deemed “free society” in general to be a failure, he drew most of hi  
evidence from industrialized European nations where land was scarce and labor 
abundant. Ireland, for example, would not have experienced mass starvation in the late 
1840s if the people there had not been “freed” from the beneficent protection of feudal 
lords. For the foreseeable future at least, American laborers had the ability to escape the 
clutches of the greedy capitalist. For this reason, Fitzhugh claimed that there was not a 
“sane man in America” who advocated the literal enslavement of white men. It would be 
unwise, impracticable, and inexpedient. “We all agree,” he explained in the Enquirer, 
“that so long as the poor may become independent freemen and land-holders, by 
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emigrating to the west . . . it is better that they should become independent freemen, than 
sink down into the apathetic, lethargic, but secure and comfortable position of slaves.”34  
Fitzhugh was a bit inconsistent on this point, however. In response to a critic of 
Cannibals All!, he once again disclaimed any desire to promote the enslavement of white 
northerners. Despite all his musings on the failure of free society, he conceded that the 
“social forms of the North and South are each excellent, and should not be changed or 
tampered with.” Southern society was normal and natural, while that of the North was 
exceptional, but the latter could endure until the continent was densely populated, which 
might not happen for a very long time. Indeed, Fitzhugh kept postponing the loss of this 
safety valve. In Sociology for the South e suggested that the West would “soon” fill up 
with settlers; later he suspected that “several centuries may elapse,” then “thousands of 
years,” and finally, he conceded that it “may never occur.” And until such time, this 
exceptional form of society would continue to answer well for northern workers. But on 
other occasions, he seemed to posit an “irrepressible conflict” between the two sections. 
Sociology contained a prediction that slavery would be everywhere abolished or 
everywhere reinstituted. In one of his 1856 Enquirer editorials, he argued that the “evils 
of free society” should not be extended to new lands and future generations. Free society 
and slave society were incompatible and could not coexist among civilized men. “The 
one must give way and cease to exist,” he contended, while the other became universal. 
Wish notes the similarity of this view to those expressed by Lincoln and Seward. In 1858 
Douglas lambasted Lincoln for suggesting that the nation could not continue half slave 
and half free, and for predicting a sectional “crisis” in his “House Divided” speech. 
Lincoln later noted that neither he nor Seward deserved the “enviable or unenviable 
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distinction of having first expressed that idea.” Unaware of Fitzhugh’s authorship, he 
claimed that the Richmond Enquirer had broached the notion of an irrepressible conflict 
“two years before it was expressed by the first of us.” In any event, it is worth noting that 
neither Lincoln nor Fitzhugh believed or hoped that the issue would be decided on the 




 Unfortunately, the subtleties of Fitzhugh’s position were all too easily lost in the 
crashing waves of his generalized endorsements of slavery in the abstract and 
condemnation of free society. Not surprisingly, antislavery northerners continued to 
invoke them in the years following Buchanan’s election. In an effort to highlight a 
longer-term conspiracy than Fitzhugh’s writings alone could provide, they also cited an 
1836 speech in which Congressman Francis Pickens of South Carolina had opined that 
American society would eventually divide between capitalists and laborers rather than 
along strictly racial lines. “Let not gentlemen from the North start at this ruth,” Pickens 
intoned. “We are yet a people in our infancy. Society has not yet been pressed down to its 
classifications. Let us live through an era, and we shall discover this great truth. All 
society settles down into a classification of capitalists and laborers. The form r will own 
the latter.”36   
 New ammunition also presented itself. The Panic of 1857 exacerbated sectional 
hostilities by contrasting the northern and southern economies and, at least in 
southerners’ minds, vindicating the paternalistic principle intrinsic in slavery. They now 
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had undeniable proof that free society was inherently unstable and insecure. The 
floundering of the nation’s banking system triggered widespread unemployment, 
particularly in eastern cities. Men demonstrated in the streets, attended “hunger 
meetings” and voiced their demand for government assistance. Republicans responded by 
stepping up their support for a higher tariff to shield American workers from foreign 
competition and a homestead law to provide distressed northerners with greater access to 
western lands. Congress passed a law lowering the price of public land to twenty-fiv  
cents an acre, but President Buchanan vetoed it, insisting that laboring men had no desire 
for the government’s “charity.” Southerners on the other hand, boasted that their 
economy had been left relatively untouched. “The wealth of the South is permanent and 
real,” crowed De Bow’s Review, “that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Events now 
transpiring are exposing the fiction as humbug after humbug explodes.”37 
 The chief spokesman for this newly enhanced hubris was Senator James Henry 
Hammond of South Carolina. A passionate advocate of nullification and states’ rights, 
Hammond had edited the Southern Times and had served in the House of Representatives 
and as governor of South Carolina, although his political career had been cut short by 
poor health and family scandal. He was elected by the state legislature to succeed 
Andrew Butler in 1857 and soon enraged the North with a swaggering exposition on 
slavery’s morality and freedom’s failure. On March 4, 1858 he proclaimed to the Senate 
that southerners were “unquestionably the most prosperous people in the world.” 
Southern cotton constituted the bulk of the nation’s exports and had single handedly 
saved the North from economic ruin. “You dare not make war on cotton,” he cried. “No 
power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is king.”38  
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In response to Senator Seward’s recent condemnation of slave labor, Hammond 
clearly echoed Fitzhugh’s defense of the paternalistic principle. Seward may have been 
correct that much of the world had abolished slavery in name, but Hammond insisted that 
it would always exist in reality. Slavery would only be abolished, he explained, when 
God repealed the inescapable fact of poverty. The northern worker who lived by his daily 
toil, “and scarcely lives at that,” was all too often crushed by the vagaries of the
marketplace and the avarice of his employer. The liberty of the northern laborer “was no 
more than a choice of whether to beg or steal, to starve or go to prison.” Consequently, 
Hammond informed his northern colleagues that their “whole class of manual laborers 
and operatives, as you call them, are slaves.” The only real difference between these 
northern slaves and southern blacks was that southern slaves enjoyed job security and 
were well compensated. “There is no starvation, no begging, no want of employment 
among our people,” he argued. Nor were southern slaves forced to compete with each 
other for jobs or resources. Northern slaves, on the other hand, “are hired by the day, not 
cared for, and slightly compensated,” a fact that could be easily proven by the deplorable 
conditions in northern cities. “Why, sir, you meet more beggars in one day, in a single 
street of the City of New York,” Hammond declared, “than you would meet in a lifetime 
in the whole South.”39  
 Northerners responded to Hammond just as they had to the barrage of proslavery 
editorials two years earlier. Although northern Democrats shied away from Hammond’s 
remarks, Republicans presented them as further evidence of “the new Democratic 
doctrine.” A Kansas newspaper captured the sentiments of many when it expressd 
outrage that those who earned their bread by the sweat of their brow and “adorned and 
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beautified the earth” with railroads and steamers and palaces, and who converted a sterile 
soil into a blossoming garden, would ever be characterized as slaves. Surely those who 
gave their votes to President Buchanan “must feel themselves highly flattered,” it 
remarked, in being ranked with the chattel laborers of the South.40 
 This defense of slavery in the abstract continued to serve as a major bone of 
contention in the 1860 campaign. In the Senate, southerners voiced their approval of 
Hammond’s paternalistic sentiments. According to Jefferson Davis, slavery was but a 
“form of civil government for those who by their nature are not fit to govern themselves.” 
Senator Hunter, in his defense of the “social system of the South,” exalted slavery as “the 
normal condition of human society,” and “best for the happiness of both races.” His 
colleague, James Mason, similarly proclaimed that slavery was “ennobling to both races, 
the white and the black.” In response, Sumner announced his dismay that senators 
“insensible to the true character of slavery” would presume to laud it as a form of high 
civilization. Fitzhugh, on the other hand, expressed delight that the southern leadership in 
Congress had adopted his doctrine. They had finally realized that it was safe to proclaim 
it, he observed, “because it is popular with the people.” With no small degree of pride, he 
mused, “Yes! It has been solemnly announced in Congress that Southern society is 
normal, Northern society exceptional and experimental.”41    
Douglas’s choice of Georgia senator Herschel V. Johnson as his running mate 
allowed Republicans to tie Douglas even more closely to the southern position. In terms 
similar to those quoted endlessly by Republicans in 1856, Johnson had announced that 
“capital should own its labor.” And as before, northerners did not hesitate to express their 
incredulity. How could a man who uttered such a vile calumny come before the norther 
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public and ask for the second-highest office in the land? “Are you willing to stand tamely 
by and hear this Southern slave-driver taunt you with the name of slaves?” inquired the 
Cedar Falls Gazette. Just as Lincoln had condemned Douglas’s position for failing to 
recognize anything wrong with slavery, others noted that Douglas never rebuked or found 
fault with any of his southern colleagues when they denounced northern working men as 
“mudsills” or “white slaves.”42  
In short, antislavery northerners had more than enough evidence to convince 
themselves that the paternalistic aspect of the proslavery argument was a potential threat 
to white laborers. In reality, however, paternalism was not the most prominent fac t of 
the proslavery defense. Southern slavery was simultaneously an example of slav ry in the 
abstract and a form of specifically racial servitude. Notwithstanding the popularity of 
Fitzhugh’s views, or the politicians who occasionally echoed them, southerners geally 
defended black slavery as a means of enhancing and sustaining white liberty.   
    
            
     
















    
                                                          
1 Thomas R. Bayne to Zoe Adams, September 11, 1895, Kansas State Historical Society.
   
2 Thomas R. Dew, Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832
(New York: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 288; Kevin C. Julius, The Abolitionist 
Decade, 1829-1838: A Year-by-Year History of Early Events in the Antislavery 
Movement (New York: McFarland, 2004), 92-93; William J. Cooper, Jr. and Thomas E. 
Terrill, The American South: A History (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 259-
260.  
 
3 Stephen B. Oates, The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner’s Fierce Rebellion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975). 
 
4 Hammond quoted in William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification 
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 299. 
 
5 William Goodell, Slavery and Anti-Slavery: A History of the Great Struggle in Both 
Hemispheres (New York: William Goodell, 1853). 
 
6 Richmond Enquirer, December 15, 1855. 
 
7 Decatur (Ill.) State Chronicle, August 14, 1856; “Modern ‘Democracy,’ the Ally of 
Slavery, Speech of Hon. M.W. Tappan, of New Hampshire, in the House of 
Representatives, July 29, 1856,” Republican Campaign Documents of 1856: A Collection 
of the Most Important Speeches and Documents Issued by the Republican Association of 
Washington, During the Presidential Campaign of 1856 (Washington, D.C.: Lewis 
Clephane, 1857), 14. 
 
8 Carl R. Osthaus, Partisans of the Southern Press: Editorial Spokesmen of the 
Nineteenth Century (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 12.  
 
9 Abraham Lincoln, The Life and Writings of Abraham Lincoln, Philip Van Doren Stern, 
ed., (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 404-405, 413. 
 
10 Richland County (Wisc.) Observer, October 21, 1856; Canton (Ohio) Repository, 
September 24, 1856; Whitewater (Wisc.) Register, March 20, 1858. 
  
11 Richmond Enquirer quoted in Alton (Ill.) Weekly Courier, September 29, 1856. 
 
12 Manitowoc (Wisc.) Tribune, October 2, 1856. 
  
13 Harvey Wish, George Fitzhugh: Propagandist of the Old South (Baton Rouge: 




                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Fitzhugh later included the entire text of Slavery Justified as an appendix to Sociology 
for the South. 
  
15 George Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society (New York: 
Burt Franklin, 1854), 241; George Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! or Slaves without Masters, C. 
Vann Woodward, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 18. 
   
16 Fitzhugh, Sociology, 34, 51, 229; Patrick Allitt, The Conservatives: Ideas and 
Personalities Throughout American History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 
42.  
 
17 Merrill D. Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the American Mind (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1960), 169-170. 
 




20 William H. Herndon, The Hidden Lincoln: From the Letters and Papers of William H. 
Herndon, Emanuel Hertz, ed. (New York: The Viking Press, 1938), 96.  
 
21 Springfield Daily Illinois State Journal, April 10, 1856. 
 
22 Republican Campaign Documents of 1856, 2.  
 
23 Although Fitzhugh rarely ventured away from home, in the spring of 1855 he accepted 
an invitation to debate Wendell Phillips in New Haven, Connecticut. While there he also 
visited his distant kinsman, Gerrit Smith. As always, the Virginian was attentive and 
amiable, but saw nothing that significantly changed his opinion of free society. 
  
24 On rare occasions, Fitzhugh’s editorials were signed “G.F.” or “F.” However, the 
majority were anonymous. 
 
25 Wish, George Fitzhugh, 78, 144. 
 
26Eugene D. Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation 
(Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), 129; Albert J. Beveridge, 
Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1858 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 31; Robert J. 
Loewenberg, “John Locke and the Antebellum Defense of Slavery,” Political Theory 13 
(May 1985), 281; Robert Johannsen, Lincoln the South and Slavery: The Political 
Dimension (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 79. 
   




                                                                                                                                                                             
28 Lawrence R. Tenzer, The Forgotten Cause of the Civil War: A New Look at the Slavery 
Issue (Manahawkin, N.J.: Scholars’ Publishing House, 1997), 216-217; Genovese, World 
the Slaveholders Made, 135; Wish, George Fitzhugh, 126.  
 
29 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 
I, 515; Eric McKitrick, Slavery Defended: The View of the Old South (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), 58-67. 
 
30 Wish, George Fitzhugh, 171; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the 
Antebellum Republic, Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 235, 237.  
 
31 Richmond Enquirer, May 5, 1856. 
  
32 Fitzhugh, Cannibals All!, 201, 220. 
  
33 Hogeboom also arranged for the publication of the correspondence in a forty-page 
pamphlet, George Fitzhugh and A. Hogeboom, A Controversy on Slavery, Between 
George Fitzhugh, Esq., of Virginia, Author of “Sociology for the South,” etc., and A. 
Hogeboom, Esq., of New York (Oneida, N.Y.: Oneida Sachem Office, 1857). 
  
34 Richmond Enquirer, September 19, 1856. 
 
35 Wish, George Fitzhugh, 151. 
 
36 Pickens quoted in James M. Ashley, Success of the Calhoun Revolution: The 
Constitution Changed and Slavery Nationalized by the Usurpations of the Supreme Court 
(Washington D.C.: Buell and Blanchard, 1860), 23.  
 
37 George Washington Van Vleck, The Panic of 1857: An Analytical Study (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1943), 88. 
 
38 James L. Huston, The Panic of 1857 and the Coming of the Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 125-127. 
 
39 Drew Gilpin Faust, James Henry Hammond and the Old South: A Design for Mastery 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 246.  
 
40 Huston, Panic of 1857, 127; Atchison (Kans.) Freedom’s Champion, April 3, 1858. 
 
41 Charles Sumner, The Works of Charles Sumner, Vol. 5 (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 
1872), 11; Wish, George Fitzhugh, 285. 
 















 The facet of the antislavery argument presented in this study can be seen as a 
counterpoint to the southern argument that black slavery provided a safeguard for the 
freedom of white Americans. For many northerners, the rationales for African bondage 
were not strictly racial, and could therefore be applied to anyone, regardless of race. They 
repeatedly argued that the South’s societal defense of slavery was applicable to whites as 
well as blacks. According to southerners’ own logic, individuals did not threaten social 
stability because they were a particular color—they threatened society because they were 
poor.  
First, it is important to understand the southern position. Despite the “bleaching” 
effects of amalgamation, and the racially unspecific appeal to slavery’s benign 
paternalism, most southerners viewed white skin as an unimpeachable badge of personal 
liberty. Rather than reject the Declaration of Independence entirely, they sought to defend 
the ideal of equality for whites alone. As Genovese points out, most southerners still 
wanted to believe, despite the incongruity, that they could have the Reformation, Locke
Jefferson, and slavery too. They may not have rejected the paternalist argument (for 
blacks), but it seems clear that their ideal society was divided by race, not eco mic 
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 On the eve of the Civil War, there were around 385,000 slaveowners in the fifteen 
slave states. Out of a million and a half free families in the South, only one-fourth had 
slaves at their direct disposal. And of those 385,000 individuals, only a small fraction can 
be classified as large planters—those who owned twenty slaves or more. The vast 
majority owned fewer than ten slaves; fifty percent owned fewer than five. Consideri g 
the relatively small number of large slaveholders and the sizeable majority of 
nonslaveholders, some may find it difficult to explain why the South was so obdurately 
wedded to its peculiar institution.2  
For those who personally owned slaves, their bondsmen represented a $3 billion 
investment. For other white southerners, the economic benefits were less straightforward, 
but not insignificant. Some did resent slavery and the influence of their wealthier 
neighbors, but many lived in the orbit of the plantation system. Small farmers depended 
on local plantations for access to cotton gins and for financial assistance in tim s of need. 
There were also extensive kinship networks. Wealthy planters were not aristcr t  in the 
European mold, however much they may have attempted to style themselves as such. In 
most cases they were new money without a long family history of influence and 
privilege. Consequently, the poorest resident of a county might easily be a cousin of the 
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wealthiest planter. These economic and familial ties undoubtedly helped to mute class 
tensions.   
In addition to its economic importance, slavery was a powerful social institution. 
Because the African presence in certain parts of the slave states was considerable—and 
nearly overwhelming in states like Mississippi and South Carolina--slavery became an 
important form of race control. Southern whites considered the legal servitude of blacks 
to be absolutely necessary for the maintenance of white supremacy. Despite their 
insistence that slavery was a blessing to those held in bondage, southerners could not 
deny their sense of unease, a feeling that was betrayed by the ubiquity of slave patrols 
and the hysterical reaction that followed Nat Turner’s insurrection and the Harp rs Ferry 
raid.3 
There was far more to nonslaveholders’ support than simple fear, however. As 
George M. Fredrickson has explained, slavery created “a psychologically satisf ing sense 
of racial superiority” for all southern whites. Most southerners advocated what the 
sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe has called “Herrenvolk democracy.” Acording to 
van den Berghe’s explanation, these are regimes like South Africa and the United Sta es, 
societies that are “democratic for the master race but tyrannical for the subordinate 
groups.” Indeed, democracy in the Old South was “no sham,” as Fredrickson points out. 
Universal white manhood suffrage existed in most states, which made nonslaveholders a 
significant political force. James Oakes contends that southerners actually took the lead 
in the democratization of state constitutions in the 1820s and 1830s—although reform 
was somewhat slow to reach the eastern states, South Carolina in particular. Yet in any 
case, given the need to mollify the nonslaveholding majority, the planter elite activ ly 
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appealed to their constituents’ sense of racial pride. Consequently, their approach to 
politics could not be as oligarchic as Genovese suggests. Herrenvolk egalitarianism was 
the only ideology that could guarantee a white consensus.4  
In short, black slavery made southern whites feel better about themselves by 
obfuscating class divisions. Prejudice may be accurately defined as a desire to create the 
comparative illusion of superiority for oneself by denigrating people one views as 
different. Slavery defined all whites as fundamentally superior. In so doing, it fostered an 
assumption that all whites were fundamentally equal, regardless of class. A white man 
could be as poor as dirt and dumb as a fence post and still wear his skin as a badge of 
superiority—a sign of his membership in the “natural aristocracy.” This was particularly 
significant for those southern whites who would otherwise have little reason to feel 
superior. It is therefore disingenuous to contend that nonslaveholders (later the common 
soldiers of the Confederacy) had no stake in slavery simply because they owned no 
slaves. Certainly all the perpetrators of racial violence in the years afte  the war were not 
former slaveholders angry over the loss of their labor force. Nothing was more 
humiliating to nonslaveholders than the idea of being placed on any sort of equality with 
blacks, of having to compete with them for jobs or for a place in the social hierarchy. By 
diving society along racial lines, slavery raised all classes of whites to the master class. 
On the eve of the war, Georgia’s Governor Joseph E. Brown reminded his constituents 
that slavery “is the poor man’s best Government.” The poor southern white man did not 
belong to a menial class, he claimed: “The Negro is in no sense his equal. He belongsto 
the only true aristocracy, the race of white men.”5     
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Indeed, just as northern Democrats fostered anti-black prejudice in order to court 
immigrant workers (those who had to vie with blacks for the second-lowest rung on the 
social ladder), southern politicians were not at all hesitant to remind nonslaveholders f 
their social stake in the institution. “With us,” argued Calhoun in 1848, “the two great 
divisions of society are not the rich and the poor, but white and black; and all the former, 
the poor as well as the rich, belong to the upper class, and are respected and treated as 
equals . . . and hence have a position and pride of character which neither poverty nor 
misfortune can deprive them.” Virginia governor Henry A. Wise (to whom Fitzhugh had 
dedicated Cannibals All!) contended that black servitude was the very foundation of 
white liberty. “Break down slavery,” he argued, “and you would with the same blow 
destroy the great democratic principle of equality among men.”6  
The same ad hominem appeals to white supremacy also found their way into 
proslavery newspapers. Despite its publication of Fitzhugh’s much-maligned 
endorsements of class-based slavery, the Richmond Enquirer perfectly expressed the 
herrenvolk idea: “The presence of the Negro population, occupying an inferior social 
position, and excluded from political privileges, imparts to the white laborer a peculiar 
sense of personal pride and independence.” The southern laborer stood on the same legal 
and social level with the rich and the powerful, and hence “exhibits a dignity of character 
and an elevation of feeling found among the same class in no other social system.” Bill 
Cecil-Fronsman notes that Kansas’s proslavery papers couched their arguments in these 
terms because most of the migrant Missourians were small farmers rather th n large 
planters. “Color, not money marks the class,” announced the Atchison Squatter 
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Sovereign. “Black is the badge of slavery; white the color of the freeman, and the white 
man, however poor [and] whatever his occupation feels himself a sovereign.”7 
Historians seem to have reached a consensus as to the importance of the 
herrenvolk ideology in the southern mind. William Barney argues that nonslaveholding 
whites opposed emancipation because their self-respect would no longer be “reinforced 
by a color line separating free from slave.” J. Mills Thornton concurs in his study of 
antebellum Alabama. African slavery, he argues, dispensed with classes among whites, 
and he makes it quite clear that this was the reason the nonslaveholding majority 
defended the institution, even to the point of secession and war. Thornton also highlights 
the argument promulgated by southern politicians that poor whites would be hurt the 
most by emancipation. Unlike the wealthy landowners, who had the means to maintain 
their status, it was the working whites who would be thrown into a degrading competition 
for employment and social standing with former slaves. But with bondage recognized as 
the natural and legal status for blacks, every white man could rest secure in the belief that 
he was no one’s inferior.8 
Although the paternalist and the herrenvolk ideologies were not totally 
incompatible, there was certainly tension between the two. Ultimately the paternalists, 
with their appeal to slavery’s beneficence (regardless of race), gave way to a vociferous 
appeal to white supremacy. As we have seen, Fitzhugh, the arch paternalist, fully 
conceded black inferiority, and defended an exalted position for whites. Given the size 
and political influence of the nonslaveholding population, slavery’s “benefits” would be 
reserved for blacks alone. In fact, some defenders of slavery denounced any form of 
hierarchy within white society. While the paternalists had pointed to historical examples 
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of white slavery as instructive, others rejected them as unnatural. In a pamphlet endorsed 
by Jefferson Davis and J.D.B. De Bow, the ethnologist and New York Day Book editor 
John Van Evrie denounced any type of white subordination as unjust and “artificial.” All 
whites, he insisted, were endowed by God with the capacity and right to govern 
themselves. In the spring of 1861, the new Confederate vice president, Alexander H. 
Stephens, forcefully announced that white equality and black subordination was the only 
natural basis for society and would therefore serve as the “cornerstone” of th new 
southern nation. “Many governments,” he noted, “have been founded on the principles of 
subordination and serfdom of certain classes of the same race; such were, and are in 
violation of the laws of nature. Our system commits no such violation of nature’s laws. 
With us, all the white race, however high or low, rich or poor, are equal in the eyes of the 
law.” The cornerstone of the Confederate States of America would rest upon “the great 
truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man, that slavery—subordination to the 
superior race—is his natural or normal condition.”9 
At first blush, it might seem that northerners, being equally racist, would have 
posed no threat to African slavery. But a quick examination of the 1860 census returns 
convinces one that northerners and southerners would have had vastly different 
conceptions of race control. In many areas of the South, blacks constituted a majority or a 
sizeable minority of the population. Over 57 percent of South Carolinians were African 
slaves. Slightly more than 45 percent of Alabamians were held in bondage. Even in 
Tennessee and Arkansas, roughly one in every four people was a black slave. In Illinois, 
on the other hand, it was rather unlikely that 7,628 blacks would overwhelm the 
remaining population of 1,704,323. Likewise, the 326,073 residents of New Hampshire 
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were unlikely to be dominated by 494 free blacks. Even the 56,949 free blacks of 
Pennsylvania had little chance of overpowering 2,849,266 of their fellow Pennsylvanians. 
It is therefore not difficult to understand that southerners would have considered bondage 
to be the only reliable means of maintaining “proper” race relations, while northerners 
would not.10 
Because blacks were not property in the North, and because their numbers were 
not sufficient to threaten white supremacy, northerners were in a far better position to 
perceive the threat slavery posed to their own freedom. Their white skin and racial 
prejudice notwithstanding, they understood that accepting black slavery could all w 
themselves and their posterity to be encompassed by the institution’s subjective criteria. 
Having accepted the rationales for African bondage, there was no guarantee th t th y 
would never be defined as inferior or dangerously dependent.  
 
The Republican Paradox 
 
 White supremacy was an important component in what many white Americans—
South and North—viewed as a stable and secure society. But there was another 
component that had long been stressed in American history—the need for a virtuous 
citizenry. A virtuous citizen was both educated and independent. For a participatory 
republic to function, those entrusted with the franchise had to possess adequate 
knowledge of pertinent issues. Jefferson famously proclaimed that “those who expect to 
be ignorant and free expect what never was and never will be,” a sentiment that many 
Americans, North and South, fully endorsed. Yet citizens also required personal 
108 
 
independence, which would protect them from coercion and enable them to pursue the 
common good, rather than their own purely selfish interests. And the greatest impediment 
to personal independence was poverty, or simply the absence of economic autonomy. 
People without productive property—which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
meant land—were necessarily dependent on others for their livelihood. They could 
therefore be bought, bribed, intimidated, or swayed by a demagogue into attacking the 
property of those who could maintain the independence requisite for genuine liberty. Said 
Jefferson in his Notes on the State of Virginia, “Dependence begets subservience and 
venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of 
ambition.”11 
 The prevailing fear among landed elites was the possibility of an agrarian 
redistribution of property. This was the paradox of republicanism: property trumped 
liberty because private property, in the Lockean sense, was the physical manifestation of 
self-ownership. As Locke explained in his Second Treatise, because each individual owns 
his own person, he also owns his labor, and therefore he owns the fruits of his labor. 
Whatever individuals mixed their labor with—picking an apple off a tree, building a 
house, or working for a salary—they owned the end product. Consequently, private 
property became the essence of personal freedom. It was the product of one’s liberty, 
and, by this reasoning, it could not be taken away without consent. To do so would be an 
attack on liberty itself—hence Americans’ insistence on “no taxation without 
representation” in the 1760s and 1770s. However, if a person did not own sufficient 
property to maintain economic independence, he became a threat to the property of 
others. This is why a property requirement for voting was universal during the colonial 
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period and remained widespread in the United States prior to the 1820s. A typical 
assumption had been voiced by Gouverneur Morris during the Constitutional Convention 
when he expressed certainty that mechanics and manufacturers, “who receivetheir bread 
from employers,” would sell their votes to would-be aristocrats.12    
In fact, there was a long tradition of justifying not only disfranchisement, but also 
varying degrees of servitude, as a necessary element of a stable society. Ac ording to 
Edmund Morgan, the eighteenth-century commonwealthmen, along with their Virginia 
counterparts, considered poverty to be as great a threat as tyranny. Not unlike Virginia’s 
blacks, England’s poor were social pariahs—unclean, shiftless, vicious, and decidedly 
unworthy to be trusted with political influence that could endanger the property righ s of 
the elite.13  
None of the British proposals for the enslavement of the poor came to fruition, 
but, in Morgan’s view, the fact that they were simply entertained suggests “that the 
English poor of this time seemed to many of their betters to be fit for slavery.” One of the 
most notable proposals can be found in Andrew Fletcher’s Two Discourses Concerning 
the Affairs of Scotland. Fletcher, a member of the Scottish parliament and supporter of 
William III, denounced the Christian Church for coddling his impoverished countrymen. 
By establishing almshouses and hospitals, it had enabled them to live without the need 
for gainful employment. The result was 200,000 “idle rogues” wandering the countryside 
and destabilizing Scottish society. The most effective solution, he argued, would be to 
enslave them and put them at the service of men of property. In response to those who 
worried about the possibility of ill treatment, Fletcher noted that economic self-interest 
would prevent even “the most brutal man” from mistreating “his beast.” As Morgan 
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points out, these words “might have come a century and a half later from a George 
Fitzhugh.”14  
 Virginians, on the other hand, lived under a different, and in their minds, 
felicitous, dynamic. After the tumult of Bacon’s Rebellion, in which former indentur d 
servants joined Nathaniel Bacon’s campaign against western Indians and eastern elites, 
Virginia’s political establishment began to see racism as an effective way to improve the 
material and psychological condition of poor whites and, in so doing, to vent class 
animosities. Virginians were therefore able, in Morgan’s analysis, to assume the mantle 
of republicanism. They did not have to fear a dangerous mob because their rabble had 
already been enslaved and effectively detached from society.  
 In fact, Fitzhugh presaged Morgan’s argument in Ca nibals All!. As a corollary to 
his defense of herrenvolk democracy, he contended that black slavery allowed the 
franchise to be safely extended to non-propertied whites because of their devotion to 
white supremacy. More so than northerners, southern whites without property felt a 
strong sense of racial unity with property owners. This made the South a safer place for 
democracy and, by consequence, the leader in democratic reforms. Along these lines, 
Fitzhugh proudly noted that “the slaveholding South is the only country on the globe that 
can safely tolerate” freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and universal white 
manhood suffrage. The South was “the friend of popular government” because “the 
interests and feelings of many non-property holders are identified with those of a 
comparatively few property holders.” It was not necessary to the security of property that 
the majority of voters should possess it, he explained. “But where the pauper majority 
becomes so large as to disconnect the mass of them in feeling and interest from the 
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property holding class, revolution and agrarianism are inevitable.” Fitzhugh declined to 
assert that northern society was tending in that direction, but he nevertheless felt 
compelled to observe that property was becoming more concentrated in the North and 
that pauperism was increasing.15     
 Indeed, since the argument had already been made to enslave impoverished and 
disorderly Europeans, it was unclear why American whites were necessarily immune to 
the possibility of enslavement when they should happen to become an “unstable 
element.” Senator Douglas insisted that the American government had been “made by the 
white man for the benefit of the white man.” As for the rights of others, he believed they 
should be respected as long as their exercise was “consistent with the safety of society.” 
Yet if blacks could be enslaved in light of their dependence, what would prevent the 
enslavement of whites if they should have the misfortune to fall into pauperism and 
thereby endanger social stability?16  
 In light of the South’s critique of northern society, the republican paradox had 
apparently not been resolved because southerners were still confounding blackness and 
poverty. Northerners were quick to note that southerners condemned their “servile class 
of mechanics and laborers” as being “unfit for self-government.” Along these same lines, 
Governor George McDuffie of South Carolina insisted that it was dangerous to endow 
the poor with freedom and power that could be directed against the property of their 
social betters: “Hence the alarming tendency to violate the rights of property by agrarian 
legislation.” If slaves, “bleached or unbleached,” were allowed equal political privileges, 
McDuffie reasoned that no rational man would consent to live in such a society if h 
could possibly help it. With these assertions in mind, Benjamin Stanton, the Republican 
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candidate for the eighth congressional district of Ohio in 1858 (and future chairman of 
the House Committee on Military Affairs), wrote a public letter in which he summarized 
the southern position:  
It will be seen at once that the real issue between the Republican and Democratic 
parties is whether the productive labor of the country, the rugged toil which is 
required to develop its resources, and augment its wealth, population, and power, 
shall be performed by freemen or slaves. 
It is now the well settled doctrine of the Democratic party of the South . . . that the 
laboring masses of every country, must of necessity be a degraded, ignorant, and 
servile class, who have not intelligence enough to govern the country, and that the 
tendency of free labor society is constantly anarchy and agrarianism, ad that 
therefore they should not be entrusted with power, but should be placed under the 
absolute dominion and control of that more intelligent class who wield the capital 
of the country.  
How easy and natural the conclusion is that laboring men, women and children 
are property, as much the legitimate subjects of commerce as horses and cattle. 
 
Stanton’s political hyperbole notwithstanding, it does seem clear that some slaveholders 
were eschewing universal liberty in favor of republicanism. The latter was fundamentally 
incompatible with the former because the right to private property eclipsed the personal 
freedom of anyone who threatened property rights.17  
 Within the southern speeches and editorials northerners cited as evidence of the 
slave power’s designs, the threat posed by laborers as a political force was a common 
refrain. In one of his Enquirer editorials, Fitzhugh declared that free society was 
insufferable because it was “everywhere starving, demoralized, and insurrectionary.” The 
Washington Union—“the national organ of Buchanan”—referred to the northern settlers 
in Kansas as “a miserable blear-eyed rabble who have been transferred like so many 
cattle to that country.” Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina, whom northern editors 
referred to as the uncle of “assassin” Preston Brooks, was quoted as saying th t a man 
had no right to vote in South Carolina unless he owned ten slaves or real estate valued at 
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$10,000. And included with Herschel Johnson’s widely denounced pronouncement that 
“capital should own its labor” was his observation that the “slaves” in northern 
workshops were vulnerable to political intimidation by their employers: “They ar  driven 
to the polls at the beck of their masters under penalty of being discharged.”18 
 But by far the most infamous and clearly stated condemnation of northern 
laborers’ political power was Hammond’s “Mudsill” speech. “Your slaves are white,” he 
instructed the North, and “are your equals in natural endowment,” which engendered a 
feeling of galling degradation among a potentially unstable social element. Southerners 
denied their slaves political rights for a reason, and he suggested that northerners would 
be wise to consider the possible implications of universal white manhood suffrage. Being 
in the majority, northern slaves “are the depositories of all your political power,” and 
could therefore use that power for their own purposes: “If they knew the tremendous 
secret, that the ballot-box is stronger than any army, with bayonets, and could combine, 
where would you be? Your society would be reconstructed, your government 
reconstructed, [and] your property divided.” Hammond then issued a warning that 
southerners, angered by northern insults and interference with their slaves, could easily 
send forth lecturers and agitators to instruct these degraded northern laborers on the 
potentialities of the ballot box.19   
 
Indentured Servitude and Debt Peonage 
 
 Disfranchisement due to a lack of property was one thing; enslavement as a result
of poverty was quite another. Yet the latter was not without a foundation in reality. 
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Beginning in 1618 the British government swept up thousands of poor children and sent 
them to America to serve as apprentices, with or without their family’s approval. 
However, many were sold to southern planters and, not unlike other new arrivals in the 
tobacco colonies, were dead within a year. Prior to 1776 the authorities in London also 
forcibly transported between 50,000 and 70,000 convicts to the American colonies, as 
well as thousands of other “undesirables,” including beggars, prostitutes, Quakers, 
Cavaliers, Irishmen, and Scottish Jacobins. Yet these numbers, while not insignificant, 
were dwarfed by the 300,000 indentured servants who took their chances in the British 
colonies. Although they willingly agreed to temporarily exchange their labor for the hope 
of a better life down the road, upon arriving in America they often found that they wer 
de facto chattels, and could be bought, sold, and abused with impunity. As Gary B. Nash 
has written, “most depictions of early America as a garden of opportunity airbrush 
indentured servants out of the picture while focusing on the minority who arrived free.” 
Their indentures may have been temporary (for those who survived), but the anguish of 
servitude was no less real.20     
Indentured servitude was not the only form of economic bondage that haunted 
American society. After 1848, Congress was forced to consider the future of peonage in 
the Mexican Cession. Under Mexican law, a creditor could force a debtor to remain in his 
employ until the debt was paid—a condition that could also bind the debtor’s heirs. 
Southerners tended to look favorably upon the continuation of peonage, viewing it as an 
issue of personal property analogous to slavery. Jefferson Davis, for example, defended 
peonage, asserting that it was a species of property, and denying that Congress had any 
right to interfere with it. In response, Stephen Douglas denounced “this revolting system 
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by which white men, our own kindred, may be reduced to a system of slavery.” Referring 
to this exchange, James Huston notes that Douglas’s conception of morality would not 
allow the liberty of whites to be determined by majority rule, even though popular 
sovereignty consigned blacks to the caprice of the majority. Douglas may indeed have 
felt that way, but it is difficult to see an objective principle that could have prevented the 
subjugation of whites if a majority had been so inclined.21  
 Nor did Republicans ignore the specter of peonage as a threat to white liberty. 
The circular issued by the first Republican national committee in April 1856 raised the 
issue: “What will result from the creation of a cordon of slave states across the 
continent?” The answer, they suggested, could be found in the condition of the nominally 
free population of Mexico, where slavery was abolished in name yet still existed in 
practice. Once the slaveocracy came to power in the new territories, they would 
inevitably charge their workers more for supplies than they paid them in wages, “ nd the 
result is, that the laborer is constantly falling more and more in debt, and the law subjects 
him to his creditors until he works out his indebtedness.” The ultimate effect of this 
system would be “to compel a man to sell himself and his family.” The circular then took 
note of the pervasive poverty found in southern society, and, as evidence of the slave 
power’s pernicious designs, once again quoted Fitzhugh’s statement that slavery “does 
not depend on difference of complexion.” It concluded that under this doctrine there 
would be an even more direct enslavement of the white race than the servitude that 
currently pertained under debtor vassalage in Mexico.22    
 A related issue arose shortly before the election of 1860. In August The Weekly 
Oregonian of Portland related a disturbing development out of New Mexico and an 
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equally disturbing reaction from Democrats in Congress. A few proslavery men had 
settled in New Mexico, and finding it unprofitable or impractical to bring their black 
slaves, they had “made slaves of poor white people.” In the same manner as Mexican 
landowners, these proslavery men advanced clothing and supplies, but paid the lowest 
possible wages, thus imprisoning their workers through indebtedness. But unlike 
Mexican landowners, these southerners refused to abide by the laws and customs that had 
protected peons from abuse by their masters. “They wanted the privilege of WHIPPING 
these WHITE MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN,” explained the editor, and the 
territorial legislature accordingly passed a law denying the courts jurisdiction over any 
case involving the “correction that masters may give their servants for neglect of their 
duties.” Here was the principle of slavery in the abstract carried out. Congress, however, 
had the authority to nullify territorial statutes under the terms of New Mexico’s organic 
law. Accordingly Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts introduced an amendment to 
abrogate the offensive provision, but Republicans could not overcome Democratic 
opposition. Among those voting against the amendment were Jefferson Davis, Albert 
Gallatin Brown, James Chestnut, Andrew Johnson, R.M.T. Hunter, Robert Toombs, John 
Slidell, and Louis Wigfall. Douglas was not present, but given his earlier opposition to 
peonage, one suspects he would have supported the measure. The Weekly Oregonian was 
also dismayed by the fact that one of Oregon’s own senators, Joseph Lane, had voted 
with the southern bloc: “What do you think of this white men of Oregon? How would 
you like your employers to cudgel and WHIP you, and when you seek redress, find the 
courts shut against you?” It was therefore a sad commentary on the currentstat  of the 
Democratic Party that some had sought to make Lane Senator Douglas’s running mate. 
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(Not coincidently, Lane did become the vice presidential nominee under John C. 
Breckinridge. One of his sons also fought for the Confederacy.)23 
 Such were the principles of “The New Democratic Doctrine.” Not only were 
laborers better off in bondage, the stability of American society depended on it. 
“Herrenvolk democracy” may have created an illusion of superiority for southern whites, 
but the vagaries of economic fortune could expose anyone to the fate of the peon or the 
rationalizations of property holders. As history proved time and again, slavery was 
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 The arbitrariness of slaveholders’ views on inferiority, the slaves’ welfare, 
society’s welfare, and the lessons of history makes it quite apparent that, in t e fi al 
analysis, enslavement was determined solely by the desire and ability of the strong to 
oppress the weak. This made everyone’s liberty contingent on the vicissitudes of 
circumstance—namely the transience of strength. Faced with an increasingly strident 
proslavery defense, some northerners came to this conclusion. They repeatedly suggested 
that American slavery was analogous to other examples of human tyranny. Daniel 
Webster presaged this argument in his famous Seventh of March address. Although he 
was advocating sectional rapprochement and compromise—and would suffer the 
opprobrium of his fellow New Englanders for so doing—he could not help but observe 
“the wide difference of opinion” between the North and South in respect to slavery’s 
general nature and character. For southerners, the institution was economically vital, 
morally superior, and biblically sanctioned. From the northern perspective, slavery was 
morally iniquitous. According to Webster, northerners believed that slavery “is founded 
merely in the right of the strongest; that it is oppression.” In the end, slavery was like “all 
unjust wars; like all those conflicts by which mighty nations subject weaker nations to 
their will.”1   
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The Accident of Birth and the Vagaries of Circumstance 
 
Slavery and subjugation were not peculiar products of the African-American 
experience. Because of the subjectivity of proslavery rationales, anyone wh  found 
themselves vulnerable or unpopular could be oppressed or, if practicable, reduced to 
bondage. As illustrated by the Know Nothings’ popularity between 1854 and 1856, there 
was certainly no shortage of hostility directed toward foreigners and Catholics. In this 
vein, a Kansas newspaper, The Herald of Freedom, argued that the South was “changing 
front on the subject of slavery,” and warned that slaveholders’ historical rationales would 
put its Irish and German readers at risk. As previously noted, Native Americans, 
Mexicans, the Chinese, and the Japanese were also characterized and treated as “inferior 
races.” In response to the Washington Union’s suggestion that the Chinese could serve as 
an economical labor force in the absence of black slaves, Th  Columbus Republican 
Journal expressed doubt that “the slave power would always remain satisfied with 
reducing negroes alone to servitude.” Other races of men, regardless of color or ethnicity, 
“must be brought under the yoke, when the power becomes sufficiently strong to 
subjugate.” Slavery in the Roman period was not limited by race or color, it noted, and 
there was no reason to assume that the modern slaveocracy would not be “equally 
indiscriminate, when it gets the strength to execute its purpose.”2  
Other northerners employed the same logic. According to Russel B. Nye, the 
northern laborer was often warned that he would be the first to be enslaved, “since his 
was the weakest political and economic position in society.” In response to a Richmond 
Enquirer article noting that “the strong in mind or body were born to command,” and 
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conversely that nature had made slaves of the weak, the editor of a Michigan newspaper 
warned that “according to this doctrine, my brother shopman, if you, by reason of 
sickness or misfortune are enervated in body and mind, why you are a SLAVE!” This 
could only be expected, said the editor, because the difference in color between slaves 
and free whites was becoming so slight, particularly in Virginia, that it was almost 
impossible to differentiate between the two. Similarly, Congressman Cyrus Dunham of 
Indiana declared that slavery could endure only “by the might of [the master’s] power, 
and no longer.” In 1858, William Seward suggested that the freedom of northern laborers 
would not last indefinitely given the current proslavery outlook. The only reason they 
were not enslaved, he told a New York audience, was because they could not “as yet, be 
reduced to bondage.” As a long-time opponent of nativism, he also warned them that it 
ultimately would not matter if they were native or foreign born. And at the very 
beginning of the speech in which he posited an “irrepressible conflict” between North 
and South, he observed that the confinement of slavery to blacks was “only accidental.” 
Slavery’s main principle was not racial, he explained. It was the weak and debased 
condition of the laborer.3  
The noted Scottish journalist, William Chambers, also gave voice to this concern. 
Along with his brother, Chambers was co-editor of Chambers’ Journal of Popular 
Literature. In 1853 he undertook a tour of the United States and Canada that led to the 
publication of two books, Things as They Are in America, nd American Slavery and 
Colour. While visiting Richmond, Chambers attended a slave auction, a spectacle he 
deemed “the most curious I ever witnessed.” He spoke with slaveowners, would-be 
buyers, and with the slaves themselves, and discovered a surprising degree of 
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cheerfulness among all parties, although the slaves facing separation from family 
members willingly expressed their sorrow. Summing up the experience, he expressed 
doubt as to the fairness of selling a man, even if that man was inferior. After all, it w s 
only from “a variety of fortunate circumstances” that his new owner could claim 
superiority. In any event, Chambers’ American tour gave him a firm understanding of the 
southern position—or at least the northern interpretation of it.  On the first page of 
American Slavery, he presented the southern argument and noted the dangers it posed to 
the weakest members of society. 
“Race! Do not speak to us of race—we care nothing for breed or colour. What we 
contend for is, that slavery, whether of black or white, is a normal, a proper 
institution in society.” So proclaim southern writers in the United States. The 
principle of enslaving only coloured persons, descendants of imported Africans, is 
now antiquated, and a scheme which embraces slavery of every race and variety 
of complexion is at length put forward as a natural and desirable arrangement for 
all parties. . . . Any one could have foreseen that it must come to this. The 
prodigious and irregular amalgamation of races in the south . . . led to a pretty 
nearly pure, nay, absolutely pure breed of white slaves. A new style of reasoning 
is consequently required. If slavery is to be at all vindicated, it must not now be 
on the narrow basis of colour, but on the broad grounds, that there is an inherent 
right in the stronger and more wealthy classes to reduce the poorer, and, it may 
be, more ignorant orders to a state of perpetual bondage. 
 
Even the most cursory glance at the southern press—Chambers had apparently read the 
Richmond Enquirer—would, in his view, disabuse anyone who doubted the accuracy of 
this description.4  
In the end, it was up to the American people to repudiate the notion that slavery 
was normal and proper, for a supposedly beneficent institution could not be logically 
confined to any particular race. In terms similar to Lincoln’s oft-expressed concern for 
the status of slavery in the public mind, a Pennsylvania newspaper stated that the 
“soundness of the popular heart” depended on the nation’s perception of the institution’s 
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morality or immorality. This was important, said the editor, because the assumption that 
slaveholding is right and benevolent “confounds all our notions of right and wrong.” If 
the American people acquiesced to the southern position, class, color, race, and ethnicity
would prove no barrier to an individual’s enslavement. “A universal degeneracy” would 
seize the country. Thousands would join the Democratic Party in denouncing the 
Declaration of Independence and insisting that men should own their servants. Then it 
would only be “by sleepless vigilance” that the poor and friendless could “avoid 
becoming mere chattels and things.”5  
 
An Appeal to History 
 
 Northerners and Southerners both invoked historical experience in an attempt to 
validate their position. The advocates of slavery were particularly eagerto prove that the 
institution carried the approbation of Christian experience. Proslavery newspapers offered 
lengthy disquisitions on scripture’s recognition of human bondage. The title of a 
pamphlet written by a southern clergyman in 1850 was fairly typical of the southern 
thesis: A Defense of the South Against the Reproaches and Encroachments of the North: 
In Which Slavery Is Shown to Be an Institution of God Intended to Form the Basis of the 
Best Social State and the Only Safeguard to the Permanence of a Republican 
Government.  
 Once again, Professor Dew’s apologia provided a model for later proslavery 
writers. “There is no rule of conscience or revealed law of God that can condemn us,” he
assured his fellow slaveholders. There was nothing whatsoever in the Old or New 
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Testaments to even suggest that the southern master committed an offense. As proof, he
pointed to biblical patriarchs who were also slaveowners. “Abraham had more than 300; 
Isaac had a ‘great store’ of them.” Even Job had “a very great household.” Nor did Christ 
presume to “meddle” with the established institutions of mankind. Jesus had accepted all, 
Dew insisted, including “the monarch and the subject, the rich and the poor, the master 
and the slave.” And with a thinly veiled reference to Nat Turner’s recent revolt, he 
angrily condemned the supposed philanthropy of northern abolitionists: “What a rebuke 
does the practice of the Redeemer of mankind imply upon the conduct of some of his 
nominal disciples, who seek to destroy the contentment of the slaves, to rouse their most 
deadly passions, and to lead them on to a night of darkness and confusion!” He then 
suggested that northerners misunderstood the Golden Rule. It may properly govern 
personal conduct, but it did not mean that men should be wrested from their “calling,” 
even if their calling was to be a slave.6  
 The southern historian and novelist William Gilmore Simms also took pains to 
highlight biblical passages that seemed to legitimize the southern position. He noted that 
the angel of the Lord had explicitly enjoined a runaway slave owned by Sarai (Ab ham’s 
wife) to “return unto thy mistress, and submit thyself under her hands.” The apostle Paul 
had likewise urged slaves to submit to their masters and advised a runaway to return to 
his owner.7  
 Even apart from biblical sanctions, the very fact that slavery and serfdom had 
been an integral part of so many great societies encouraged southerners to draw 
comparisons. Ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, Carolingian France, and Norman England 
had all rested on some form of paternalistic servitude. These were the societie  that had 
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produced the greatest art, the greatest literature, and the greatest architectural monuments 
to human ingenuity. These were the societies that Americans consciously sought to 
emulate. “There is not a respectable system of civilization known to history,” crowed 
Virginia’s R.M.T. Hunter, “whose foundations were not laid in the institution of domestic 
slavery.”8 
Although many southerners may have been unwilling to admit the logical 
implications of their religious and historical appeals, northerners were quick to note that 
biblical slavery had been white slavery. Of course this was also Fitzhugh’s purpose in 
rejecting race as the sine qua non of servitude. In an editorial for De Bow’s Review he 
accurately observed that black slavery was “of very recent origin.” And then, in one of 
his more controversial statements, he argued that anyone who suggested that “the white 
race is not the true and best slave race” contradicted all history. In fact the very image of 
“Liberty” in the United States (which appeared on almost every American coin and 
banknote) was a white woman holding or wearing a Phrygian cap, the symbol of 
emancipation in ancient Rome.9  
This is precisely why northerners viewed slavery as yet another manifest tion of 
“might makes right.” In response to L.Q.C. Lamar’s attempt to show that the Bible 
sanctioned slavery, Congressman Sidney Edgerton of Ohio noted that “if it did, it was 
white slavery.” Indeed, the Mississippian did not even attempt to sustain slavery on the 
basis of race or color, but “upon the more startling assumption that the stronger class has 
a right to enslave the weaker.” The National Era also expressed alarm over the 
capriciousness of historical servitude. The slavery of antiquity had been white slavery, it 
declared in 1854, and “had its origin in just such cause as black Slavery in our day has 
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grown out of.” Six years later, it was still reminding its readers that the slav s held in the 
time of Moses were white men, as were those held in the Roman Empire: “They were 
either the unfortunate poor sold into slavery for debt, or else they were captives taken in 
war” who were then sold into slavery instead of being executed. (Fitzhugh had taken the 
latter fact and suggested that slavery was more “durable” if those held in bondage were of 
a different nationality than their masters. But Republicans often took this and style  it as 
a threat to Irish and German Americans.)10  
William Henry Fry’s 1860 campaign tract was dedicated in large part to 
southerners’ invocation of historical servitude, which many viewed as an ominous signal 
of southern intentions. Once the South succeeded in enslaving the white laborers of the 
North, the United States would degenerate into a nineteenth-century reproduction of 
Roman despotism. Why would it be any different? According to Fry, history provided 
indisputable proof that the “cause of slavery was the same everywhere . . . and so must be 
its highest development.” It was born of warfare and human rapacity. “Cities and villages 
are given to flames and pillage, and the inhabitants not killed to the conqueror’s yoke. 
Slavery never can be other than its origin made it. It is simply the triumph of brute 
force.”11   
 The most widely employed piece of biblical “evidence” for the divine origins of 
slavery was the Curse of Ham. The original story in Genesis 9:18-27 was that Ham, he 
son of Noah, had looked upon his father’s nakedness as Noah lay drunk in his tent after 
the flood. Precisely what “looked upon” meant has long been the subject of debate. For 
some it implies castration, for others merely a lack of reverence. In eithercas , Noah’s 
other two sons, Shem and Japheth, carefully covered their father without looking upon 
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him. When Noah awoke and discovered what Ham had done, he cursed Canaan, Ham’s 
son, declaring that he would be a “servant of servants” unto his brothers.  
David Brion Davis has written that no other biblical passage “has had such a 
disastrous influence through human history.” Slaveholding Christians held it up time and 
again as justification for African servitude, the implication being that Africans were 
descendants of the cursed Ham. It was cetainly more acceptable than the notion of 
polygenesis, which denied the idea of a common human origin and, in so doing, flatly 
contradicted the story of creation. Davis seems to agree with the conclusion of Alexander 
Crummell, a respected free African American, who argued in 1862 that the belief that 
black slavery was a consequence of the Curse of Ham was “almost universal” in the 
Christian world.12  
The obvious problem, which both Davis and Winthrop Jordan are quick to point 
out, is that there was absolutely nothing in the story about race or blackness being a result 
of Noah’s curse. In fact, it was not until the mid-fifteenth century, after the first 
Portuguese expeditions along the West African coast, that the curse became associated 
with blackness in the European mind. The subsequent persistence of this idea, as Jordan 
explains, “was probably sustained by a feeling that blackness could scarcely be an thing 
but a curse.” Similarly, George Fredrickson suggests that the curse, as applied to blacks, 
was a matter of popular mythology rather than biblical exegesis. Jordan observes that 
black and white were emotionally loaded colors, particularly for Elizabethan Englishmen. 
Black connoted filth, debasement, and shame, while white conveyed purity, virtue, and 
beauty. Yet at other times, the curse was applied to Asians, the inhabitants of India, and 
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was also used to explain European serfdom and the enslavement of Turks, Slavs, and 
other peoples.13   
The Curse of Ham, therefore, had been a historically capricious doctrine. The 
story had no inherent pertinence to color or race. Fitzhugh, with his penchant for 
debunking popular ideas, was happy to point this out. Charles Sumner did as well. Upon 
his return to the Senate in 1860, Sumner undertook a detailed rebuttal of a speech 
Jefferson Davis had recently made in which the future Confederate president twic  
invoked Noah’s curse upon Ham as evidence of slavery’s divine origins. Sumner 
pointedly suggested that Davis’s expertise was military rather than biblical. As a former 
secretary of war and current chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, Davis “may 
perhaps set a squadron in the field,” Sumner noted, “but he has evidently considered very 
little of the text of Scripture on which he relies. The senator assumes that it has f xed the 
doom of the colored race, leaving untouched the white race.” Davis was apparently 
unaware that the Polish aristocracy had used the curse as an excuse for holding white 
serfs, “and that even to this day the angry Polish noble addresses his white peasant as the 
‘son of Ham.’”14 
In more recent years, the existence of white slavery in Islamic North Africa had 
provided northerners with a compelling analogue to black slavery. From the early 
sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century, there may have been as many as
1,250,000 slaves held in the North African states of Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, and, in 
particular, Algiers. Although this was only a tenth the number of African slaves tak n o 
the New World during the same period, it is not an insignificant figure. Many were 
fishermen and coastal villagers from Spain and Italy, but most were captured sailors,
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including some taken from the British navy. Very few had the family resources to 
purchase their freedom; many died of disease and maltreatment.  
This was another example of historical slavery that Sumner took a particular 
interest in. He spoke on the issue numerous times, and in 1853 wrote a book, White 
Slavery in the Barbary States. In addition to Franklin’s fictitious letter of 1790 (see 
chapter one), Sumner recounted John Jay’s reaction to complaints that the British had 
taken slaves from New York in violation of the Treaty of Paris. Jay, then secretary for 
foreign affairs under the Confederation, asked how Americans would respond if the 
French were to liberate American captives in Algiers, but then agree to return them to 
their masters upon making peace. He admitted that he was making unpopular arguments, 
but Jay nonetheless felt compelled to observe that the only difference between the two
cases was “that the American slaves at Algiers are white people, whereas the African 
slaves at New York were black people.” Nor could Sumner resist observing that the 
Barbary regencies were located near the parallel of 36˚30’, which made Algiers, Tunis, 
Tripoli, and Morocco the African equivalents of Virginia, the Carolinas, Mississippi, and 
Texas—or as Sumner dubbed them, “The Barbary States of America.” The “common 
peculiarities of climate, breeding, indolence, lassitude, and selfishness,” he sugg sted, 
were the cause of their mutual “insensibility to the claims of justice and humanity.”15  
As noted in chapters two and four, both Lincoln and Fitzhugh drew a parallel 
between American slavery and the caste system of medieval Europe. Their conclusions, 
however, were diametrically opposed. Fitzhugh made the comparison to establish the 
South as being within the mainstream of history, and to defend slavery as a means of 
protecting the weak from the strong. Lincoln drew the analogy in order to show that the 
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rationales for slavery were capricious and arbitrary. It was not freedom, but slavery, and 
past iterations of it, that represented the principle of “might makes right.” Slaveholders, 
just like the aristocrats and monarchs of old, insisted that the people under their control 
were “inferior,” that they were better off enslaved, or that they had been consigned by 
God to a menial station. Lincoln made this comparison at Peoria in 1854, in the 
previously quoted speech in Chicago in 1858, in his final reply to Senator Douglas at 
their last joint debate at Alton, and in his recognition of Jefferson’s birthday the 
following year. At Alton he waxed poetic in a style not unlike his second inaugural six 
years later. The “real issue”—which transcended the Illinois senate race o  any other 
single campaign—was the “eternal struggle” between right and wrong. “The one is the 
common right of humanity,” he told his listeners, “and the other the divine right of 
kings.” In an appeal to free-labor principles, he argued that the latter was simply the old 
mentality that says “You toil and work and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.” Whether it came 
from a king who justified living off the fruits of his subjects’ labor or from a southerner 
determined to rationalize slavery, it was “the same tyrannical principle.”  
Nor was Lincoln the only northerner to view slavery as a manifestation of Old 
World absolutism. “It might be thought that in a Democracy a slaveholder could be no 
more safely trusted with power than a monarchist,” declared the New York Tribune. 
“Neither believes in the theory of popular rights; to either the Declaration of 
Independence is a self-evident lie or a rhetorical flourish. Each should be carefully 
watched to prevent him from corrupting the minds and subverting the liberties of the 
people.” Southerners, with their predilection for tyranny and violence, simply could not 
be trusted with questions of right and justice. They were “incapacitated for 
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statesmanship.” According to an Indiana editor, northerners should be willing, if 
necessary, to take up arms against those who were “endeavoring to re-inaugurate the 
regime of the dark ages,” when oppression, crime, and ignorance reigned supreme. Along 
these same lines, Senator Lyman Trumbull gave a speech in July 1857 (which was 
suspiciously similar to one Lincoln had delivered a month earlier) in which he maintained 
that the framers of the Declaration of Independence had not intended to declare all men 
equal in all respects, but had meant “to repudiate the idea of a superiority of birth,” by 
which the divine right of kings and a hereditary aristocracy was upheld in the Old Worl, 
“and which is now sought by the self-styled Democracy to be transplanted into the 
new.”16 
Trumbull referred to the Declaration as the polar star that Americans should never 
lose sight of, lest they forget the philosophical foundation of the liberty their fathers had 
fought to secure. Lincoln called it a standard maxim and a stumbling block to all those 
who would “seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.” But as 
the 1850s progressed, it became distressingly clear that the star was fading and the 
stumbling block eroding under the constant pressure of southern assaults and Democratic 
qualifications.17        
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Because the rationales for human servitude were inherently capricious, the 
acceptance of black slavery rendered the liberty of all Americans contingent on 
circumstance. Having come to this understanding, some northerners insisted that he only 
guarantee of individual liberty was universal liberty. Only by accepting the universal 
equality of natural rights could Americans of all races rest secure in thebelief that their 
own liberty would always be respected, regardless of circumstance. Thus the Declaration 
of Independence assumed a sacred position as the ultimate palladium of human rights. 
According to William H. Seward, the American Revolution had been a struggle to 
maintain the principle of universal liberty, which he deemed the supreme law of man. 
“That supreme law is necessarily based on the equality of nations, of races, and of men. It 
is a simple, self-evident basis. One nation, race, or individual may not oppress or injure 
another, because the safety and welfare of each is essential to the common safety and 
welfare of all. If all are not equal and free, then who is entitled to be free, and what 
evidence of his superiority can he bring from nature or revelation?”1 
When southerners rejected or qualified the Declaration, they eroded the American 
people’s devotion to liberty as a central principle, and in so doing, placed the nation on a 
path to despotism. By denying that “all men” were endowed with inalienable rights, they 
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destroyed the self-evidence of those rights. The Declaration’s meaning became a 
prominent theme for northerners and southerners alike, although heretofore it has 
received scant attention from historians. In numerous speeches and editorials, antislavery 
northerners stressed the importance of the Declaration, decrying southern denials of 
universal liberty, particularly in respect to Chief Justice Taney’s decision n Dred Scott v. 
Sanford.      
As northerners contemplated the future of freedom in a slaveholding country, they 
echoed the fears of Jefferson himself. In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson 
expressed particular concern that the people’s liberty could not be sustained if they 
removed “its only secure basis.” In his view, this basis was “a conviction in theminds of 
the people that these liberties are the gift of God.” And he candidly admitted that he 
trembled for the fate of his country when he recalled that God is just. Because blcks and 
whites were equally members of the human race, the vagaries of circumstance could 
someday ensnare whites in the black man’s bondage. “Considering numbers, nature and 
natural means only,” Jefferson explained, “a revolution of the wheel of fortune, [and] an 
exchange of situation is among possible events.” In fact, he believed such an event could 
easily occur through “supernatural interference.”2 
Over seventy years later, Charles Sumner informed his southern colleagues in the 
Senate that “it was the inspiration of Liberty Universal that conducted us through the Red 
Sea of the Revolution.” This was also the principle that gave the Declaration of 
Independence “its mighty tone, resounding through the ages.”3 Shortly thereafter he stood 
before a New York audience and echoed Jefferson’s argument that the liberty of whites 
depended on the liberty of blacks. 
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As a man, he stands before you an unquestionable member of the Human Family, 
and entitled to all the rights of man. You can claim nothing for yourself, as a 
man, which you must not accord to him. Life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness—which you proudly declare to be your own, inalienable, God-given 
rights, and to the support of which your fathers pledged their lives, fortunes and 
sacred honor, are his by the same immortal title that they are yours.4 
 
According to both Jefferson and Sumner, universal liberty meant that all men were justly 
entitled to their natural rights simply by virtue of their status as human beings. Without 
that assumption, individual liberty would never be self-evident, and, consequently, would 
never be fully secure.  
This argument points to the critical discrepancy inherent in the American 
Revolution. How could a slaveholding nation effectively champion human rights? From 
the very beginning, the founding generation struggled to reconcile its ideals with its 
actions. Some found it convenient to blame the British for the introduction and 
preservation of slavery. It is well known that Jefferson had wanted to include a 
condemnation of the slave trade in the Declaration of Independence as part of his litany 
of charges against George III: 
He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred 
rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended 
him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur 
miserable death in their transportation thither. . . . Determined to keep open a 
market where men should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for 
suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrabl  
commerce.5   
 
Not surprisingly, Congress excised the entire passage, in part because it strained credulity 
to blame the young king for the continuation of African slavery in the British colonies. 
Jefferson, however, contended that Congress made the change “in complaisance to South 
Carolina and Georgia”— which was undoubtedly true. According to Don Fehrenbacher, 
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southerners may have been particularly disturbed by the moralistic tone of Jefferson’s 
denunciation, which could easily have extended from the slave trade to slavery itself.6  
Thus at the moment of America’s independence, the ideal of universal liberty 
bowed to the reality of slavery’s existence. Jefferson expressed hope that the Revolution 
would eventually abate “the spirit of the master,” and prepare the way for “a ttal 
emancipation.” As Lincoln later noted, northerners and southerners could not have united 
if the former had grasped for the immediate abolition of slavery. Neverthelss, he insisted 
that this submission to necessity, by itself, did not “destroy the principle that is the 
charter of our liberties.”7    
 
Our Progress in Degeneracy 
 
The Declaration of Independence may have been the sheet anchor of American 
liberty, but its legacy was more nebulous than Lincoln and other antislavery norther ers 
cared to believe. In the end, the “Spirit of Seventy-Six” was just that—a spirit. Unlike the 
Constitution, it was not the supreme law of the land, or any law for that matter. Toward 
the end of his life, Jefferson explained that his purpose in writing the Declaration had 
been “to place before mankind the common sense of the subject,” and to do so “in terms 
so plain and firm as to command their assent.” But as the decades passed, what was self-
evident to some Americans became an inconvenience and anathema to others.8 
The incongruity of human slavery in a nation dedicated to human liberty had 
always been painfully obvious. At the time of the Revolution, half a million Americans 
were slaves, constituting more than a sixth of the nation’s population. For those who 
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viewed whites and blacks as members of the same family, the fate of one race was 
inextricably tied to the fate of the other. “It is astonishing,” wrote a Pennsylvanian in 
1777, “that men who feel the value and importance of liberty . . . should keep such 
numbers of the human species in a state of so absolute vassalage. Every argument which 
can be urged in favor of our own liberties will certainly operate with equal force in favor 
of that of the Negroes; nor can we with any propriety contend for the one while we 
withhold the other.” Indeed, every argument that could be urged in favor of black slavery 
could operate with equal force in favor of the subjugation of whites.9 
Prior to the 1830s, most southerners agreed with northerners that slavery was 
incompatible with the ideals of 1776. Yet once slavery ceased to be a necessary evil and
became a “positive good,” southerners began to sound increasingly iconoclastic in respect 
to the Declaration’s pronouncement that “all men are created equal.” In an address to the 
Senate on the crisis surrounding the Mexican Cession, John C. Calhoun contemplated 
what a future historian might say about the dissolution of the Union. “If he should 
possess a philosophical turn of mind,” he could trace America’s destruction to “the most 
false and dangerous of all political errors,” the proposition that “all men are born free and 
equal.” (This was the wording of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights. Calhoun considered 
the wording of the Declaration of Independence to be only slightly less objectionable.) In 
an effort to discredit such an insidious doctrine, Calhoun treated it as a literal statement 
rather than a philosophical expression. Men did not come into the world free or equal, he 
intoned. They were born in a state of abject dependence, and slowly grew “to all the 
freedoms of which the condition in which they were born permits.” To claim otherwise 
was palpably absurd. And, therefore, it was also absurd to argue that the notion of 
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equality had any logical place in the colonists’ separation from Great Brit in or in the 
governments they subsequently established.10    
Some southerners, such as Calhoun, denied the principle of universal freedom 
entirely, while others, along with the northern advocates of popular sovereignty, qualified 
it in an attempt to exclude blacks. In either case, the Declaration lost its power as a 
palladium of individual liberty—a dangerous development, given the caprice of 
Jefferson’s “wheel of fortune.” Consequently, northerners often lamented what they 
sensed as a declension in the American public’s devotion to universal liberty. “Our 
progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid,” Lincoln wrote to his old friend 
Joshua Speed in 1855. “As a nation we began by declaring that ‘all men are created 
equal.’ We now practically read it ‘all men are created equal, except Negroes.’” Once 
again comparing black slavery to the subjugation of whites, he speculated that “when the 
Know-Nothings get control, it will read ‘all men are created equal, except Negroes and 
foreigners and Catholics.’”11  
Antislavery editorials and speeches were full of jeremiads on the South’s, and by
extension the nation’s, retrogression in respect to the Declaration’s preamble and the 
incongruity of human slavery. On a symbolic level, northerners deplored the fact that 
streets named after revolutionary heroes served as venues for auctions where men, 
women, and children were sold to the highest bidder. The Methodist Quarterly Review 
referred to this degeneration of the public mind as “the Great American Apostasy.” 
Washington, Henry, Madison, and Jefferson had all lamented the prejudicial influence of 
slavery, noted the editor, and had hoped for its ultimate extinction. But as the decades 
passed, it became “the self-complacent folly of pretentious, but puny-minded men among
141 
 
us, to laugh at the assertion of human equality, made in the Declaration of 
Independence.”12    
In short, as southerners became more and more strident in their defense of their 
peculiar institution, and as northern Democrats acquiesced to their demands, the 
incompatibility of slavery and freedom became too jarring to ignore. “How strange the 
spectacle,” lamented the National Era, “that less than thirty years after the death of 
Jefferson, the very basis of our free institutions, which his own hand laid in the 
Declaration of Independence, should be rooted up and cast aside by the party which he 
founded in his native state.” It then suggested that no one currently residing in Virginia 
would dare to stand up to the slave power and defend the principles that an earlier 
generation of Virginians had staked their lives and sacred honor upon.13 During the 
debates over the Wilmot Proviso, the old conservative Thomas Corwin told the Senate 
that the men of 1776 did not believe that any man was born “booted and spurred” to ride 
another. And in an attempt to analogize southern apostasy with European tyranny, he 
noted that “in those days, Virginia and Virginia’s sons, Washington and Jefferson, had as 
little respect for that maxim, partus sequitur ventrem, as for that other cognate dogma, 
‘Kings are born to rule.’”14 Similarly, a local schoolmaster delivering a Fourth of July 
oration in Ottawa, Illinois exclaimed to his audience that the Declaration’s pri ciple of 
universal freedom was consecrated by the blood of their fathers and had once been held 
as an axiom by all Americans. But now the people “hear it almost daily assaulted, even 
on the floor of Congress. We are gravely told that it is a silly abstraction, that God did not 
create all men free and equal; that he designed some for hewers of wood and drawers of 
water—some as slaves, and some as masters!” The people should thank God, he 
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remarked, that the founders did not live to see what their children had become. While 
they had once declared slavery to be a national disgrace and contrary to the public good, 
Americans were now “required to believe and declare Slavery to be a patriarchal, heaven-
ordained institution, the only true basis of a free government; that the capitalists should of 
right own the laborer; [that] the Declaration of Independence is a lie, and the fathers of 
this republic were silly bigots. Such are the sentiments advocated in broad daylight in this 
free Republic . . . ALL THIS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, and in the United 
States!”15 
In response to Senator Albert G. Brown’s resolution in favor of a federal slave 
code for the territories, Henry Wilson lamented the “complete revolution” in the political 
sentiments of the nation’s public men. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, all 
Americans had cherished, “as a living faith, the creed that ‘all men are created equal,’” 
and had voiced their hope that slavery would eventually perish. But seventy years lat r, 
those who dictated the policies of the national government shamefully sacrificed the 
rights of man to the economic interests of the slaveholding minority.16 Frederick 
Douglass likewise decried slavery’s regressive influence. In his view, th institution had 
quite literally “bewitched” the people. “It has taught us to read history backwards. It has 
given us evil for good—darkness for light, and bitter for sweet.” If the signers of the 
Declaration could rise from their graves, they would be “banished from the councils of 
the nation.” Their struggle for human freedom had been supplanted by the political 
apostasy of unworthy successors—men who accepted or defended the view that slavery 
was a natural and necessary condition for at least some members of the human family.17  
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 Moreover, if the defenders of slavery succeeded in overthrowing the belief that 
“all men are created equal,” the American Revolution would be stripped of its principal 
legacy. No longer a struggle for the rights of man, it would stand as just another 
rebellion, a war undertaken by fractious colonials for the limited goal of self-government. 
“If slavery is right,” announced the Indiana abolitionist Philip S. Cleland, “the axioms set 
forth in [the Declaration of Independence] are glaringly false; the American Revolution 
was but a successful revolution; and our fathers should be regarded as a band of rebels, 
engaged in unlawful resistance against the lawful authority of George III.”18 In a more 
facetious manner, although no less serious, Lincoln suggested that the rejections and 
qualifications of the Declaration eliminated any need to celebrate the anniversary of 
America’s independence. Why should Americans bother commemorating the Declaration 
when it had little or no relevance to the present day? Southerners had “become so greedy 
to become masters” that they called the same maxim “a self-evident lie.”  Consequently, 
“on the question of liberty as a principle, we are not what we have been.” Still, “the 
Fourth of July has not quite dwindled away,” he told a Kentucky correspondent. “It is 
still a great day—for burning fire-crackers!!!”19        
To make matters worse, America’s retrogression exposed the United Stats to 
ridicule and charges of hypocrisy. As immigrants from New England made their way 
west to Kansas, they often sang “The Freeman’s Song.” One verse posed a telling 
question: 
Men, who bear the Pilgrim’s name, 
Men, who love your country’s fame, 
Can ye brook your country’s shame 




In a similar vein, William Lloyd Garrison argued that his supposed “fanaticism” 
amounted to nothing more than his insistence that Americans either abolish slavery or 
cease to “prate on the rights of man.”21 It was simply too easy to convict them of 
duplicity. This hypocrisy also undermined America’s influence on the world stage as a 
symbol of freedom, while the slaveholding ascendancy provided a comforting analogue 
to the enemies of reform. Lincoln pointedly warned that “the one retrograde institut on n 
America is undermining the principles of progress, and fatally violating the noblst 
political system the world ever saw.” As he reiterated during the war, Americans had a 
solemn responsibility to maintain the world’s “last best hope” and ensure that a 
government dedicated to the principle that “all men are created equal” would not perish 
from the earth.22   
Southerners, however, were naturally compelled to reject or qualify the 
Declaration if they intended to justify slavery as anything more than a temporary 
aberration. Senator Hammond suggested that Jefferson, while a great patriot, had been 
overly attached to “sentimental French philosophy,” which later led to the reign of 
terror.23 The New York Evening Post reprinted a speech John C. Breckinridge delivered 
in 1856 in which the soon-to-be vice president dismissed the Declaration as a dangerous 
abstraction that had no bearing on the Constitution. If the Declaration had the force of 
constitutional law, he warned, it would compel the government to “protect every man in 
his right to ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’” thus undermining the rights of the 





Freedom’s Face Value 
 
In addition to political speeches, newspaper editorials, and private letters, the 
increasing acceptability of slavery in the United States can be easilydiscerned in popular 
imagery. One of the most abundant sources of popular imagery during the antebellum 
period was the multitude of banknotes that circulated throughout the nation’s economy. 
Although we may not think of it when making a purchase, examining the contents of our 
own pockets can offer ample proof that there is more to money than spending power. In 
addition to providing a circulating medium, currency and coins are works of art. While 
the most obvious reason for such artistry may be the need to deter counterfeiting, it also 
transforms our money into a powerful patriotic device. From the lowest to the highest 
denominations, for thousands of years people have used money as a means of celebrating 
leaders, institutions, and ideas. 
Faced with the exigencies of the Civil War, in 1861 the United States began to 
develop a nationalized monetary system, complete with a national currency. As a result
of this system, our monetary iconography typically commemorates our national herit ge. 
However, with the exception of the continental bills issued between 1775 and 1779, prior 
to the Civil War paper currency was a state and local creation. By the late 1850s, there 
were roughly seven thousand different banknote varieties in circulation.25 From a strictly 
economic perspective, this diversity lent itself to considerable confusion as the United 
States developed a national market. It also provided highly fertile ground for the 
proliferation of counterfeits.26 Yet from a historian’s perspective, this diversity of local 
notes not only allows us to compare northern and southern iconography; it allows us to 
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examine changes in the iconographic representations of liberty and slavery from the 
Revolution to the Civil War.  
Despite the potential for local variety, northerners and southerners employed 
many of the same vignettes on their currency. One of the most common was the 
allegorical representation of liberty as a woman holding or wearing a liberty cap. 
Moreover, while every state, and many towns, chose to commemorate their own leaders 
and historical figures (for example, nearly every note issued in South Carolina portrayed 
the less-than-benign countenance of John C. Calhoun), they frequently chose likenesses 
of Washington, Franklin, and the other founding fathers, as well as images of shipping, 
generic pastoral scenes, and depictions of women that occasionally bordered on the 
salacious.27    
  Southern currency differed from northern currency in one key respect: Southern 
notes often displayed images of slaves. Considering the enormous monetary value of the 
institution, it is perhaps not surprising that southerners included illustrations of slavery on 
their money. Representing nearly $3 billion, the investment in slaves was more than the 
national investment in railroads and manufacturing combined.28 The use of slave 
vignettes also demonstrates its importance to southern society as a whole. By displa ing 
images of happy, hardworking bondsmen, southerners attempted to validate their belief 
that African bondage was a blessing to blacks and whites alike. 
 The emergence of slavery vignettes over time is perhaps the clearest trend. From 
the early eighteenth century to the adoption of the Constitution, the colonies and states 
issued bills of credit adorned with allegorical and sometimes fanciful images. Th se were 
often accompanied by moralistic mottos, which, during the years of the Revolution, 
147 
 
became fervently patriotic and anti-British. Benjamin Franklin suggested many of the 
designs found on the Continental notes, which explains their instructive, “Poor Richard” 
quality. Given the symbolic importance of monetary design, it is telling that eigh eenth-
century southerners never used their currency to defend the enslavement of African-
Americans. Indeed, anyone unfamiliar with Britain’s southern colonies might have 
looked at their currency and assumed that the South was home to lions, elephants, and 
unicorns, but they would have had no idea that it was home to even a single slave. The 
references to slavery that did appear were both general and decidedly negative. Maryland 
issued an entire series of bills in 1775 that depicted a female representation of America 
offering a petition to her British counterpart. At the same time, America can be seen 
trampling on a scroll marked “slavery,” while George III stands to the left trampling on 
the Magna Charta and personally setting fire to an American town! On a four-dollar note 
issued in 1776, Georgia announced that “freedom is more precious than gold,” a 
sentiment that future generations of Georgians actively sought to qualify. The following 
year, South Carolina issued a twenty-dollar note with the image of a bird escaping from 
its cage and the motto Iba Patria Ubi Libertas—“Our country, the land of freedom.” The 
thirty-dollar note of the same series presented the motto Misera Servitus Ominis—“All 
slavery is wretched.” The irony of these sentiments is palpable when one considers that 
more than half of South Carolina’s population was enslaved. Yet while these mottos may 
have been somewhat hypocritical, they do suggest that eighteenth-century southerners 
considered slavery to be at best a necessary evil.29 
 The first slave vignettes appeared in the 1830s and rapidly proliferated over the 
next twenty years. Not coincidently, this was also the period in which southerners 
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launched their counterattack against the burgeoning abolitionist movement. Reflecting 
the new interpretation of slavery as a “positive good,” one popular vignette depicts slave  
cheerfully riding on a wagon loaded with cotton. Another shows an idyllic depiction of a 
slave mother and her child, while another portrays a field hand with a basket of cotton 
and a very distinct smile on his face. 
 Although northerners were expressing increasing hostility to the South’s peculiar 
institution, northern engraving firms were happy to oblige the aesthetic tastes of th ir 
southern customers. During the antebellum period, the vast majority of notes issued by 
both northern and southern banks were engraved by printing firms in New York and 
Philadelphia. (Seven of the most prominent engraving firms came together in 1858 to 
form the American Bank Note Company, which still produces financial and other 
security documents today.) This explains the considerable degree of repetition in the use 
of popular images. After the development of reusable, interchangeable dies (which 
produced notes that rival, and perhaps even exceed, the quality of today’s currency), bank 
representatives were able to choose from existing stocks of decorative borders, portraits, 
and vignettes, including a wide variety of slavery-related images.  
 Southerners clearly used these images to demonstrate the moral and historical 
acceptability of African bondage. Although Jefferson’s observations on human equality 
had fallen out of favor, they were anxious to associate slavery with the statesmen and 
military heroes of the Revolution. This is dramatically illustrated in a vignette used by 
South Carolina and the Confederate government that includes the only slave to appear on 
paper money who can be personally identified: Oscar Marion.30 Oscar, the personal 
servant of General Francis Marion, appears in the famous image of the Revolutionary 
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hero inviting a British officer to partake in his dinner of sweet potatoes. This seemingly 
unabashed connection of slavery with the American Revolution is quite unlike the 
sentiment South Carolinians chose to express in the 1770s. Similarly, other southern 
notes depicted images of slavery next to portraits of George Washington, James Monroe, 
Henry Clay, and even Daniel Webster. In an act of historical revisionism, the Merchants 
and Planters Bank of Savannah, Georgia went so far as to position Benjamin Franklin 
next to a scene of an overseer addressing a slave.31   
Despite the association of liberty and slavery, there was a clear incongruity in the 
use of the liberty allegory and the use of slave vignettes. For Southerners, “Lady Liberty” 
was potentially subversive. She was not merely a symbol of individual freedom—she wa  
a symbol of emancipation. When Americans think of “Lady Liberty” today, our most 
prominent mental image is undoubtedly that of the Statue of Liberty. However, this is not 
the traditional allegory. For Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
female personification of liberty was most readily identified by her “liberty cap.” This 
soft conical cap had been associated with freedom for two thousand years. When a slav  
was emancipated in ancient Rome, he went through a ceremony in which his owner 
would touch him on the shoulder with a staff and present him with the traditional 
headgear of the working citizen. This cap was known as the pileus, although most 
historians refer to it as the Phrygian cap, due to its prominence in the ancient countryof 
Phrygia in Asia Minor. Because of this ceremony, the Phrygian cap was a widely




Notwithstanding her association with manumission, southerners often failed to 
perceive the incompatibility of the liberty allegory with the institution of slavery. This is 
due in large measure to the widespread adoption of “Lady Liberty” and her Phrygian cap 
during the Revolution. Paul Revere was the first American to employ the symbol, using it 
on an obelisk he designed to commemorate the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766.33
Throughout the Revolutionary period, the liberty cap could be seen on currency, 
newspaper mastheads, and regimental flags. In an obvious reference to its emancipatory 
connotation, it figured prominently in the Genius of America Encouraging the 
Emancipation of the Blacks, the first abolitionist painting created by an American. The 
French also adopted the liberty allegory during their own revolution in the 1790s. Named 
“Marianne,” she remains an important symbol of France today. Yet the prominence of 
“Liberty” and the liberty cap in the United States can be most directly attributed to their 
use on American coins. (Although the Senate proposed using Washington’s image, the 
president thought it would smack of monarchy and convinced Congress to adopt an 
emblem representative of American freedom.) Until the early twentieth century, the 
majority of coins were struck with the image of “Liberty” wearing her cap or holding it 
aloft on a pole. Consequently, it is not at all surprising that banks chose to use similar 
images on their paper money (which, after all, was supposed to represent gold and silver 
coins). On both northern and southern banknotes, the liberty vignette was more common 
than any other image.  
Nevertheless, southerners may not have been totally ignorant of the 
incompatibility of the liberty allegory with African bondage. As secretary of war, 
Jefferson Davis adamantly opposed the use of the liberty cap on the statue of freed m 
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that Thomas Crawford was designing for the new United States Capitol dome. The 
supervising engineer of the Capitol expansion, Montgomery Meigs, told Crawford that 
Davis “does not like the cap of liberty introduced into the composition; that American 
liberty is original, and not the liberty of the freed slave.”34 Crawford therefore had little 
choice but to replace the offending cap with a helmet. Moreover, while the pervasivenes  
of the liberty allegory on southern banknotes would suggest that most southerners did not 
share Davis’s aversion to the liberty cap, there is reason to believe that they were not 
completely unaware of its incongruity with black slavery. Although there werthousands 
of banknote varieties issued in the South, in only five cases do “Liberty” and slavery 
appear together on the same note.  
Bank representatives were not explicit about their motivations for choosing 
particular images. However, their reasoning can often be inferred. Many vignettes—
cornucopias and strongboxes overflowing with coins, canals and railroads, Hermes, the 
Roman god of commerce—were intended to inspire confidence and optimism, whether 
such confidence was justified or not.35 As for the images of slaves, southern bankers may 
simply have been reflecting the world in which they and their customers lived, a world in 
which slavery had become an acceptable status for at least some human beings. 
Furthermore, while the classical attributes of “Lady Liberty” may be unfamiliar to 
Americans today (she has not appeared on circulating coins or currency since 1947), and 
while images of black laborers may be an uncomfortable reminder of white southerners’ 
devotion to the institution of slavery, their coexistence on southern paper money is a 




The Declaration and Dred Scott 
 
According to many antislavery northerners, one of the chief architects of the 
nefarious effort to qualify the Declaration of Independence was none other than the chief 
justice of the United States Supreme Court, Roger B. Taney. After two decades on the 
high court, the chief justice was old and frail, and though a Marylander, he had not 
always been a vociferous proslavery apologist, having emancipated his own bondsmen. 
In fact he had once defended the free speech rights of an abolitionist minster (using terms 
Harry Jaffa describes as Lincolnesque). However, by the 1850s he was dismayed by what 
he saw as antislavery aggression, warning his fellow southerners that “the knife of the 
assassin is at their throats.” Nor was Taney alone in this assessment. Four of his fellow 
justices were residents of slave states. According to Don Fehrenbacher, Justice Peter 
Daniel of Virginia was “a brooding proslavery fanatic,” while the others were 
“unreserved defenders of slavery.”36   
 In fairness to Taney and his colleagues, Congress had spent nearly ten years 
trying to give the Court the final say on slavery’s status in the territories. At the height of 
the controversy over the Wilmot Proviso, the Senate had passed a compromise, sponsored 
by John M. Clayton of Delaware, granting territorial tribunals authority over “questions 
of personal freedom” and allowing expedited appeal to the Supreme Court. Although 
Clayton’s bill failed in the House, its language was incorporated into the Utah and New 
Mexico Acts of 1850, prompting Senator Thomas Corwin of Ohio to remark that 
Congress had passed a lawsuit rather than a law. Nevertheless, Congress was apparently 
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comfortable with this provision, for it was copied once again into the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act.  
 As it turned out, however, the Taney Court’s opportunity to rule on this issue—
one that had confounded the nation for decades—did not emanate from the Mexican 
Cession or from Kansas. The origins of the Dr d Scott decision could be traced back 
nearly a quarter of a century and to the northern reaches of the Louisiana Purch se. In 
December 1833, Dr. John Emerson reported for duty at Fort Armstrong in Illinois, 
accompanied by his recently purchased slave, Dred Scott. Emerson expressed his 
displeasure with the decrepit accommodations at Fort Armstrong for over two years 
before he finally received a transfer to Fort Snelling in Wisconsin Territory. Shortly 
thereafter, he purchased another slave, Harriet, who soon became Scott’s wife. The Scotts 
traveled with their master to assignments in Louisiana and Missouri, but also spent time 
hired out to other officers at Fort Snelling. When Dr. Emerson took a position in Florida 
in 1840, his wife returned to St. Louis along with Dred and Harriet.     
 After the doctor’s death in 1843, Eliza Emerson became the Scotts’ legal owner.
Although Dred’s whereabouts for the next three years are unclear, the Scotts were clearly 
reunited in Missouri by the spring of 1846. That April they initiated legal action agai st 
Mrs. Emerson in the state circuit court in St. Louis, thus beginning their labyrinthine 
course through the state and federal legal systems.   
 Unfortunately for Dred and Harriet, the increasing political rancor over slavery in 
the territories was beginning to bleed into the judiciary. Scott lost his case on a 
technicality in late 1846, but in 1850 a jury reported a verdict in his favor. Mrs. Emerson 
appealed the circuit court’s ruling to the state supreme court, which, despite its earlier 
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decisions upholding the freedom of those who had lived in free territory, remanded the 
Scotts to slavery by a two-to-one decision in 1852. Speaking for the majority, Judge John 
F. Ryland conceded that the court had previously freed slaves in circumstances similar to 
those in Scott v. Emerson, but candidly noted that the changing times were undermining 
the principle of interstate comity. In the previous ten years, individuals and states had 
been “possessed with a dark and fell spirit with respect to slavery, whose gratification is 
sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable consequence must be the destruction 
and overthrow of our government.” Under these circumstances, Ryland concluded, “it 
does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the least countenance to any measure 
which might gratify this spirit.”37  
 At this point, the only recourse left to Scott was the Supreme Court of the United 
States. But the Court had recently refused to hear a similar case on appeal from 
Kentucky—Strader v. Graham—thus leaving Dred and Harriet with little hope for a 
favorable outcome. The dynamics of the Scotts’ case had changed, however, when Eliza 
remarried and transferred control over Scott and his family to her brother, John F.A. 
Sanford. Consequently, Scott’s attorney was able to file an entirely new suit against 
Sanford in federal circuit court under the diverse citizenship clause of the Constitution. 
The presiding judge (a slaveholder and former attorney general of Missouri) ruled against 
Scott in 1854, paving the way for an appeal to the Taney Court. 
 The Court was in no way obligated to pass judgment on the larger issues 
surrounding Scott’s suit, namely the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise and, 
by extension, the principle of congressional prohibition. That it ultimately chose to grasp 
the needle struck northerners as yet another example of the slave power’s machinations. 
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First the justices decided to hold the case over for reargument the following year, 
conveniently postponing it until after the presidential election. Before Buchanan’s 
inauguration, however, they voted to reaffirm the Strader precedent and uphold the 
previous rulings of the federal circuit court and the Missouri supreme court. If Taney and 
his colleagues had stuck to this course, Dred Scott would have receded into obscurity and 
the Court’s voice would not have exacerbated the national debate over slavery’s 
expansion and the scope of human liberty. Yet within a few days, the Court reversed 
itself and announced its intention to issue a comprehensive ruling. Its reasoning for doing 
so has long been the subject of debate. Given their majority, southerners were particularly 
eager for a judicial settlement. Another interpretation is that the two non-Democrats, 
Benjamin Curtis of Massachusetts and John McLean of Ohio, provoked a reaction from 
the southern majority by announcing their intention to issue detailed dissents. Not 
wanting the dissenters’ endorsement of black citizenship and the constitutionality f the 
Missouri Compromise to be the Court’s only statement, Taney agreed to write a detailed 
defense of the southern position.38   
 Taney first had to consider whether Scott, as a slave and a black man, was a 
citizen of the United States with the right to sue in federal court. Prior to the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there was no constitutional definition of 
American citizenship. Consequently, Taney turned to the nation’s seminal document, the 
Declaration of Independence, and sought to determine whom the signers included as 
citizens of the new nation. Through an examination of contemporary laws and attitudes 
regarding race, he carefully considered the historical context in which the Declaration 
was written. He came to the conclusion that neither Africans imported as slaves, nor their 
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descendants (whether free or slave), could be included under the rubric “all men.” 
According to the chief justice, Americans of the 1850s had difficulty comprehending the 
ubiquitous denigration of Africans in the colonial and revolutionary periods: “They had 
for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations.” In 
fact they had been considered so far inferior, “that they had no rights which the whie 
man was bound to respect.”39  
This was a universal axiom, Taney explained, which no one, North or South, had 
ever questioned. As evidence, he pointed to colonial and state statutes, particularly hose 
enacted in the North, that placed legal barriers between blacks and whites. Massachusetts, 
for example, passed laws in 1705 and 1786 invalidating interracial marriages and 
prescribing harsh penalties for anyone who presided over interracial weddings. (Rhode 
Island followed suit in 1822.) New Hampshire passed a law in 1815 prohibiting the 
enrollment of blacks in the state militia, which in Taney’s view was indisputable 
evidence that blacks were not considered citizens, who alone had the privilege and 
obligation to defend the state. In the end, the North had abolished slavery because of the 
absence of economic need and a determination that the institution was socially 
inconvenient. It had not been an egalitarian impulse. 
To a point, Taney was undoubtedly correct. Racism had been, and continued to 
be, widespread in the northern states. Yet it was highly disingenuous to suggest that 
blacks had never exercised the rights and privileges of citizens. As Curtis and McLean 
pointed out in their dissents, northern blacks had possessed numerous legal rights in 
1787—the right to make contracts, seek redress in court, and to hold property—and had 
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cast their votes in five states to ratify the Constitution. Taney attempted to circumvent 
these inconvenient facts through the specious (and constitutionally inaccurate) argument 
that blacks could be citizens of individual states without being citizens of the United 
States.  
Nor was Taney correct in his suggestion that blacks actually enjoyed greater 
privileges in 1857 than they had in the early days of the republic. After quoting the 
Declaration’s preamble, the chief justice opined that the words “all men are cre t d 
equal” “would seem to include the whole human family, and if they were used in a 
similar instrument at this day, would be so understood.”40 Lincoln noted that two of the 
five states that had given free blacks the right to vote—New Jersey and North Carolina—
had since restricted the franchise to whites, while New York had imposed additional 
restrictions on black voters. Meanwhile, even as states did away with property 
qualifications, no state, old or new, had extended voting rights to African Americans. 
Southern states had also passed laws making it much more difficult for masters to 
emancipate their slaves. It was therefore “grossly incorrect,” Lincoln concluded, to 
assume that public sentiment or policy was more favorable to blacks in the 1850s than it 
had been in the 1770s.41  
Nevertheless, Taney insisted that it was “too clear for dispute” that the founders 
had never intended to include Africans among those created equal in their rights to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To argue otherwise would be to charge the signers 
of the Declaration with gross hypocrisy. Like Senator Douglas, he contended that if 
Africans were included in the Declaration of Independence, the conduct of the founders 
“would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they assrted; 
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and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they 
would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.”42  
In his dissent, Justice Curtis foreshadowed Lincoln’s argument that the founders’ 
actions could not and should not be taken as a statement of their principles: “A calm 
comparison of these assertions of universal abstract truths, and of their own individual 
opinions and acts, would not leave these men under any reproach of inconsistency.” 
Although many of them had clearly expressed disapproval of the institution, neither 
Jefferson nor any of the founders could launch a frontal assault on slavery where it was 
already entrenched on both an economic and a social level. As Lincoln was quick to point
out, this had been nothing more than a concession to necessity. They had not intended to 
legitimize the institution. According to Curtis, they had been ready and anxious to bring 
the ideal of universal liberty to fruition “whenever a necessary regard to circumstances, 
which no statesman can disregard without producing more evil than good, would 
allow.”43 Therefore it would be neither just nor true to assert that they had intended to say 
that white men alone were endowed by God with natural rights. 
The effects of the Court’s decision were manifold. Taney and his colleagues 
consigned Dred Scott to slavery, although he soon secured his freedom in a bizarre twst 
of fate. As previously noted, Eliza Emerson had remarried in 1850. Her new husband, 
Calvin Chaffee, was elected to Congress from Massachusetts in 1854 as an antislvery 
Know Nothing and reelected as a Republican two years later. At what point Chaffee 
learned that his wife owned the most famous slave in America is a matter of dispute, but 
with the uproar over Taney’s ruling, the connection became a severe embarrassment both 
to the congressman and to the Republican Party. Chaffee hastened to transfer Scott to 
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Taylor Blow of St. Louis, the son of Scott’s original owner, so he could be emancipated 
under Missouri law. Sadly, Scott succumbed to tuberculosis the following year. Yet even 
though he died as a free man, it was only through the largess of his master, not by virtue 
of his extended residence in free territory, or his status as a human being.  
On a political level, the consequences of the Court’s decision were dramatic. 
Taney ruled that Scott’s residence in free territory had not emancipated him because the 
exclusion of slavery north of 36˚30΄ had been unconstitutional, a violation of the property 
rights guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. This was clearly an attempt to invalidate the 
Republican Party’s principal goal of prohibiting the expansion of slavery into the 
territories. Republicans, however, argued that the Court, having denied Scott’s citizenship 
and right to sue, had no authority to pass judgment in a case that was not properly before 
it. As David Potter explained, the obiter dictum theory was “a psychological godsend” to 
Republicans in that it allowed them to defy the Court without seeming to defy the law. 
On the other hand, Taney’s assertion that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to 
ban slavery in the territories, and could not delegate this authority to a territorial 
legislature, undermined the northern interpretation of popular sovereignty, and effectiv ly 
drove a wedge in the Democratic Party.44 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court gave its imprimatur to the 
rejection of universal liberty as a fundamental principle. The potential implications of this 
rejection sparked a heated debate between the pro-administration Washington Union and 
the New York Tribune. In response to the Tribune’s condemnation of the Court’s 
judgment, the Union’s editor demanded to know how the decision posed any conceivable 
threat to the rights or liberties of northern whites. The ribune then explained that the 
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decision constituted an outright denial of “the rights of human nature”—the ideal for 
which the founders had risked their lives to maintain. Unlike their descendants, 
southerners of 1774 had understood that an assault on the rights of others—the Coercive 
Acts—destroyed the inviolability of their own rights. Americans, North and South, had 
therefore gone to war for the universal principle expressed in the Declaration. Of course 
it was true, the Tribune admitted, that Dred Scott was black and the descendants of 
Europeans were white. It insisted, however, that the rights of man “know no distinction 
founded on this difference of origin and color.” Thus Americans could not afford to 
predicate their rights on the “fickle breath” of popular or judicial majorities. Their 
security could only rest “on the firm basis of eternal justice,” and “whatever assails or 
defies that basis renders all rights unstable, our own included.”45 In its sneering rejoinder, 
the Union congratulated the Tribune for “its full appreciation of its own color,” and 
criticized its “fanatical” theories and “general homilies upon humanity.” It also repeated 
Taney’s reasoning that the inclusion of slaves in the Declaration of Independenc  “is 
directly in the teeth of all our history.” Indeed, if slaves were included, why did Scott not 
claim his freedom by virtue of “the rights of human nature” instead of the comparatively 
limited principle of the Missouri Compromise?46  
Although, in the Union’s view, “the Tribune utterly fails to meet the case we put 
to it,” other northerners offered similar arguments. The editor of the Pittsburgh Gazette 
viewed the court’s decision as an affront to American principles that would “awaken the 
friends of freedom to renewed efforts.” The Chicago Tribune likewise warned its readers 
that the Court was “part of a grand conspiracy against freedom.” Its decision “sweep  
away all the legislation of the fathers against the extension of slavery,” and provided 
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cover for the slave power’s “efforts at despotism.” Thurlow Weed’s Albany Evening 
Journal announced that “the three hundred and forty-seven thousand five hundred and 
twenty-five Slave holders in the Republic” had succeeded in converting the Supreme 
Court “into a propagandist of human slavery.”47 Weed then appealed to “all who love 
republican institutions and who hate aristocracy” to prepare for the struggle “which 
threatens your liberty and will test your manhood.” In Milwaukee, Sherman Booth’s Free 
Democrat labeled the decision “the most important public document that has been 
published in this country since the founding of the government.” It was a “counter-
revolution” that “subverted the public liberties of the nation” by declaring freedom 
unconstitutional.48  
According to the editor of The New Englander, the consequences of the chief 
justice’s ruling could easily redound to the detriment of white Americans. By qualifying 
the Declaration, the Court “absolutely destroys the fundamental principles upon which 
our democracy is built.” If men were not entitled to liberty by virtue of their statu  s 
human beings, the rationales for oppression could be applied to anyone, white or black: 
“The Amendment which Judge Taney would make in the Declaration, that ‘all men are 
created equal,’ destroys the s lf-evidence of the truth. It is not self-evident, nay, it is not 
true, that white men, as creatures of God, are different from the rest of the race as 
creatures of God. The whole self-evidence is founded upon the common nature of man, 
and the moment the proposition is limited, so as to be applied to one only of the branches 
of the human family, it becomes an idle vaunt of the superior race, founded on no 
universal necessity, but on a mere consideration of external circumstances.” I d ed, 
without universal liberty, the vicissitudes of circumstance would place the weak entirely 
162 
 
at the mercy of the strong. If the slave power could reinterpret “all men are created equal” 
to mean “all men, but negroes, are created equal,” and if, as Taney suggested, “the 
citizens of each state” could be converted to “a portion of the citizens of each state,” there 
was nothing in the Constitution that could stand firm. “It can be made to mean anything a 
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As Americans’ devotion to the principle of universal liberty appeared to decline in 
the face of slavery’s deepening entrenchment in southern life, northerners feared the 
concomitant rise of an aristocracy in the United States. This fear was implicit in northern 
denunciations of the “slave power,” the “slaveocracy,” and the southern oligarchy, as it 
was in their comparisons of southern slavery with medieval serfdom and divine-right 
monarchy. All the arguments southerners advanced in favor of slavery had been 
advanced by previous generations in favor of hereditary privilege. They insisted that 
laborers were better off in a state of servitude, and that society benefited from the 
suppression of the poor and the contributions of the leisure class. Consequently, as some 
northerners came to believe that Americans of any race could fall victim to proslavery 
arguments, they could not help but conclude that southern masters would be the ones 
making these arguments.  
Antislavery northerners clearly worried that slaveholders, debauched by power
and luxury, would use their wealth and political influence to transform America’s 
egalitarian experiment into a European-style hierarchy. First, they had a detailed 
understanding of the constitutional provisions and political arrangements that gave 
southerners a disproportionally large share of political power in the national government. 
168 
 
Second, they believed the experience of mastery fostered a tyrannical disposition among 
slaveholders. In short, slavery taught behaviors contrary to those necessary for a viable 
republic. It effectively destroyed the republican principle of “virtue.” Furthermore, the 
degradation of the southern work ethic led to a disparity of wealth that could not sustain 
an egalitarian society. 
Fear of the slaveocracy was one of the most common themes in the antislavery 
movement. In 1853 the abolitionist William Jay estimated that there were no more than 
248,000 slaveholders in the United States. “Yet this small body of men engross the 
greater portion of the slave region, forming in fact a powerful feudal aristocracy, 
possessing nearly three millions of serfs, and governing and oppressing at pleasure the 
rest of the population.”1 In addition to the South itself, many northerners believed that the 
slaveholding minority dominated the federal government, riding roughshod over the 
people’s rights and molding national policy to serve their own interests. Slaveholders 
consistently controlled the presidency, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the 
Supreme Court. During the debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, Henry Bennett
of New York argued that southern slaveholders had more political influence “than any 
aristocracy of Europe.”2 William Lloyd Garrison likewise believed that the evils inflicted 
by the slave power “are worse than ever were inflicted by the most kingly aristocracy, or 
the most despotic tyranny.”3 And according to Moses M. Davis of Wisconsin, “the 
tyrannical Slave power has got possession of the people, and will crush out their liberties 
before many more years pass by.”4 
 Nevertheless, historians have long debated the legitimacy of the “slave-power 
conspiracy.” Writing in the early 1870s, Henry Wilson suggested that “freedom became 
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timid, hesitating, [and] yielding” after the Missouri crisis, while “slavery became bolder, 
more aggressive, and more dominating.”5 Wilson, of course, was recounting his own 
experiences as a Republican senator in the 1850s. After the publication of Chauncey 
Boucher’s influential article “In Re That Aggressive Slaveocracy” in 1921, many 
historians dismissed the slave power thesis, viewing it primarily as an example of 
paranoia in American politics. This view dominated until the publication of Russel B. 
Nye’s Fettered Freedom in 1949. Nye contended that abolitionists were genuinely 
convinced, particularly after the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, that a secret 
agreement existed among southern slaveholders “to foist slavery upon the nation, destroy 
civil liberty, extend slavery into the territories (possibly to whites), reopen the slave trade, 
control the policies of the Federal government, and complete the formation of an 
aristocracy founded upon and fostered by a slave economy.”  Yet he also doubted that 
this “conspiracy” was at all organized in the sense that Lincoln suggested when he 
condemned “Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James” for their attempt to nationalize 
slavery.6 Also taking issue with Boucher, William Gienapp argues that historians often 
underestimate the significance of the slave power argument. In his mind, it is the 
“essential key” to understanding the Republican Party, in that it united northerners’ fear 
for “white liberties,” their animosity for southern planters, and their conspirator al 
mindset.7  
Similarly, Leonard Richards has demonstrated that the slave power was a real, if 
not a well-organized, phenomenon. While Boucher was correct that southerners could be 
“hopelessly divided” politically, they still enjoyed tremendous advantages that allowed 
them to dominate the federal government from the 1780s to the 1850s. Contrary to 
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Boucher’s postulate, Richards insists that northerners had never agreed on a common 
group of conspirators. They did, however, agree on the political assets behind the slave 
power’s success. These advantages made the slave power thesis perfectly rational, in that 
they supported a powerful tendency, if not a unified conspiracy.8 
 
The Slave Power and the Federal Government 
 
Among the South’s most obvious advantages was the three-fifths compromise. 
The Constitution permitted the slave states to count three-fifths of their slave population 
toward the apportionment of congressional representation, thus enhancing their voice in 
the House of Representatives and the Electoral College. At the Constitutional 
Convention, Gouverneur Morris contended that slavery was “the most prominent feature 
in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed constitution.” He predicted that the 
equation’s application to direct taxes would be meaningless, considering that direct taxes 
would be avoided in favor of import duties (which proved to be the case). The only effect 
of the three-fifths clause would be to give southerners disproportionate representation as 
a reward for an institution that was utterly incongruous with the nation’s founding 
principle.9 Morris foreshadowed the frustrations of many when he argued that southerners 
“will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in the 
public councils.”  A mere thirteen years later, so-called “slave seats” provided Thomas 
Jefferson’s margin of victory over John Adams. Driven from power, Federalists watched 
with alarm as new slave states came into the Union, expanding the Jeffersonians’ u fair 
advantage. At the same time, Jefferson’s party was increasingly dominated by 
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southerners, driving the president’s northern followers to exasperation, particularly with 
the economically devastating foreign policy of the Virginia leadership. Much like their 
Federalist opponents, they began to echo Elbridge Gerry’s argument that southern 
“property” was no more deserving of representation than northern pigs and cattle. 
Richards contends that these frustrations help to explain the actions of James Tall adge 
and his supporters in 1819.10  
The three-fifths rule continued to be a thorn in the side of northern politicians in 
the 1850s. William Seward referred to slaveholders as “modern patriarchs” who, under 
the aegis of the three-fifths clause, had become “political patriarchs.”11  He then asked 
whether they would show “the modesty of their Jewish predecessors” and relinquish this 
unjust advantage. Lincoln, despite his fidelity to all constitutional provisions, could not 
help but note that it was “manifestly unfair” that South Carolina and Maine had equal 
representation in Congress, even though Maine was home to more than twice as many 
free whites. Here was yet another reason to stop slavery’s expansion. If it was truly a 
“sacred right of self-government” for a man to go to Kansas and “decide whether  will 
be the equal of me or the double of me,” Lincoln predicted that the day would soon arrive 
that northern liberties would only be detectable through a microscope. “They will surely
be too small for detection with the naked eye.”12 William Jay also pointed out that six 
slave states—South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi—
had an “aggregate free population of 189,791 less than Pennsylvania.” Yet the people of 
those states had six times as many senators and an additional twenty-three electoral 
votes.13    
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Second, the principle of state equality in the Senate enabled southerners to at leas 
partially counteract the burgeoning population of the North. Admittedly, this was not the 
intention of the framers. Most of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention believed 
the “Great Compromise” would be a boon to the geographically limited states of the 
Northeast. Every slave state, with the exception of Maryland, wanted representation i  
both houses to be based on population. Virginians were particularly vocal about the 
sacrifice they had made to appease states like Connecticut and Rhode Island. Only later, 
as new slave states entered the Union with comparatively small free populations, would 
the Senate become a bastion for the South. It was the Senate that scuttled the Tallmadge 
amendments and the Wilmot Proviso. Conversely, pro-southern measures like the Indian 
Removal Act, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the Lecompton Constitution faced far less
resistance in the Senate than they did in the House. Even after the South lost Senate 
parity with the admission of California in 1850, a fair number of northern senators felt 
sufficiently insulated from antislavery pressures (given their six-year terms and election 
by state legislatures) to vote with their southern colleagues.  
Indeed, northern politicians who supported southern initiatives—the so-called 
“doughfaces”—helped to turn the South’s minority status into a majority political 
position. Although the dominant parties of the antebellum years—the Jeffersonian 
Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats—were based in the South with subservient 
northern wings, the three-fifths clause and Senate parity were alone insufficient to 
maintain southern hegemony as the northern population continued to outstrip that of the 
slave states. Consequently, those northerners with southern proclivities began to play a 
central role.  
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Despite their proud opposition to all forms of legal favoritism, northern 
Democrats seemed to lie prostrate before a mere 350,000 southern slaveholders. What 
explains their support for southern measures? According to Jay, slaveholders won the 
support of their fellow southerners by identifying their private interests with the public 
welfare (meaning white supremacy). However, the ubiquity of racism in the North cannot 
explain the rise of the doughface. Many northerners opposed slavery (or at least the 
extension of it) because of their antipathy toward blacks. Instead, it appears to h ve been 
the result of political calculations. Troubled by the destructive potential of sectionalism 
displayed during the Missouri crisis, Martin Van Buren and his New York “Bucktails” 
promoted their reliability to the Virginia leadership—in contrast to Republicans like 
DeWitt Clinton and James Tallmadge. In addition to their desire for party harmony, 
northern Democrats who harbored presidential ambitions needed southern approval. 
Southern Democrats exercised great influence in the party’s national conventions, where 
a required two-thirds majority for nomination allowed them to veto any candidate not to 
their liking (which, ironically, would derail Van Buren in 1844 and Stephen Douglas in 
1860). Although southern measures like the Indian Removal Act and the gag rule were 
unpopular in the North, Van Buren and the Bucktails supported them, which undoubtedly 
helped to make the New Yorker palatable to southern Democrats in 1836. As noted in 
chapter one, Douglas’s Kansas-Nebraska Act also seemed like a craven capitulation to 
southern demands. “This indifference [popular sovereignty] was all the slavepower c uld 
ask,” declared the Leavenworth, Kansas Times. “If a house was on fire there could be but 
two parties. One in favor of putting out the fire. Another in favor of the house burning. 
But these popular sovereignty fellows would stand aloof and argue against interferig. 
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The house must take care of itself subject only to the constitution and the conditions of 
fire and wood.”14     
Because of these factors, slaveholders were able to maintain their ascendan y in 
the federal government. However, this does not mean that their vision for the nation’s 
future was undemocratic. As noted in chapter three, many southerners were devoted to a 
“natural aristocracy” of whiteness, which in their minds was the only stable basis for 
democracy. For Calhoun and others, their laudation of herrenvolk democracy was the 
natural corollary of their denouncement of universal liberty. 
 
The Psychology of Aristocracy 
  
Even paternalists like Fitzhugh and Hammond fully endorsed the principle of 
racial aristocracy. During the debates over the acceptance of abolitionist petit ons in 
1836, Hammond, then a member of the House of Representatives, examined the 
abolitionists’ comparison of southern slaveholders with European aristocrats. “Slavery 
does indeed create an aristocracy” he admitted. “I accept the terms. It is a government of 
the best.” Nevertheless, he insisted that the southern aristocracy avoided the 
disadvantages of the European variety. Slaveholding did not foster “the pride, the 
exclusiveness, the selfishness, the thirst for sway, the contempt for the rights of others, 
which distinguish the nobility of Europe.” The southern aristocracy was open to all white 
men, whether they were slaveholders or not. This neutralized class animosities, he 
explained. And in so doing it prevented the “prostitution” of the Declaration of 
Independence by “the ignorant, uneducated, semi-barbarous” masses who pursued their 
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“ultimate agrarianism” in Europe and the North.15 Using similar terms, Congressman 
Thomas F. Bowie of Maryland accused northern capitalists of being an aristocracy f 
brute strength—“the cold, heartless, selfish, cruel, and despotic power of wealth—which 
brings to its feet, as a humble supplicant, the labor of the white man.” In the North the 
poorer classes “are ground down to the earth; and the only question among them is who 
can make the other work for him, a species of white slavery that I utterly abhor.” The 
southern aristocracy, if it could be called that, was the aristocracy of nature. “It is the 
aristocracy of enlightened intelligence, of love, of kindness, of magnanimity, of hon r, of 
generosity, of valor, of independence, of hospitality, and, above all, of indomitable 
energy. And if, in the patriotism of the North, they can hate aristocracy like this, I do not 
envy them the emotion of their hearts.”16 
Jefferson, on the other hand, had argued that only a prodigy could avoid the onset 
of a tyrannical disposition after a childhood surrounded by masters and slaves. 
Northerners agreed, maintaining that slavery did in fact engender a “thirst for sway” and 
a “contempt for the rights of others.” Accustomed to wielding the lash and having their 
every command obeyed, slaveholders naturally developed an imperious, tyrannical, and 
intolerant temperament. The Ohio abolitionist John Rankin—the man William Lloyd 
Garrison called “my anti-slavery father”—argued that slavery “cultivates  spirit of 
cruelty” by causing slaveholders to “think lightly of human misery.” It fostered tyranny 
because “it is directly opposed to the fundamental principles of republicanism maintained 
in that part of the Declaration of Independence, which declares ‘that all men are cre ted 
equal.’” Given these influences, it was not surprising that slaveholders “manifested a 
propensity for the unjust acquisition of power.” And as a result, the slave states “do 
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practically maintain the fundamental principles of absolute monarchy.”17 In reaction to a 
Richmond Enquirer editorial defending the superior social character of slave society, the 
New York Times asked whether the consciousness of absolute power over others actually 
inspired the Christian virtue of brotherly love: “Unless all history is a lie, exactly the 
reverse is the effect produced.” Arbitrary power inevitably begot an arbitrary temper; and 
an unchecked dominion over others induced “a skeptical forgetfulness of higher duties 
and of high obligations.”18 The Kansas Free State likewise argued that “the servility of 
the slave naturally increases the spirit of intolerance and tyranny in the mast r, which is 
exercised not only toward the slave but towards all others.”19  
It was an axiom among the founders that republicanism required a virtuous 
citizenry—one that prized widespread independence over personal aggrandizemet. 
George Washington wrote to Lafayette that “the general government . . . can never be in 
danger of degenerating into a monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or any other 
despotic or oppressive form, so long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the 
people.”20 As John Adams famously put it, “liberty can no more exist without virtue and 
independence, than the body can live and move without a soul.” No matter how perfectly 
crafted the frame of government, liberty would not be secure if a significant portion f 
the population put its own status and the pursuit of wealth ahead of the public good.21 By 
this reasoning, a love of “luxury” was every bit as perilous as poverty. Consequently, 
having developed an imperious mindset and a sense of entitlement, slaveholders were 
rendered unfit for republican government. They violated not only the language of the 
Revolution, but also its spirit. This apprehension can be discerned at least as far back as 
the debates over the Constitution in the late 1780s. According to “Cato,” a prominent 
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New York Anti-Federalist, the new national legislature would enable southerners to 
spread their anti-republican tendencies across the entire nation. 
The people, who may compose this national legislature from the southern states, 
in which, from the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the soil, and the value 
of its productions, wealth is rapidly acquired, and where the same causes naturally 
lead to luxury, dissipation, and a passion for aristocratic distinctions; where 
slavery is encouraged, and liberty of course, less respected, and protected; who 
know not what it is to acquire property by their own toil, nor to economize with 
the savings of industry—will these men therefore be as tenacious of the liberti s 
and interests of the more northern states, where freedom, independence, industry, 
equality, and frugality, are natural to the climate and soil, as men who are your 
own citizens, legislating in your own state, under your inspection, and whose 
manners, and fortunes, bear a more equal resemblance to your own?22
  
Given the debauching influence of luxury and arbitrary command, slaveholders 
often seemed as intolerant of dissent in the political arena as they were on the plantation. 
Northerners could point to the gag rule, the annexation of Texas, the Mexican War, the 
Fugitive Slave Act, and the Kansas-Nebraska Act as evidence of southern domination. 
And when placed on the defensive, southerners would brook no criticism or opposition. 
On May 22, 1856, two days after Charles Sumner decried the slave power’s “Crime 
Against Kansas,” Congressman Preston Brooks of South Carolina approached the 
senator’s desk and thrashed him repeatedly with a cane. According to the New York 
Times, the Sumner assault provided conclusive proof that the slaveocracy would stop at 
no extremity of violence to subdue the people of the North “and force them into a tame 
subservience to its own dominion.”23 To be sure, the analogy between slaveholders’ 
behavior on the plantation and their behavior in the halls of power seemed obvious. 
When did it come to pass, asked the New York Evening Post, that northerners had to 
“speak with bated breath” in the presence of their southern masters? “Are we too slaves 
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for life, a target for their brutal blows, when we do not comport ourselves to please 
them?”24 
Northern settlers in Kansas had perhaps the most compelling reasons to ask this 
question. Those with proslavery proclivities frequently resorted to violence and 
intimidation. In one incident, a gang of “pukes” in Atchison threatened to hang the 
Reverend Pardee Butler when he refused to sign a resolution denouncing free-state men. 
After berating him for two hours before a crowd, his assailants sent him downriver on a 
raft with orders never to return. On another occasion, a group of Missourians seized an 
antislavery lawyer in Leavenworth, shaved one side of his head, tarred and feathered him, 
and drove him out of town on a rail. Many others were assaulted and condemned in 
similar fashion. Southerners, announced the Cincinnati G zette, could not tolerate free 
speech anywhere, and would soon stifle it in Washington with the bludgeon and the 
bowie-knife, “as they are now trying to stifle it in Kansas by massacre, rapine and 
murder.”25 Ohio congressman Samuel Galloway told the House that if he and his northern 
colleagues were to go to Kansas “and express the very common, and as we think very 
reasonable, sentiments that free labor was more profitable and vastly more pleasant th n 
slave labor, and that the people would be richer, happier, and holier with the benefits of 
freedom than with the blessings of slavery” they would be liable to arrest; “and, although 
perfectly free, we might in a short time have the glorious experience of the perf ction of 
our freedom within the walls of a prison—a place not usually regarded as affording the 
largest liberty.” In fact the founders themselves, along with such American lumi aries as 
Henry Clay, would suffer a similar fate were they to reappear and give voice to th ir 
original sentiments.26  
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In addition to the apparent link between slaveholding and the development of an 
imperious, intolerant demeanor, slavery also produced a psychological aversion to 
physical labor. Benjamin Franklin argued that the presence of slaves “diminished” whites 
because their children became habituated to luxury. They were “proud, disgusted with 
labor, and, being educated in idleness, are rendered unfit to get a living by industry.”27 
Slaveholding clearly violated the labor theory of value, which had dominated Anglo-
American economic theory since John Locke’s defense of private property in the Second 
Treatise. Private property, according to Locke, was sacrosanct because it derived from 
the labor of free individuals, and was thus a physical manifestation of personal liberty,
which a legitimate form of government could not take away without consent. Yet 
slaveholders, like other aristocrats, were able to live a life of leisure by expropriating the 
fruits of other people’s labor, and they could pass this unfair advantage from one 
generation to the next. As Lincoln explained, slavery rested on the same tyrannical spirit 
that says “you toil and work and earn bread, and I’ll eat it.”28 The abolitionist John Rock 
told the Massachusetts Antislavery Society that the slaveholder’s primary concern was 
not race, but the dollar, “and that he is determined to get without working for it.” 
Therefore, it only stood to reason that “he would as soon enslave white men as black 
men.” This was a key aspect of the northern critique of slave society.  
It was not just the slaveholders themselves who developed a psychological 
aversion to personal industry. Because slavery stigmatized manual labor by associating it 
with servility, any kind of work performed by slaves was automatically eschewed by 
southern whites. During the debates over Missouri statehood, James Tallmadge’s close 
friend and congressional colleague from New York, John W. Taylor, decried the “baleful 
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consequences” of slavery’s expansion. Free laborers would never settle in a region 
“where they must take rank with negro slaves,” he explained. They would “labor 
cheerfully while labor is honorable; make it disgraceful, they will despise it. You cannot 
degrade it more effectually than by establishing a system whereby it shall be performed 
principally by slaves. The business in which they are generally engagd, be it what it 
may, soon becomes debased in public estimation. It is considered low and unfit for 
freemen.” This was true regardless of their social class. Consequently, slavery made the 
poor whites of the South just as hopeless and degraded as the slaves themselves.29  
The result was a stagnant, backward society inhabited by the subjugated poor and 
a bloated aristocracy. Egalitarianism simply could not survive such an unbalanced and 
inequitable distribution of wealth.30 The southern states, according to Theodore Parker, 
had already jettisoned their “republican form of government.” And unless their influence 
was checked, the same would soon hold true for the entire nation. Henry Ward Beecher, 
among the most eloquent critics of slave labor, denounced the South’s attempt to 
introduce this type of society to the plains of Kansas. 
The men of the South, reared where labor was a disgrace, are without mechanic 
arts, without habits of industry, without organizing tendencies, without the 
creative force which builds up new societies. They come to curse the land with a 
system of husbandry which the earth detests, as well it may, for the foot of the 
slave burns the soil like fire. It is the agriculture of exhaustion. It is the husbandry 
of impoverishment. If the South inoculates the State with her leprosy, the plains 
of Kansas are fairer and richer today as a wilderness, than they ever will be again. 
For Slavery robs first the slave, and then the soil. It sucks the blood from 
everything it touches. And nothing can fatten upon it, except the cunning few that 
sit upon the middle of the web—over-swollen spiders—while the rest swing in the 
edges thereof, mere skeleton insects.31 
 
Even after the outbreak of war in 1861, northerners continued to argue that the 
South represented a reactionary force, committed to the preservation of aristocr tic 
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principles. The war was a “slaveholders’ rebellion,” launched by would-be oligarchs in 
order to halt the advance of human rights. The Atlantic Monthly observed in 1862 that 
logic naturally compelled “the Confederate oligarchs of today” to pass from a defense of 
mere African slavery to a defense of aristocracy in the abstract.32 In one of the earliest 
accounts of the conflict, written while it was still being waged, the historian John Abbott 
concluded that slavery destroyed the master’s republican virtue. Nothing but slavery 
could so corrupt the conscience as to convince a father to sell his own daughter as a 
“fancy girl” to the highest bidder. Thus the ultimate question to be decided by the war 
was “shall there be, in the United States, an aristocratic class, maintained by the 
Constitution, who are to enjoy exclusive privileges, living without labor upon the 
proceeds of the toil of others?”33  
Impoverished by the enervating psychology of slavery, and politically dominated 
by an imperious master class that qualified or denied the principle of universal liberty, 
Americans of all colors faced the possibility that the United States would become merely 
another rotation in an endless historical cycle of might makes right. According to the 
Boston abolitionist Joshua P. Blanchard, slaveholders had become “an aristocracy of the 
most oppressive and debasing nature, in which no trace is discernable of the equal rights 
of men.” He then warned northerners that this aristocracy, through its political 
machinations, was in the process of overwhelming “every principle of revolutionary 
freedom” in the free states as well.34 
As antislavery northerners united under the Republican banner in the 1850s, it 
remained to be seen whether they would stem the tide and restore the principle of the 
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Declaration. To do so, they would need to convince their fellow northerners that blacks 
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 Shortly before the inauguration of James Buchanan, Joshua R. Giddings captured 
northerners’ attention when he challenged his Democratic colleagues in the House to 
uphold the principles of the Declaration of Independence: “I ask any member of the 
Democratic party, North or South, whether that party is ready to stand by those 
principles? I pause for an answer. I hear no reply. Sir, such is the response I always get to 
my well-defined interrogatories.” Southerners unequivocally rejected universal liberty, he 
observed, while northern Democrats sat in silence. In fact, the latter wer in a most 
uncomfortable position. If they were to renounce the Declaration, they would be cast off 
by their constituents; if they sustained it, they would be repudiated by the South. “Thus 
they vibrate between heaven and hell.” Giddings then took note of Senator John Pettit’s 
characterization of the Declaration as “a self-evident lie,” and contended that the entire 
Democratic Party now sanctioned that libel, whether tacitly or explicitly.1  
 While southerners, under the banner of slavery’s beneficence, threatened 
American liberty by rejecting or qualifying the Declaration of Independence, northern 
Democrats did the same under the banner of popular sovereignty. The latter could hardly 
define slavery as anything less than legitimate, given their adoption of Douglas’s “care 
not” philosophy in respect to the institution’s future. Consequently, as Giddings 
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suggested, antislavery northerners believed that southerners and northern Democrats both 
stood guilty of maligning and distorting the founding fathers’ legacy. And they offered 
the same arguments in response to northern Democrats’ denials and qualifications of the 
Declaration as they did to southerners’ denials and qualifications. In fact Republicans and 
northern Democrats both went to great lengths to align themselves with the revolutionary 
generation. It is important, therefore, to evaluate the purposes and historical accur cy of 
their respective arguments—not only in respect to their territorial policies, but also in 
regard to the differences that underlay their mutual opposition to secession.    
 As a national policy, popular sovereignty implied a national acceptance of the 
institution of slavery whenever and wherever a local majority wanted it. Lincoln 
therefore contended that Pettit only said “what consistency and candor” required all of 
Douglas’s supporters to say.2 Indeed, Pettit was not the only northerner guilty of 
egregious apostasy. Antislavery northerners also denounced the influential Massachusetts 
senator Rufus Choate. Troubled by the sectional character of the Republican Party, 
Choate had declared for Buchanan in 1856 and, in a letter to the Whig Central Committee 
of Maine, had criticized Republicans for quoting “the glittering and sounding geeralities 
of natural right which make up the Declaration of Independence.” Many New Englanders 
expressed dismay that such a sentiment had come from one of their own. “Glittering 
generalities!” cried Ralph Waldo Emerson when he learned what Choate had written: 
“blazing ubiquities, rather!”3 Charles Francis Adams, the grandson of John Adams, 
likewise criticized Choate for undermining the ideals of the Revolution and subverting 
the people’s liberty with his “poison to freedom.”4  
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Although northern Democrats may have had no love for the institution of slavery, 
their acceptance of it logically compelled them to join the southern apologists who 
discarded the principle of universal liberty or qualified it to exclude blacks. In so doing, 
they unwittingly destroyed the self-evidence of human liberty and justified he exclusion 
of others. They sustained the host of arbitrary proslavery rationales that destroyed the 
inalienable rights of man. Shortly after Pettit’s infamous speech, the New York Evangelist 
chastised the senator for his inability to distinguish mankind’s equality of rights from 
men’s inevitable inequality of condition. “The truth is, the doctrine of equality in original 
rights is founded upon a limited, and not on universal similarity among men. All are 
MEN; all rest upon the generic and central trunk of a common humanity, a common 
nature as intellectual and moral beings, a common origin and relation as the creatures of 
God. It is not necessary to be a Senator in order to be a man; neither is it necessary to 
have a white skin, or an expanded intellect.” This universality of natural rights was 
necessary, explained the editor, given the transience of circumstance and thesubjective 
lens through which human conditions could be viewed. Strength, intelligence, wealth, 
and beauty were all fragile foundations for the enjoyment of personal freedom. “Essential 
humanity as the basis and criterion of rights, is compatible with a great variety in the 
condition of beings.” Without this foundation, “the whole doctrine of rights is a mere 
fiction. . . . Even the Senator from Indiana might justly be a freeman one moment, and a 
bondsman the next, but for that equality of right which he spurns, and whose assertion in 





Getting Right with the Founders 
 
 Republicans and northern Democrats each accused the other of misrepresenting 
the intentions of the founding fathers who signed the Declaration of Independence. 
According to Douglas, the Declaration was not a grand statement of universal fr edom. It 
merely proclaimed that Americans, having been denied their inalienable rights as British 
subjects, were justified in their repudiation of the British crown. Less than two months 
after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, Douglas attended a Fourth of July 
celebration at Philadelphia’s Independence Square. After listening to a recital of the 
Declaration, the Little Giant spoke for over an hour, defending his measure as another 
triumph in the American people’s original and continuing struggle for self-government. 
Nothing that occurred in the following years shook him from this conviction. As he told 
Senator Seward in response to the New Yorker’s defense of the Topeka Constituti  in 
1856, he would not sacrifice “the political and constitutional rights of twenty millions of 
white people for the benefit of three millions of negroes.”6 Following his return to the 
Senate in 1859, Douglas expounded on the conformity of popular sovereignty in the 
territories with the American colonies’ struggle for self-government in a lengthy 
exposition he wrote for Harper’s Magazine. With the assistance of the historian George 
Bancroft, he presented the resolutions of colonial assemblies and the First Continental 
Congress to prove that “the Declaration of Independence was founded and the battles of 
the Revolution were fought” for Americans’ exclusive right to pass legislation involving 
“all local and internal concerns, slavery included.” It was not the rights of man for which 
they fought, but rather “the inalienable right of local self-government.” Consequently, the 
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Republicans’ broad misinterpretation of the Constitutional provision giving Congress the 
right to make “all needful rules and regulations for the territories” was an logous to the 
tyranny of the British Parliament as expressed in the Declaratory Act.7 
Whether Douglas’s logic convinced many readers is open to debate. Robert 
Johannsen doubts that it did, noting that the Little Giant’s reasoning was turgid, tedious, 
and contrived, and by attempting to frame it as a historical precedent, may actu lly have 
hurt popular sovereignty’s appeal as a practical solution. Nevertheless, other northern 
Democrats offered similar historical arguments. The Democratic Partyof Pennsylvania 
resolved that popular sovereignty extended to the territories “the rule of ‘equal and exact 
justice to all men,’ of all sections of the confederacy, which was designed by the framers 
of our government, and which was defined as one of its essential principles by the 
immortal Jefferson.” The Republican insistence that their policy agreed with that of 
Jefferson was “an old fraud,” announced the Democratic Club of Syracuse, New York. 
Treating the territories as “infants” rather than self-governing communities was in 
opposition to the “doctrine of Jefferson and Jackson.”8       
Given this inclusion of black slavery in the prerogatives of a self-governing 
majority, Douglas, like Chief Justice Taney, contended that the founders had never 
dreamed of including blacks under the rubric of “all men.” They had referred only to 
“men of European birth and European descent.” This, he maintained, was amply proven 
by their actions.9 He repeatedly asked whether Jefferson could possibly have meant to 
declare that his own African bondsmen, “which he held and treated as property, were 
created his equals by divine law.” If he had, would he not stand guilty of violating God’s 
law every day of his life by holding them as slaves? Jefferson had in fact been the owner 
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of over 175 slaves when he wrote the Declaration, and he made little effort to emancipate 
them over the course of his life or upon his death. For Douglas, the answer was clear: 
Jefferson had not intended to include blacks among those men who were “created equal” 
and therefore entitled to self-government. He noted that neither Jefferson nor any other 
slaveholding delegate had emancipated his bondsmen during the Revolution. 
Furthermore, when the Declaration was signed, slavery was legal in every colon , which 
meant that every delegate represented a slaveholding constituency. “Are ou willing to 
have it said,” Douglas demanded, “that every man who signed the Declaration of 
Independence declared the negro his equal, and then was hypocrite enough to continue to 
hold him as a slave, in violation of what he believed to be the divine law?” This was 
precisely what Republicans were doing, he insisted—charging the signers of the 
Declaration with abject hypocrisy.10 
 While Douglas viewed the Declaration as an endorsement of self-government for 
those of European descent, Republicans viewed it as a palladium of individual liberty, 
regardless of race. At their first national convention, held at Philadelphia in 1856, the 
new party resolved that “the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the 
Declaration of Independence and embodied in the Federal Constitution are essential to 
the preservation of our Republican institutions.” Therefore, “with our Republican fathers 
we hold it to be a self-evident truth that all men are endowed with the inalienable right to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It had been “the primary object” of the 
national government to secure these rights to all persons “within its exclusive 
jurisdiction”—which included the District of Columbia and the territories. Only by this 
means (restricting slavery to the states where it already existed) could Americans define 
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slavery as a temporary aberration and thus maintain freedom as a national ideal.11 At a 
Republican meeting in Brooklyn, James A. Briggs (a supporter of Salmon Chase who, in 
an effort to weaken the presidential prospects of William Seward, invited Lincoln to 
speak at Cooper Union) announced that he was a Republican “because he believed that 
all men were created free and equal . . . that no man had a right to hold another man in 
bondage . . . that freedom was the natural condition of every man, of every woman, and 
every child on God’s earth.”12 Congressman James Humphrey of New York likewise 
observed that the Republican platform rested on the Declaration of Independence. He 
then predicted that America was about to face “the conflict of the century,” which ould 
decide whether the United States was to be a slave nation or a free nation.13 Humphrey’s 
colleague in the House, Anson Burlingame, struck at Douglas’s conception of the 
Declaration as a guarantee of self-government for political communities but not a 
promise of universal human liberty. “We hold that this government was not formed to 
protect the rights of States alone, but the great rights of man.”14   
In respect to the argument that the founders could not have included a race they 
held as slaves, Lincoln, as noted in chapter one, argued that Douglas’s logic amounted to 
“nothing at all.” The Declaration of Independence was not a reflection of reality or an 
edict of emancipation. Acquiescing in the existence of slavery where it wasalre dy 
entrenched had been a matter of unavoidable necessity. However, the Declaration was an 
expression of the ideal of universal liberty, and should therefore serve as a maxim and 
guide for the nation’s future. As for the argument that Jefferson’s proclamation of 
“equality” contradicted the obvious reality that some men were superior to others, i  is 
true, as Pauline Maier has suggested, that Jefferson’s language was not as clear  it 
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could have been. The phrase “all men are created equal” was not directly linked to th  
enumeration of inalienable rights—“life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”15 Yet 
despite those who would dismiss it as a ridiculous proclamation that all men were equal 
in condition, the Declaration’s defense of “equality” applied only to these natural rights. 
It applied to all (at least in theory), transcending the vagaries of condition and 
circumstance, and thus ensuring the self-evidence of each individual’s liberty. Charles 
Sumner agreed:  
The primal truth of the equality of men, as proclaimed in our Declaration of 
Independence, has been assailed, and this great charter of our country discredited. 
Sir, you and I will soon pass away, but that will continue to stand, above 
impeachment or question. The Declaration of Independence was a Declaration of 
Rights, and the language employed, though general in its character, must 
obviously be restrained within the design and sphere of a Declaration of Rights, 
involving no such absurdity as was attributed to it yesterday by the Senator from 
Indiana [John Pettit]. Sir, it is a palpable fact that men are not born equal in 
physical strength or in mental capacities, in beauty of form or health of body.
These mortal cloaks of flesh differ, as do these worldly garments. Diversity o  
inequality, in these respects, is the law of creation. But, as God is no respecter of 
persons, and as all are equal in his sight, whether Dives or Lazarus, master or 
slave, so are all equal in natural inborn rights; and pardon me if I say it is a vain 
sophism to adduce in argument against this vital axiom of Liberty the physical or 
mental inequalities by which men are characterized, or the unhappy degradation 
to which, in violation of a common brotherhood, they are doomed. To deny the 
Declaration of Independence is to rush on the bosses of the shield of the 
Almighty, which, in all respects, the supporters of this measure seem to do.16 
 
It was in this spirit that Lincoln pointedly reminded Douglas that Jefferson, though a 
slaveholder, had “used the strong language that ‘he trembled for his country when he 
remembered that God was just.’” By this reasoning, the acceptance of slavery’  
expansion and indefinite continuation, either through the indifference of popular 
sovereignty or an explicit defense of the institution, was contrary to the principles 
espoused by the founding fathers and inimical to the liberty of the American people.17 
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 For these reasons, antislavery northerners adamantly denied that their movement 
was dangerous or novel. They saw themselves as the political heirs of the founding 
fathers. Like Washington, Jefferson, and Adams, they were combatants in the eternal 
struggle between freedom and tyranny. Southerners may have echoed the revolutionary 
generation’s hostility to distant and arbitrary government, but unlike the founders, th y 
feared centralized government as a threat to slavery rather than liberty. Henry Wilson 
offered a litany of quotations to prove that the framers of the American government 
considered slavery to be incompatible with the legacy of the Revolution. Washington 
“wished as much as any man living to see slavery abolished by legislative au hority.” 
Franklin regarded slavery as “an atrocious debasement of human nature.” Madison, the 
father of the Constitution, pronounced slavery “a dreadful calamity,” and he “thought it 
wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in man.” 
Gouverneur Morris, who edited the final document, denounced slavery as “a nefarious 
institution.” Luther Martin believed that “God was Lord of all, viewing with equal eye 
the poor African slave and his American master;” and he would “authorize the General 
Government to make such regulations as should be most advantageous for the gradual 
abolition of slavery and the emancipation of the slaves which were already in the States.” 
George Mason declared that slavery produced “the most pernicious effects on manners;” 
that “every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant;” and that “it brought the curs  of 
Heaven on a country.”18  
Notwithstanding their differences on immediatism, both abolitionists and 
Republicans embraced the argument that antislavery constituted a renewal of the 
founders’ policy. As early as 1845, Salmon Chase had insisted that the new Liberty Party 
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was actually “the Liberty party of 1776 revived.” Indeed, it was the same party th t had 
struggled throughout history against “the party of false conservatism and slavery.”19 
Fifteen years later, James Doolittle proudly exclaimed that the Republican Party “stands 
today upon precisely the principles of the old Republican party of Thomas Jefferson,” 
The New York Tribune pointedly noted that “the doctrines of Jefferson” had found their 
natural home in the Republican Party. And according to the abolitionist Henry Highland 
Garnett, the endorsement of equal rights in the Declaration of Independence “would lead 
the framers of it, were they now living, to fight in our cause.”20  
Not surprisingly, Republicans and northern Democrats were somewhat selective 
in their use of the founders’ legacy. Douglas pointed to the Ordinance of 1784, which he 
deemed the “Jeffersonian Plan” for the territories, as a philosophical prototye f r the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act (in that the ordinance granted settlers full control over their own 
internal policies). Yet he quickly brushed aside Jefferson’s proposal that all new 
territories, North and South, should be closed to slavery after 1800, a proposal that, much 
to Jefferson’s regret, had fallen one vote short of passage. Republicans, on the other hand, 
repeatedly pointed to the Northwest Ordinance, which had prohibited slavery in all the 
territory the national government had controlled in 1787 (a point Douglas conspicuously 
ignored in his Harper’s article). In addition to Douglas’s frequent reminder that the 
founders had made no effort to eliminate slavery, or even to emancipate their own slaves, 
when they signed the Declaration of Independence, other Democrats were quick to note 
that it was Jefferson who had acquired Louisiana, and had signed the measure allowing
slavery in the new territory. Furthermore, it was the same Thomas Jefferson who had 
lamented the creation of an artificial dividing line between free and slave territory—the 
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very line that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had abolished. It therefore stood to reason that 





Douglas may have been on firmer historical ground than Lincoln realized or cared 
to admit. As Philip Detweiler pointed out almost fifty years ago, and as Pauline Maier has 
noted more recently, the founders spent surprisingly little time debating what the 
Declaration’s preamble actually meant. “Attention centered upon the conclusion—the 
announcement of independence.” In one of the first histories of the Revolution, David 
Ramsay wrote in 1789 that the Declaration was essentially “the act of the unied colonies 
for separating themselves from the government of Great-Britain”—a point of view that, 
according to Detweiler, prevailed in most of the histories and textbooks produced in 
Jefferson’s lifetime. Consequently, the modern historian who would assert that the phrase 
“all men” was understood by the delegates to the Continental Congress to include African
slaves “has a fragile foundation on which to build.”22  
In fact, the Declaration as a whole received relatively little attention in the fifteen 
years after its promulgation. Because Jefferson was known to be an excellent writ r—and 
a miserable debater—Congress gave him the task of composing a document that many 
saw as little more than an ornamental formality. Although it was significant enough to 
shift Independence Day from July 2 (when Congress approved Richard Henry Lee’s 
resolution dissolving the colonies’ political ties with Britain) to July 4, it would seem that 
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the Declaration itself was quickly forgotten after it had served its purpose. Early Fourth 
of July orations rarely invoked it. Its wording was not incorporated into any state 
constitution prior to that of Wisconsin in 1848. The delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention largely ignored it, as did the authors of The Federalist Papers. Nor did the 
Antifederalists appeal to the Declaration in their protests against the Constitution.23 
The Declaration soon gained new life, however, with the development of party 
politics in the 1790s. Prior to this time, it was not widely known that Jefferson was the 
principal author. Most Americans thought of it as the work of the entire Congress (not 
unfairly, considering the revisions to Jefferson’s original draft). But as Jefferson became 
the leader of the Republican opposition, the Declaration became an indelible part of his 
legacy, both in the eyes of his supporters and his critics. The former lauded Jefferson’s 
words as the seminal expression of the nation’s political philosophy. In terms amenable 
to Lincoln’s interpretation, Republican newspapers suggested that the Declaration should 
be celebrated not only “as affecting the separation of one country from the jurisdiction of 
another; but as being the result of a rational discussion and definition of the rights of 
man, and the end of civil government.”24 Federalists, on the other hand, denounced 
Jefferson as a revolutionary pro-French demagogue and a howling atheist. And they 
dismissed the Declaration as a fanatical anti-British screed. As Simon P. Newman has 
demonstrated, Federalists often celebrated Washington’s birthday in lieu of the Fourth of 
July. Others attempted to downplay Jefferson’s importance. When John Marshall 
recounted the drafting of the Declaration in his Life of George Washington, he consigned 
Jefferson (then the sitting president) to a footnote.25 Furthermore, given the obvious 
influence of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Jefferson’s ideas and phrasing, some 
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Federalists hinted that the Sage of Monticello was little more than a plagiarist and 
suggested that it was Locke who truly deserved credit for the Declaration of 
Independence.    
But once Republicans gained the political ascendancy with Jefferson’s accesion 
to the White House in 1801, they were in a position to write the Declaration’s legacy on 
their own terms. In her influential History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the 
American Revolution, Mercy Otis Warren lavished praise on this “celebrated paper,” 
which had “done so much honor . . . to the genius and heart of the gentleman who drew 
it.” She believed the Declaration should be “read by the rising youth of the American 
states, as a palladium of which they should never lose sight.” Its principles wer  
“grounded on the natural equality of man, their right of adopting their own modes of 
government, the dignity of the people, and that sovereignty which cannot be ceded either 
to representatives or to kings.” Perhaps not surprisingly, Jefferson was well pleased with 
this “truthful account,” and promptly ordered copies for himself and his entire cabinet.26 
This was the legacy of the Declaration that gained widespread acceptance after 
the Treaty of Ghent. According to Maier, it was the second generation of Americans who, 
finding themselves somehow lacking in comparison to their fathers, lifted the Declaration 
up to the status of “American scripture.” As part of this effort, Congress commissioned 
the artist John Trumbull to paint a grand (and ultimately ahistorical) tableau of the 
signing ceremony, which was later exhibited in several eastern cities before its final 
installation in the Capitol rotunda. Publishers also catered to the public’s interest with 
biographies of the signers, of whom only four were still alive in 1820: William Floyd, 
Charles Carroll, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. In its appraisal of one such work, 
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the North American Review heaped encomiums on both the book and its subject: “The 
declaration of Independence—a national monument, not more lasting than brass, but as 
durable in its effects and associations, as the republic itself and the name of freed m—
still deserves every illustration, which documents, tradition, or the arts can afford.”27  
The Declaration also assumed a special place because, in the end, it was the only 
national document that proclaimed the inalienable rights of man, making it a much 
sought-after ally to those battling injustice. It was this legacy that Lincoln and the new 




Lincoln was correct when he observed that some southerners had denied the truth 
of the Declaration “for a period of years” prior to Pettit’s “shameful” pronouncement that 
it was “a self-evident lie.” But he was wrong to accuse Douglas and Taney of b ing the 
first to assail it “in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did 
not include the Negro.” Indeed, Douglas missed an opportunity to severely embarrass his 
opponent after Lincoln announced that it would be “a matter of great astonishment to me” 
if it could be shown that a single American had ever attempted to exclude blacks from the 
Declaration prior to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.28 
In fact the congressional debates of 1819-1820 included arguments quite similar 
to those made by Democrats and Republicans over three decades later. James Tallmadge 
based his amendment to the Missouri enabling bill on the Declaration of Independence. 
In terms similar to Lincoln’s, he warned his colleagues that “the eyes of Eurpe” were 
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upon them: “You boast of the freedom of your Constitution and your laws; you have 
proclaimed, in the Declaration of Independence, ‘That all men are created equal; that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that amongst these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and yet you have slaves in your country.”29 Two 
days later, Timothy Fuller of Massachusetts argued that the acceptance of slavery in the 
South had been a necessary exception to the “republican principle.” Any attempt to 
extend slavery past its present limits would therefore violate the clause in the 
Constitution that guaranteed a republican form of government to the states. And in his 
view, it was the Declaration that provided “a definition of the basis of republican 
government.”30 By this logic, the founders had effectively quarantined slavery as a 
temporary evil, allowing the Declaration to remain as the foundation of American 
society. An antislavery memorial from Connecticut also conceded that the principle of 
the Declaration had been “waived” in regard to those states where slavery already 
existed. “But this was done in the spirit of compromise,” it reminded Congress. “The 
original principle which was avowed in the Declaration of Independence revives, in all its 
primitive force, with reference to any new States which may be admitted into the 
Union.”31  
In response to this reasoning, some southerners began to dismiss the Declaration’s 
impact on American life. Senator William Pinkney of Maryland presaged Senator Pettit’s 
interpretation when he observed that “the self-evident truths announced in the 
Declaration of Independence are not truths at all, if taken literally.”32 John Randolph 
expressed the same sentiment as he looked back upon the Missouri controversy in 1826. 
Invoking the Declaration was dangerous business, he argued. Taken to its logical 
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extreme, it meant that “all men are born free and equal.” This he could not abide, “for the 
best of all reasons, because it is not true.” In his mind, the Declaration was merely a 
“fanfaronade of abstractions.”33  
Unbeknownst to Lincoln, southerners had also attempted to exclude blacks from 
the term “all men.” Don Fehrenbacher goes so far as to argue that, after 1820, the vast 
majority of Americans subscribed to the southern interpretation that the Declaration of 
Independence did not proclaim universal human rights, “but rather applied to whites 
alone.” In the course of the debates over Missouri’s admission, Senator James Barbour of 
Virginia, exasperated by northern invocations of the Declaration, demanded: “What has 
that to do with this question? Who were the parties—the slaves? . . . Did it enter into any 
human mind that it had the least reference to this species of population?”34 Other 
southerners presaged Douglas’s argument that the Declaration was a guarantee of self-
government for whites only, with black slavery as a legitimate subject of majrity rule. 
Congressman Louis McLane of Delaware announced his concurrence with the 
Declaration’s principles, but denied that Africans were included: “The Revolution found 
them in a state of servitude, the acknowledgment of our actual independence left th m so, 
and the Constitution of the United States perpetuated their condition.” He maintained that 
the principle of “equality” should be extended to the white citizens of Missouri, thus 
granting them the right to choose their own institutions as they saw fit.35 In he same vein, 
Congressman John Tyler of Virginia, later the tenth president of the United States, 
expressed his love for the principle of equality “as an abstract truth,” but did not believe 
it could be applied in extenso. Therefore, since Congress could not raise the black man to 
the same level as the white (constitutionally or otherwise), it should at least guarantee the 
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political equality of white Americans. “Extend an equality to the people of Missouri,” he 
implored. “Place them upon a footing with the people of New York, Connecticut, and of 
the other states.” This “equality” did not pertain to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, but rather to the people’s right “to alter, to amend, [or] to abolish their 
constitutions.”36 A future vice president, Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, 
agreed. The Declaration was “the foundation of all civil rights, and the palladium of our
liberties,” he averred, yet like Tyler, he interpreted these rights and liberties as the 
foundation of self-government for whites alone. To him the Declaration’s overriding 
principle was that “all communities stand upon an equality.”37 This was precisely 




Yet while the Republican interpretation of the Declaration may not have been 
dominant for as long as Lincoln suggested, and while Douglas’s analysis did in fact 
antecede the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it was not disingenuous to contend that Douglas’s 
measure constituted a dangerous turning point. The principle of popular sovereignty, as 
applied to black slavery, was an ipso facto qualification of the principle of universal 
liberty. And Douglas presented Kansas-Nebraska as the new national policy for 
addressing slavery’s expansion.  
Accordingly, Lincoln and other Republicans pilloried Douglas as a traitor to 
Jeffersonian principles. “I understand you are preparing to celebrate the ‘Fourth,’” 
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Lincoln told a Springfield audience in 1857. “What for? The doings of that day had no 
reference to the present.” 
But I suppose you will celebrate, and will even go as far as to read the 
Declaration. Suppose, after you read it once in the old-fashioned way, you read it 
once more with Judge Douglas’s version. It will then run thus: “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all British subjects who were on this continent 
eighty-one years ago, were created equal to all British subjects born and then 
residing in Great Britain.”  
And now I appeal to all—to Democrats as well as others—are you really willing 
that the Declaration shall thus be frittered away?—thus left no more, at most than 
an interesting memorial of the dead past?—thus shorn of its vitality and practical 
value, and left without the germ or even the suggestion of the individual rights of 
man in it?38  
 
Less than a month after Douglas’s nomination for president by the northern wing of his 
party, a Wisconsin editor likewise presented this “new Declaration of Independence” as a 
limited and ultimately capricious guarantee of individual freedom. “We hold these truths 
to be self-evident: that the European race on this continent, and their descendants, and 
emigrants who shall come here, are created equal . . . We hold this truth to be equally 
self-evident: that negroes, the Chinese, the Indians, the Japanese, and all other inferior 
races, should have every right, every privilege, every immunity, consistent wi h the safety 
and welfare of the State; and each State and Territory must decide for itself as to the 
nature and extent of those rights, privileges and immunities.”39 
In a rousing speech later that summer, Senator Carl Schurz contrasted the 
Jeffersonian view of the Declaration as a great manifesto of human libertywith 
Douglas’s less-inspired analysis. In the latter, the Declaration was nothing more than a 
“diplomatic dodge” intended to secure foreign support by inveigling “noble-hearted 
fools” with disingenuous protestations of Americans’ devotion to human freedom. Schurz 
therefore argued that it was Douglas, not the Republicans, who had maligned the 
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founders as “a batch of artful pettifoggers,” “accomplished humbuggers,” and 
slaveholding hypocrites who had said one thing and meant another. “There is your great 
American Revolution,” he exclaimed, “no longer the great champion of universal 
principles, but a mean Yankee trick.”  He then suggested that if the authors of the 
Declaration could rise from their graves they would surely have some choice words for 
the Little Giant. Jefferson, “his lips curled with the smile of contempt,” would be heard to 
say “Sir, you may abuse us as much as you please, but have the goodness to spare us with 
your vindications of our character and motives.” In the end, Schurz assured his audience 
that the progressive ideas of the Declaration would prevail. Because only those with a 
dull or disordered mind could fail to understand its principles, it was in vain “for 
demagogism to raise its short arms against the truth of history.”40 
 
A People’s Contest 
 
 The belief that individual liberty depended on universal liberty persisted through 
the 1860 presidential campaign and its aftermath. A particularly dramatic incident took 
place in May at the Republican national convention in Chicago. Although Don 
Fehrenbacher and Eric Foner have disputed the view that the new party platform was 
substantively less radical than the 1856 version (the declaration that slavery could not 
constitutionally exist in any territory remained in place), the delegates did attempt to 
soften their condemnation of slavery in order to appeal to moderate northerners, 
particularly in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois. They dropped the reference to slavery 
and polygamy as “twin relics of barbarism,” denounced John Brown’s raid on Harpers 
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Ferry as “the gravest of crimes,” and affirmed “the right of each state to order and control 
its own domestic institutions.”41 The platform committee also eliminated the party’s 1856 
endorsement of the Declaration of Independence. Incensed by what he perceived as a 
craven surrender of principles, Joshua R. Giddings blamed Horace Greeley for this “low 
insidious effort” to muffle the party’s invocation of the rights of man. He promptly 
introduced an amendment stating “that the maintenance of the principle promulgated in 
the Declaration of Independence . . . is essential to the preservation of our republican 
institutions.” The amendment was rejected, whereupon Giddings moved to exit the hall in 
a show of opposition. “It seemed to me,” said George William Curtis, “that the spirits of 
all the martyrs to freedom were marching out of the convention behind the venerable 
form of that indignant and outraged old man.” Curtis then rose to renew Giddings’ 
motion, which provoked an enthusiastic response from the convention. According to a 
witness who recounted the scene in the Boston Herald twenty years later, Curtis “spoke 
as with a tongue of fire in [the Declaration’s] support, daring the representativ s of the 
party of freedom, meeting on the borders of the free prairies in a hall dedicated to th  
advancement of liberty, to reject the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence 
affirming the equality and defining the rights of man.” His speech “fell like a spark upon 
tinder,” and the convention adopted the amendment with deafening shouts of approval.42  
 Following Lincoln’s election, northerners were quick to note the absurdity of 
southern secession as a “revolution” in the defense of human bondage. Yet many 
southerners did in fact couch their arguments in the language of 1776. “The tea has been 
thrown overboard,” proclaimed the Charleston Mercury. “The revolution of 1860 has 
been initiated.”43 The New Orleans Picayune observed that the Confederacy was “acting 
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over again the history of the American Revolution of 1776.”44 In his inaugural address, 
Jefferson Davis announced that the South had “merely asserted the right which the 
Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 defined to be ‘inalienable.’”45 Indeed, 
according to South Carolina’s “Declaration of the Causes of Secession,” the colonies had 
struggled for the “right of self-government,” as expressed in the proclamation that the 
colonies “are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states.” Not coincidently, the 
new declaration concluded with the announcement that South Carolina was “a separate 
and independent State.”46  
Northerners responded to these arguments with adamant denials that the indefinite 
preservation of slavery was a cause analogous to that of the American Revolution. 
Leaders from across the antislavery spectrum—from Wendell Phillips to Abraham 
Lincoln—conceded that the right of revolution was undeniable when minority rights were 
consistently violated. But this was surely not the case for the South. In fact the principal 
aim of the new Confederacy directly violated the purpose of legitimate government—the 
preservation of life, liberty, and property. (Once again, northerners and southerners 
disagreed as to whether slavery was a form of property or a denial of liberty.) To 
highlight this point, northerners compared the goals of the founding fathers to the 
secessionists’ aims. “Mr. Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence was made in the 
interest of natural rights against Established Institutions,” observed the New York 
Tribune, while “Mr. Jeff. Davis’s caricature thereof is made in the interest of an unjust, 
outgrown, decaying Institution against the apprehended encroachments of Natural Human 
Rights.”47 Despite his self-proclaimed paralysis, even President Buchanan noted that 
southerners had no justification for revolution, which could only be invoked against 
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intolerable oppression. William Lloyd Garrison went even farther, arguing that the South 
was going to war for “the subversion of the Declaration of Independence.” “We appear to 
be on the eve of the oddest revolution history has yet seen,” announced the National Anti-
Slavery Standard. It was a revolution “for the greater security of injustice, and the firmer 
establishment of tyranny.” And while it had been disingenuously launched as a defense of 
popular liberty, it was a strictly reactionary movement, “such as has more than once set 
up again a throne that had been toppled down, and brought back a discarded monarch.” 
Thus the new Confederacy would be “one of the most horrible despotisms that ever 
blackened the earth, for the white man as well as the black.”48 
But while Republicans and northern Democrats both denounced secession, their 
motivations reflected their divergent views on the nature of America’s experiment in 
popular government. Douglas continued to condemn Republicans for their racial 
fanaticism and political inflexibility, yet he would ultimately sustain them in their 
opposition to disunion. Alan Guelzo has recently observed that Douglas and his 
supporters “knew no law but the vox populi”—a law that secession put at risk.49 When a 
political party comes to power through a fair democratic process, the minority, no matter 
how disaffected, is obliged to acquiesce. If it does not, popular government becomes an 
untenable proposition. As Locke had explained in the Second Treatise, “if the consent of 
the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole, and conclude every 
individual, nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act 
of the whole. But such a consent is next impossible ever to be had.” Consequently, when 
individuals refused to submit to the determination of the majority, government would 
“signify nothing,” and men would then return to the state of nature.50 Lincoln made 
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precisely the same argument when he noted in his first inaugural address that 
secessionists necessarily flew to anarchy or despotism. In short, secession would prove to 
the world that the American experiment in popular government had been a failure, and 
that democracy simply did not work.  
Yet Republicans, unlike northern Democrats, defended the American union as the 
exemplar of majority rule circumscribed by the universal rights of man. Despite 
Douglas’s constant appeals to self-government, popular sovereignty violated that 
principle by tolerating the indefinite continuation of human slavery. “When the whit 
man governs himself, that is self-government,” Lincoln explained, “but when he governs 
himself and also governs another man, that is more than self-government—that is 
despotism.” Therefore, as he would later observe in the Gettysburg Address, the founding 
fathers had not only created a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people, but one “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”51 
The fate of the Declaration of Independence was clearly on Lincoln’s mind as he 
made his way by train from Springfield to Washington in February 1861. After an 
exhausting journey, and a seemingly endless succession of expectant crowds, the 
president-elect found renewed inspiration as he traveled through the scenes of America’s 
revolution. Speaking at the New Jersey state assembly in Trenton, he recounted his 
boyhood fascination with the “struggles for the liberties of the country” and, in particul , 
Washington’s victory against the Hessians in the winter of 1776. “I recollect thinking 
then, boy even though I was, that there must have been something more than common 
that those men struggled for.” That something was not national independence alone, he 
maintained, but rather an “original idea” that “held out a great promise” to all mankind. 
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He then expressed the hope that he could serve as a “humble instrument” in the current 
struggle to maintain that principle and perpetuate the liberties of the American people.52  
On February 22, Washington’s birthday, Lincoln woke up at Philadelphia’s 
Continental House and prepared for his first visit to Independence Hall. The troubled 
state of the country had been dramatically confirmed the night before when Frederick 
Seward, the son of the incoming secretary of state, had arrived with a letter from his 
father and General Scott. The letter corroborated the private detective Alan Pinkerton’s 
discovery that southern sympathizers in Baltimore had hatched a well-organized plot to 
kill the president-elect as he traveled by carriage through the city. Despite the heightened 
alarm, Lincoln refused to forgo his scheduled engagements. Standing before city fficials 
in the hallowed hall where the Continental Congress had declared America’s 
independence, he expressed his “deep emotion” and determination to maintain the 
foundation of American liberty. He noted that “all the political sentiments I entertain 
have been drawn, so far as I have been able to draw them, from the sentiments which 
originated in and were given to the world from this hall. I have never had a feeling, 
politically, that did not spring from the sentiments embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence.” As he had done at Trenton, Lincoln then pondered the dangers faced by 
the Congress and the Continental Army and asked what “great principle or idea” ha held 
the country together for so long. “It was not the mere matter of separation of the clonies 
from the motherland,” as Douglas had argued, “but that sentiment in the Declaration of 
Independence which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all 
the world, for all future time.” It was a promise “that in due time the weights would be 
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lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance. This is the 
sentiment embodied in the Declaration of Independence.”53 
“Now, my friends,” he asked in conclusion, “can this country be saved on that 
basis? If it can, I will consider myself one of the happiest men in the world if I can help 
to save it. If it cannot be saved upon that principle, it will be truly awful. But if this 
country cannot be saved without giving up that principle. . . .” He paused. “I was about to 
say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than surrender it.”54 
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In the century and a half since Lincoln stood in Independence Hall, Americans 
have struggled to comprehend the reasons why the United States careened into fratricidal 
conflict. It is obvious to most that slavery, as Lincoln stated, was “somehow” te cause of 
the war. One can easily discern slavery’s integral role in southern life as both an 
economic and a social institution. However, northern hostility to the institution has 
proven much more difficult to explain. Historians have offered numerous interpretations 
in an effort to answer a seemingly straightforward question: What direct rel vance did 
southern slavery have for most northerners? The result has been fruitful, but not entirely 
satisfying.  
These interpretive frustrations may explain the appeal of the ethnocultural 
analysis. Unlike slavery, foreign immigration was an immediate and understandably 
visceral experience for many northerners. Given the massive influx of Catholic 
immigrants (and the consequent expansion of the Democratic Party), northern Whigs 
were primed for revolt even before the spring of 1854. Yet while the collapse of the 
Second Party System may help to explain the nation’s inability to contain sectional 
animosities, it does not explain the existence of northern animosity. Those historians, 
perhaps most notably Michael Holt and William Gienapp, who stress the impact of 
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ethnocultural hostility and the decline of traditional economic issues have highlig ted 
important catalysts but not the fundamental causes of the Civil War.1  
Likewise, political partisanship may have exacerbated the conflict, but can hardly
be said to have created it. The revisionists of the 1930s and 1940s, led by Avery Craven 
and James G. Randall, argued that better statesmanship might well have averted the war.2 
By this logic, the conflict was not the result of fundamental or structural problems in 
American society. Yet as John Ashworth has recently noted, it makes at least as much 
sense to argue that the conflict over slavery produced the failure of statesmanship as it 
does to contend that the failure of statesmanship produced the conflict over slavery. And 
as tempting as it may be, one cannot assume that the vast majority of American 
politicians were wholly irrational or self-aggrandizing. Lincoln, for example, insisted that 
he would be content never holding political office, if only Americans would once again 
place slavery on the course to ultimate extinction. Nor can moral fervor sufficiently 
account for the antislavery movement. Sympathy for the slaves and religious conviction 
may have been driving impetuses for some northerners, but not enough to significantly 
influence the North as a whole.3  
Northerners’ economic opposition to southern bondage was undoubtedly a salient 
facet of antislavery, considering the institution’s threat to free labor. Forty years after its 
publication, Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men remains one of the most 
influential single volumes on antebellum politics, in part because its emphasis on 
slavery’s threat to the North’s economic and social values provides us with a structural 
explanation of antislavery, not just an explanation of its timing or intensity.4  
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Still, in the end, historians need to accept that the sum of antislavery was greater
than any of its constituent features. As I have indicated, I believe northerners also viewed 
slavery as a threat to the philosophical structure of free society. This threat was 
inextricably linked to their economic opposition to slavery and to their fear of the slave 
power. Any American, of any race or ethnic background, could fall victim to the 
argument that they were “inferior,” that they would be better off in a state of subjugation, 
that society would be better off if they were enslaved, or that history and religion justified 
their enslavement. In short, all the arguments Americans used to justify the exclusion of 
blacks from the rights of man destroyed the self-evidence of those rights. 
William H. Herndon warned that the dismissal of the Declaration of 
Independence, and the concomitant argument that it was “right to enslave all men, black 
and white,” would destroy the main pillar of American liberty and set the nation on a path 
toward despotism.5 Precisely what that “despotism” would have meant for white 
Americans is difficult to say, however. Most antislavery writers and politicians were 
inexplicit, allowing northerners to form their own conclusions. Considering that 
Americans had long believed that economic monopolies and unchecked political power 
were inimical to republican government, it may have been sufficient simply to point out 
that slaveholders denied the universal rights of man, destroyed the dignity of labor, and 
dominated the national government. As Lincoln suggested in his tribute to Jefferson, such 
an arrangement would inevitably lead to an aristocracy, in which government existed for 
the good of the few and a rigid social hierarchy crushed the free laborer’s dream of 
personal advancement.     
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 Given the arbitrary nature of proslavery rationales, and the consequent possibility 
they could be employed against any vulnerable group, one might assume that 
complacency and indifference toward slavery would be the greatest possible folly. If
freedom was truly a failure, as southerners insisted, and slavery was a blessing to those 
who were weak or “inferior,” it only stood to reason that, as a matter of principle, it 
should be extended to the weak and inferior members of all races. Surrendering to 
southern demands in Kansas and the West would legitimize and perpetuate these 
rationales, and would therefore destroy the security of freedom’s future. Thus norther e s 
could ill afford to ignore the designs of the slaveocracy. Southern arguments were not 
only “dangerous to you and me,” Herndon insisted, but “to the whole race of men.” 
Northerners, in their “ease and comfort and fancied security,” may have believed th r  
was no danger that these infamous opinions would ever be popular; that there was no 
danger they would ever be enforced. To this Herndon simply replied “THERE IS 
DANGER,” especially when southerners found such malleable instruments (norther  
Democrats) in the free states.6  
Abraham Lincoln, Herndon’s law partner, clearly agreed, as did many 
abolitionists and northern politicians. Whether or not political speeches and newspaper 
editorials can reveal the actual depth of these antislavery arguments in the northern 
consciousness is certainly open to debate. But these are by far the most informative 
sources we have, and if the repetition of an argument by numerous individuals can be 
taken as evidence of its prominence, the antislavery positions examined in this study had 
a significant impact on the northern psyche. Consequently, the fear that black slavery 
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posed a threat to white liberty cannot be dismissed as a mere conspiracy theory held by a 
paranoid minority.  
This threat to American liberty grew dramatically with the passage of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. Even if natural forces would have prevented the extension of slavery into 
new territories, the national indifference undergirding popular sovereignty (which 
Douglas explicitly expressed) undermined universal liberty as a national ideal. Only by 
prohibiting the institution’s growth could Americans define it as a wrong, thereby 
signifying their belief that slavery was merely a temporary anomaly in a nation still 
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. The promotion, or even the 
toleration, of slavery’s expansion and indefinite continuation effectively validated the 
host of proslavery rationales. Consequently, Lincoln had always included Douglas and 
his supporters among those who failed to see the danger of slavery and therefore fail d to
treat it as a wrong.  
As the new president delivered his inaugural address, Douglas sat in the 
background, holding Lincoln’s hat and expressing approval as Lincoln condemned 
secession as a fatal violation of the democratic process. One can only speculate on what 
Douglas may have thought as the president gave his views on the conflict’s origins. 
Lincoln argued that the national crisis emanated from the inability to reconcile the 
South’s belief that slavery was right and ought to be extended with the North’s belief that 
slavery was wrong and ought to be restricted. One of the key motivations behind the 
Republican Party’s effort to halt slavery’s expansion had been the desire of antislavery 
northerners to signify national disapproval of the institution. Indeed, the moral and 
philosophical implications of the Republican platform were not lost on southerners. 
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According to the Richmond Enquirer, accepting the confinement of slavery to the states 
where it already existed would be “pregnant with the admission that slavery is w ong, 
and but for the constitution should be abolished.”7 It would be tantamount to an 
admission that human beings should not be reduced to bondage, regardless of their 
perceived “inferiority,” their “fitness for liberty,” the alleged threat they posed to society, 
or the historical examples of servitude. Unlike southerners and northern Democrats, 
antislavery northerners understood that these rationales were too arbitrary to be confin d 
to men and women of African descent. The preservation of American freedom would 
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